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Abstract
When the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Roper v. Simmons, a longstanding debate about
comparative analysis in constitutional cases came to national prominence. In Roper the Court relied in part on
comparative precedent in ruling that the execution of juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment's
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. This look beyond our borders earned the Supreme Court
both accolades and scathing criticism. This article comprehensively evaluates the place of comparative analysis
in our constitutional jurisprudence. It discusses and adds to the arguments in support of comparative
constitutional advocacy offered by several leading scholars, and responds to arguments against the practice,
including many that figured in the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice
Samuel Alito.
The article identifies several catalysts that have driven comparative constitutionalism to the fore, including the
exponential growth of foreign constitutional precedent, the similarity of constitutional issues worldwide,
shared analytic methods among jurists, and increased availability of foreign materials. Also supporting the
appropriateness of comparative analysis are increasing globalization, international judicial interaction,
constitutional convergence, and the growing sophistication of foreign constitutional courts. Countering these
factors are the U.S. Supreme Court's tradition of separateness, a longstanding view of our own constitutional
uniqueness, America's head start in constitutionalism, and the persistence of insularity and exceptionalism in
American legal education.
Comparative analysis is only worthwhile if it confers unique benefits not available from domestic law that
justify the added challenges of identifying and contextualizing foreign constitutional law. On the benefits side
of this formula are satisfaction of constitutional curiosity, shared institutional responsibility among jurists, and
increased opportunities for constitutional dialogue. Further, by looking to decisions of foreign courts, U.S.
jurists can identify rules that work elsewhere and consider their application here, as well as reject rules that
have either proven detrimental elsewhere or clearly would do so here. Considering the opinions of foreign
courts also exposes U.S. jurists to ideas uninfluenced by American political landscape, gives jurists the
opportunity to return to first principles, and allows them opportunities for judicial cross-fertilization.
The article evaluates and rejects claims against comparative constitutional analysis that stem from
conceptualization of the US Constitution as a social contract, reliance on original intention, or assertions that
reliance on foreign precedent unconstitutionally delegates decision making and interferes with separation of
powers. The article accepts some limits on use of foreign precedent based on American exceptionalism but
argues that these concerns go to the weight of foreign precedent, not its admissibility. The main challenges
inherent in comparative constitutional advocacy, however, stem primarily from U.S. lawyers' and judges' lack
of expertise with foreign materials. Many advocates and jurists are not sufficiently familiar with foreign
jurisdictions to ensure that materials selected are sufficiently similar and relevant to the case at hand. Adding
to the challenge are obvious language and access barriers. Despite these challenges, comparative constitutional
advocacy is worth the candle, although the article argues for several significant changes in legal education to
give American lawyers more skill in using foreign materials. The exercise of looking beyond our borders for
insight into constitutional issues should begin in law school and become a norm in constitutional advocacy.
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol56/iss3/3
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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2005, Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia of the 
U.S. Supreme Court engaged in a highly publicized “conversation” 
before an audience at American University’s Washington College of 
Law about the use of other nations’ constitutional law in evaluating 
and deciding U.S. constitutional questions.1  Justice Breyer generally 
favored the use of such materials.  He maintained that comparative 
constitutional law might sometimes be helpful, and the Court should 
be willing to at least look at what other nations have done on 
common questions2 even though it should never be bound by foreign 
decisions.3  Justice Scalia opposed even limited use of foreign 
materials.  Drawing on the postulates of American exceptionalism 
and originalism,4 he argued that foreign materials are at best 
                                                          
 1. Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. S. Ct., & Stephen Breyer, Justice, U.S. S. Ct., 
Discussion at the American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), in 
3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005) [hereinafter AU Conversation]. 
 2. Regarding a foreign court’s consideration of a similar controversy before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Breyer stated:  “So here you’re trying to get a picture 
how other people have dealt with it.  And am I influenced by that? I am at least 
interested in reading it.”  Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. S. Ct., & Stephen Breyer, 
Justice, U.S. S. Ct., Discussion at the American University Washington College of Law 
(Jan. 13, 2005) [hereinafter AU Conversation, Transcript] (transcript available 
through the Federal News Service). 
 3. AU Conversation, supra note 1, at 523 (“[D]ecisions of foreign courts do not 
bind American courts.”). 
 4. Id. at 521 (noting that the United States does not have “the same moral and 
legal framework as the rest of the world, and never [has]”). 
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irrelevant to American constitutional law, which requires 
interpretations of the language, structure, drafting and ratification of 
the U.S. Constitution, all of which are uniquely American legal 
questions.5 
As the nation soon learned, Justices Breyer and Scalia’s “AU 
conversation” was not a purely academic exchange.  Behind the 
discussion (known to them though not yet to us) was the Supreme 
Court’s pending decision in Roper v. Simmons.6  In an opinion by 
Justice Kennedy, the Court would rely in part on comparative 
precedent in ruling that the execution of juvenile offenders violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment.7  Roper had been argued in October 2004, and the 
Court’s decision was announced in early March 2005, barely six weeks 
after the Justices’ conversation.  The opinions in the case were almost 
certainly already being circulated among the Justices when the AU 
conversation occurred.  In Roper, Justice Breyer joined Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion.  Justice Scalia’s dissent castigated the 
Court for relying on international materials,8 advancing many of the 
same arguments he had put forward informally in the AU 
conversation. 
Roper provoked considerable commentary both for and against the 
Court’s decision.  Many of Roper’s opponents took a cue from Scalia’s 
dissent and charged the Court with misuse of foreign materials.9  
Former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay singled out Justice 
Kennedy as an activist judge bent on re-writing the Constitution to 
suit his personal predilections regarding the death penalty.10  They 
                                                          
 5. Id. (“If you told the framers of the Constitution that we’re to be just like 
Europe, they would have been appalled.”) 
 6. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 7. See id. at 575-78 (devoting an entire section to the analysis of foreign law). 
 8. See id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“More fundamentally, however, the basic 
premise of the Court’s argument⎯that American law should conform to the laws of 
the rest of the world⎯ought to be rejected out of hand.”). 
 9. E.g., Tony Blankley, Black Robes and Betrayal, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at 
A17 (“The majority, still sensing its arguments to be rather feeble, went on to try to 
buttress their case further by citing a menagerie of international treaties and foreign 
laws.”); John Hinderaker, A Government of Men:  Justice Kennedy changes his mind.  
Amazingly he found that the Constitution changed with him, WKLY. STAND. (Wash., D.C.), 
Mar. 6, 2005 (“It is not unfair to say, however, that [Justice Kennedy’s] attempted 
rationale consists of nothing but fine words, which contain no explanation of how, 
why, and when the opinions of non-Americans become relevant to our Constitutional 
jurisprudence.”); Tom Parker, Editorial, Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2005, at 4B; Stuart Taylor Jr., The Court, and Foreign Friends, 
as Constitutional Convention, NAT’L. J., Mar. 5, 2005, Vol. 37, No. 10 (criticizing the 
Court for its reliance on international and foreign law). 
 10. See, e.g., Mike Allen, DeLay Takes Fight to Talk Radio, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 
2005, at A04 (quoting Tom DeLay:  “We’ve got Justice Kennedy writing decisions 
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cited Kennedy’s reliance on foreign precedent as evidence of his 
activist sins.  The event added steam to an effort already under way in 
Congress to enact legislation forbidding the Court from relying on 
foreign materials in its constitutional adjudication.11 
Had the Roper decision involved an isolated use of foreign 
constitutional law, its reliance on comparative materials might have 
passed relatively unnoticed.  Use of comparative law is not unknown 
in the Court, particularly in Eighth Amendment cases, where 
longstanding legal principles call for the Court to engage in some 
level of comparative review.12  But the case came on the heels of 
                                                          
based upon international law, not the Constitution of the United States.  That’s just 
outrageous.”); International Law, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 3, 2005, at A12 
(emphasizing Tom DeLay’s reaction to Supreme Court decisions based on 
international law); Tony Mauro, U.S. Supreme Court vs. The World, USA TODAY, June 
20, 2005, at 15A (noting Tom DeLay’s reaction to Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Roper). 
 11. American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 3 
(2005) (“Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor any lower Federal 
court shall . . . employ the constitution, laws, administrative rules, executive orders, 
directives, policies, or judicial decisions of any international organization or foreign 
state, except for the English constitutional and common law or other sources of law 
relied upon by the Framers of the Constitution of the United States.”); Constitution 
Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005) (“In interpreting and 
applying the Constitution of the United States, a court of the United States may not 
rely upon any constitution . . . or any other action of any foreign state or 
international organization or agency, other than English constitutional and common 
law up to the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.”); 
Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005) (as referred 
to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2005) (providing identical text to H.R. 
1079); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Mar. 20, 2005) (“Expressing the sense of the Senate that judicial determinations 
regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United States should not be based 
on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original 
meaning of the Constitution of the United States.”); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (stating identical language to S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005)); American 
Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. (2004) (as referred to the 
Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, and Intell. Prop., May 20, 2004); Constitution 
Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004) (Subcomm. hearings held, 
Sept. 13, 2004); H. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (as forwarded by the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary to the full H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, May 13, 2004); H. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003) (as referred to the 
Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., Dec. 10, 2003). 
 12. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 n.21 (2002) (pointing to 
international disapproval of the imposition of the death penalty for mentally 
retarded offenders as a factor in supporting the Court’s conclusion that consensus 
exists among those who have dealt with this issue); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion) (observing the views of respected professional 
organizations, other nations that share an Anglo-American heritage and leading 
members of the Western European community, on the issue of the death penalty for 
juveniles); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982) (noting several 
countries, including England and India, that have abolished the doctrine of felony 
murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(expressing the relevance of a United Nations’ survey pertaining to the death penalty 
in rape cases, where only three out of sixty nations surveyed in 1965, retained this 
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similar uses of comparative precedent in two earlier controversial 
decisions.  In Atkins v. Virginia,13 another death penalty case, the 
Court relied in part on foreign materials to prohibit the execution of 
the mentally retarded.14  And, in Lawrence v. Texas,15 Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion used comparative precedent to support its ruling 
that criminalization of consenting adult same-sex relations violates 
the Due Process Clause.16  This trio of recent, prominent, and 
controversial human-rights-oriented decisions involving comparative 
precedent convinced conservative Court critics that the use of such 
precedent was part of an activist judicial agenda to both “globalize” 
and “liberalize” the U.S. Constitution.17  Many of them are now 
determined to exterminate this perceived abuse of judicial power. 
In addition to the prospect of congressional legislation on the 
subject, the role of comparative precedent was raised during the 
                                                          
sentence for the crime of rape); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1958) (plurality 
opinion) (emphasizing the opinion of the international community in regards to 
denationalization as a form of punishment). 
 13. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 14. Id. at 317 n.21 (discussing the international community’s disapproval of 
imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders). 
 15. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 16. Id. at 576-77 (noting the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
against the criminalization of consenting adult same sex relations in the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and Cyprus, and emphasizing that “[o]ther nations, too, have 
taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual 
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct”). 
 17. E.g., Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:  Reflections 
on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004) (noting Scalia’s condemnation 
of the Court’s use of international materials to expand rights under the U.S. 
Constitution); Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the Opinions of Mankind:  
International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261 (Spring 2005) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper and the consequences of using 
foreign and international law when interpreting the U.S. Constitution); Richard A. 
Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term:  Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
31, 84-90 (2005); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws:  The 
court should never view a foreign legal decision as a precedent in any way, LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
July/August 2004, available at http://legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2004/ 
featureposnerjulaug04.msp (arguing against the use of foreign law as precedent:  “To 
cite foreign law as authority is to flirt with the discredited . . . idea of a universal 
natural law; or to suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, 
elite community of wisdom and conscience.”); Carl Huse & David D. Kirkpatrick, 
DeLay Says Federal Judiciary has Run Amok, Adding Congress Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2005, at A21 (discussing Tom Delay’s criticism of the judiciary’s disregard for 
Congressional intent and use of international standards and precedents in cases 
involving the right to abortion and prohibitions on school prayer); Jeffrey Toobin, 
Swing Shift:  How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme 
Court, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42 (commenting that Justice Kennedy has 
turned his passion for foreign cultures and ideas “into a principle of jurisprudence”); 
Emily Bazelon, What Would Zimbabwe Do? “Comparativism”⎯Using Foreign Legal Rulings 
to Help Interpret the Constitution⎯Is Startlingly on the Rise in the U.S. Supreme Court, ATL. 
MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 2005, at 48(3) (discussing the rise of comparativism in U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions). 
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recent Senate Supreme Court confirmation hearings.18  At the close 
of the October 2005 Term, Justice O’Connor announced her 
intention to retire from the Court.  However, during deliberations on 
her successor, Chief Justice Rehnquist died leaving two vacancies on 
the Court to be filled by President George W. Bush.  Bush’s eventual 
nominees, Judges John Roberts and Samuel Alito, both faced close 
questioning from the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding their 
views on the Court’s use of foreign constitutional precedent.  Both 
nominees registered opposition to the use of such precedent, 
although they stopped short of saying that other members of the 
Court should be prevented from doing so.  Both nominees probably 
needed to oppose the use of foreign precedent in order to win the 
support of some of the Judiciary Committee’s more conservative 
members, including Senators John Cornyn and Jon Kyl.19 
In his September 2005 confirmation hearings, Judge John Roberts 
offered two principal reasons for opposing the use of comparative 
constitutional law.  First, he claimed that the democratic process is 
circumvented when judges base their decisions on precedent by 
foreign judges who were not appointed or confirmed by 
representatives accountable to the American people.20  “If we’re 
relying on a decision from a German judge about what our 
Constitution means, no president accountable to the people 
appointed that judge and no Senate accountable to the people 
confirmed that judge,” Roberts said.  “And yet he’s playing a role in 
shaping the law that binds the people in this country.”21  Second, 
Roberts raised concerns about unbridled judicial discretion.  In 
Roberts’s view, allowing judges to use foreign precedent could 
encourage cherry-picking of foreign decisions that were favorable to a 
particular judge’s personal views.22  He expressed concern that 
                                                          
 18. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) 
[hereinafter Roberts Hearing]; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, 
Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Alito Hearing]. 
 19. During Roberts’s confirmation hearing, Senator Cornyn asked:  “On what 
legitimate basis can the Supreme Court uphold state laws on the death penalty in 
1989, then strike them down in 2005, relying not on the written Constitution . . . but 
on foreign laws that no American has voted on, consented to, or may even be aware 
of?”  Roberts Hearing, supra note 18, at 42 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn, S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary).  Similarly, Senator Kyl flatly stated during the Alito hearings, “I do 
not support the use of foreign law as authority in United States court opinions.”  Alito 
Hearing, supra note 18, at 370 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 20. Roberts Hearing, supra note 18, at 200-01. 
 21. Id. at 201. 
 22. Id.  But see Sir Basil Markesinis, Judicial Mentality:  Mental Disposition or Outlook 
as a Factor Impeding Recourse to Foreign Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1325, 1334 (2006) 
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without domestic boundaries as a restraint, judges would use foreign 
law to “cloak [the result they desire] with the authority of 
precedent.”23  “Domestic precedent can confine and shape the 
discretion of judges.  [But by using] foreign law, you can find 
anything you want” Roberts noted.24  He compared looking to foreign 
law to finding one’s friends in a crowd.  “You can find them. They’re 
there.”25  Roberts declined, however, to pronounce use of foreign 
constitutional precedent as a violation of a judge’s oath of office, or 
to accept some Judiciary Committee members’ characterization of 
the practice as improper judicial behavior.26 
In January 2006, Supreme Court nominee Judge Samuel Alito 
echoed Roberts’s disapproval of comparative constitutional law.27  
Like Roberts, he opposed the practice in constitutional cases.  Alito 
argued that America’s unique governmental structure and history 
render foreign precedent unhelpful.28  He said, “I think we can do 
very well with our own Constitution and our own judicial precedents 
and our own traditions.”29  He argued that “the Framers would be 
stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by 
taking a poll of the countries of the world.”30  Alito asserted that there 
are no significant legal insights to be gained from foreign courts on 
American constitutional law questions, although their approaches 
may be “very interesting from a political science perspective.”31  Alito 
also identified several practical problems with using foreign 
precedent, such as the difficulty of determining which nations’ 
decisions to consider, how those courts are organized, and how much 
weight to give their opinions.32  Notwithstanding his general 
opposition to the use of comparative constitutional law, Alito did 
acknowledge that studying the organization of foreign constitutional 
courts might be useful.33 
                                                          
(suggesting that when interpreting both national and foreign law, “[f]ew judges can 
entirely escape from these pressures [to reach conclusions based upon personal 
convictions] or lose habits and modes of thinking acquired from background and 
environment”). 
 23. Roberts Hearing, supra note 18, at 200-01. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 293. 
 27. Alito Hearing, supra note 18, at 410. 
 28. Id. at 370. 
 29. Id. at 410. 
 30. Id. at 471. 
 31. Id. at 410. 
 32. Id. at 471. 
 33. Id. at 604. 
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As a consequence of these developments, debate over the use of 
comparative constitutional precedent, which has been simmering on 
back burners of comparative constitutional scholarship, is heating 
up.34  At the moment, the discussion has taken on a liberal versus 
conservative cast,35 with result orientations concerning the recent 
death penalty and due process issues defining positions on the 
broader jurisprudential question of the role of comparative 
precedent.  But the issue obviously transcends current events, and it 
is in need of a mature evaluation.  This Article is an attempt to 
contribute to that process by adding to the arguments supporting the 
use of comparative constitutional advocacy, and responding to those 
who oppose the practice.  My thesis is that looking beyond U.S. 
borders for insight into constitutional issues already considered 
                                                          
 34. E.g., Roger P. Alford, The United States Constitution and International Law:  
Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004) 
[hereinafter Alford, Misusing International Sources] (outlining the potential misuses 
arising from the application of international and foreign materials in interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution); Andrew R. Dennington, We Are the World?  Justifying the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Use of Contemporary Foreign Legal Practice in Atkins, Lawrence, and 
Roper, 29 B.C. INT’L COMP. L. REV. 269 (2006) (arguing in favor of limiting the use of 
foreign law in domestic constitutional interpretation, to cases representing jus cogens, 
which could reduce concerns regarding “activist judges”); Harold Hongju Koh, The 
United States Constitution and International Law:  International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, U.S. Constitution and International Law] 
(emphasizing the historical use of international law in forming domestic U.S. law 
and pointing out that “phrases like ‘due process of law,’ ‘equal protection,’ and 
‘cruel and unusual punishment’ are illuminated by parallel rules, empirical evidence, 
or community standards found in other mature legal systems, that evidence should 
not simply be ignored.  Wise American judges did not do so at the beginning of the 
Republic, and there is no warrant for them to start now.”); Hon. Diarmuid F. 
O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the 
Interpretation of Domestic Law?, Lecture at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
of the University of London (Oct. 11, 2004), in 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2005) 
(suggesting a cautious approach to comparative constitutionalism and remarking 
that “[d]espite the seemingly irresistible forces of globalization . . . our respective 
countries and legal systems remain distinct in several important aspects.  Judges who 
disregard these differences run the risk not only of making bad law, but also of 
profoundly altering their legal system by incorporating foreign values.”); Ramsey, 
supra note 17; Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 
13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006) (examining the extent of comparative 
constitutional adjudication in common law countries other than the United States, 
focusing on Australia); Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More?  
Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1275 (2006) [hereinafter Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better?] (arguing that 
criticisms over the Supreme Court’s reference to non-U.S. law are greatly overstated). 
     35.  See SIR BASIL MARKESINIS & JÖRG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW 
220, 223 (2006) (noting increased use of foreign law by liberal-leaning judges); Mark 
Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation:  An Episode in the 
Culture Wars, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 299, 309-12 (2006) (discussing the debate over 
comparative constitutionalism in terms of a “cultural war” within the courts, turning 
on competing views of constitutional interpretation and patriotism). 
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elsewhere is a valuable exercise on many levels.  This exercise should 
begin in law school and become a norm in constitutional advocacy. 
Part I of this Article examines several catalysts⎯including both 
external and internal factors⎯that have fueled the comparative 
constitutional debate in recent years, and provides an overview of the 
main positions currently discussed on both sides of the issue.  Part II 
examines the United States’ tradition of constitutional insularity, and 
identifies several explanations behind the tradition.  Part III discusses 
various prospects for changing our isolationist view of 
constitutionalism, looking in particular at the effects of globalization, 
international judicial interaction, constitutional convergence, and 
what I view as a shift in the constitutional learning curve.  In Part IV, I 
identify and analyze seven benefits of comparative constitutional 
analysis, and discuss several “factors counseling hesitation.”36  Part IV 
concludes with the assertion that the benefits of comparative analysis 
outweigh the challenges, and highlights several “best uses” of 
comparative constitutionalism.  Finally, Part V explores ways to 
implement comparative constitutional analysis, focusing on the 
importance of advocacy and the role of legal education. 
I. CATALYSTS FOR THE COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
Beyond the accidental confluence of Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper, 
there are both external and internal reasons why the use of 
comparative constitutional precedent is of greater potential interest 
than ever before. 
A. External Factors 
Perhaps the main reason that this debate has surfaced at this 
particular juncture is that foreign sources on constitutional questions 
are available to a degree and in a quality never previously 
experienced.  There are four principal causes.  First, until recently, 
there was relatively little comparative constitutional material worthy 
of serious consideration by U.S. courts.  Now there is, forcing U.S. 
judges for the first time to decide what to do about it.  Second, the 
decisions of foreign constitutional courts increasingly grapple with 
the same (or very similar) constitutional issues as their U.S. 
counterparts.  This is particularly true in human rights, where there 
has been an international convergence of constitutional human 
rights norms, making discussion of these issues in foreign courts 
more potentially relevant to U.S. jurisprudence.  Third, many foreign 
                                                          
 36. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). 
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constitutional courts possess sufficient expertise, professionalism, 
judicial independence, transparency of process, and caliber of 
reasoning to make their views worthy of mature consideration.  
Finally, while there is still a long way to go, improvements in 
information technology and availability make the decisions of foreign 
courts more accessible than they have ever been in the past. 
1. Growth of foreign constitutional precedent 
Most comparative constitutional material is of recent origin.  The 
bulk has developed since World War II.37  Prior to the War, liberal 
democracies outside the United States were rare,38 and those with 
systems for authoritative legal interpretation and application of 
constitutional norms were even rarer.39  English-speaking systems 
(most accessible because of a common tongue and common legal 
roots) were still part of the British common law system, which 
operated without a formal written constitution and without 
American-style judicial review.40  Other major non-English legal 
systems were either relatively short-lived constitutional democracies 
(such as the German pre-war Weimar republic),41 functioned under 
civil law traditions that vested constitutional authority outside the 
courts (as was the case in pre-war France),42 or simply lacked the 
indicia of true democratic governance (as was true in most of Asia, 
                                                          
 37. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 
(1997) [hereinafter Ackerman, World Constitutionalism] (observing the rise of 
constitutionalism throughout the world over the last sixty years); Stephen Gardbaum, 
The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 707 (2001) 
(noting that comparative constitutional law owes its origins and substance to the rise 
of constitutionalism that has occurred over the last sixty years). 
 38. These nations “democratized” during what is generally considered the “first 
wave of democratization.”  See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:  
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16-17 (1991) (discussing the first 
wave of democratization in countries such as the United States, France, and Great 
Britain). 
 39. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 713-14 (discussing the dominance of the 
legislative supremacy model around the world prior to 1945 and noting that in the 
pre-war period, only a small number of European countries formed constitutional 
courts equipped with “the power to review the constitutionality of national 
legislation”). 
 40. See Ackerman, supra note 37, at 771-72 (explaining the British constitutional 
model and its influence overseas, in places such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and South Africa). 
 41. See generally DETLEV J. K. PEUKERT, THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC:  THE CRISIS OF 
CLASSICAL MODERNITY (Richard Deveson trans., Hill and Wang 1992) (1987). 
 42. Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1789, stated that statutory 
law is the expression of the general will.  This was interpreted to mean that the 
legislature, and not the courts, was the supreme arbiter of constitutionality.  JOHN 
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25 (1992). 
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Central America, and most jurisdictions south of the Equator).43  
Consequently, there was practically no worthwhile constitutional 
precedent anywhere else in the world.  English law played a 
significant though occasional role in American constitutional 
thinking,44 but the constitutional law of other nations had virtually no 
role at all. 
The past fifty years have changed all of that in remarkable ways, 
most notably through the enactment of new constitutions and the 
development of tribunals for authoritative constitutional 
interpretation and application in democratic systems around the 
world.45  With direct U.S. encouragement, elements of American-style 
constitutionalism were transplanted into the new post-war 
constitutional structures adopted in Japan and West Germany.46  
Some leading Western European nations contemporaneously 
adopted new constitutional systems complete with formal 
constitutional courts.47  English-speaking constitutional legal systems 
with judicial review powers emerged in several British 
                                                          
 43. See, e.g., JOHN A. BOOTH & THOMAS W. WALKER, UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL 
AMERICA 19 (1989) (“Except for Costa Rica, Central American nations spent most of 
the period from 1838 until 1945 under either civilian or military dictatorships.”); Lu 
Ya-Li, Political Developments in the Republic of China, in DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
EAST ASIA 44 (Thomas W. Robinson ed., 1991) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT] (analyzing the potential for the development of democracy in 
Taiwan); Daryl M. Plunk, Political Developments in the Republic of Korea, in DEMOCRACY 
AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 118 (“While over the years some have called for the 
‘restoration’ of democracy in Korea, the fact remains that Koreans have experienced 
precarious little democracy.”). 
 44. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s reliance on English 
common law during its early days). 
 45. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY:  THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hirschl, Political Origins] 
(“Around the globe, in more than eighty countries and in several supranational 
entities, constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power 
from representative institutions to judiciaries.”); Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals:  The 
Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitutional Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
157, 161 (2002) (“In recent years, the spread of constitutional democracies has 
catalyzed the reemergence of comparative analysis as a significant issue in 
constitutional interpretation.”); Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 714-16 (discussing two 
concentrated bursts of “constitutionalization”); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the 
New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hirschl, New Constitutionalism] (observing a global trend towards judicial reform 
spanning two decades, as illustrated by a number of countries that adopted or revised 
their constitutions to include a bill of rights and established mechanisms for judicial 
review). 
 46. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 714-15 (elucidating how in the aftermath of 
World War II, numerous countries, including Japan and Germany, adopted the 
American model of constitutionalism, “to protect, and express their commitment to, 
fundamental human rights and liberties”). 
 47. Id.  See generally BELL, supra note 42, at 29-33 (providing an overview of the 
system of constitutional review in France); ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONS OF 
THE WORLD 8 (1993) (discussing France’s multiple constitutions). 
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Commonwealth nations including Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand.48  New supranational constitutional systems with 
authoritative judicial structures, most notably the European Court of 
Human Rights and the courts of the European Union, developed.49  
Constitutions and constitutional courts were installed in some of the 
nations that emerged from crumbling colonial empires in Africa, the 
Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the 
Pacific.50  More recently, systems of constitutional law and 
adjudication in constitutional courts were adopted in several Eastern 
European republics that were organized (sometimes with U.S. 
technical assistance) after the disintegration of the Communist bloc 
and the Soviet Union.51  Indeed, if one were to create a list of the 
fifteen or twenty leading world constitutional systems today, the 
overwhelming majority either did not exist or were in their infancy 
fifty years ago. 
2. Similarity of issues 
Many of the world’s leading constitutional systems have been in 
business long enough to develop significant and relatively mature law 
on constitutional questions that resonate with issues in the United 
States.  There is, for example, a robust transnational jurisprudence 
on such issues as reproductive freedom,52 freedom of speech,53 
                                                          
 48. See Gardbaum, supra note 37, at 719-27 (analyzing the emergence of 
constitutional structures and procedures in Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom that together form a “third model” of constitutionalism). 
 49. See generally J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-24 (1993); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 
290-98 (1997); J. H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2410-
31 (1991). 
 50. At least eighty countries liberated from colonial rule since World War II have 
established constitutions.  See CIA:  The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/fields/2063 (listing each country’s constitutions and when 
they were adopted); see also John Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-
Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 369 (1995) (noting that the dissolution of French 
and British colonial empires inspired a wave of constitution-making). 
 51. See generally Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Stefaan Van der Jeught, Human Rights 
Protection Under the New Constitutions of Central Europe, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 475 (1998) (examining the development of constitutional rights and the 
judicial enforcement of those rights in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
the Slovak Republic); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Fundamental Constitutional Rights in the 
New Constitutions of Eastern and Central Europe, 3 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73 
(1995) (analyzing the process of constitutional drafting in Eastern Europe that drew 
upon Western ideals and principles). 
 52. E.g., R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.); Tremblay v. Daigle, [1989] 
2 S.C.R. 530 (Can.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] 1975, 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 
(F.R.G.) . 
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freedom of religion,54 racial and ethnic equality,55 language rights of 
minorities,56 gender equality,57 sexual orientation equality,58 privacy,59 
constitutional limits on punishment,60 the right to counsel for the 
indigent,61 and the rights of the accused.62  An international 
jurisprudence is also developing on such structural issues as 
separation of powers and the rulemaking authority of government 
agencies,63 war and emergency executive powers,64 and even (to a 
limited degree) federalism.65 
                                                          
 53. E.g., Lange v. Atkinson, [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 424 (C.A.); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Att’y 
Gen. of Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (Can.); Curtis v. Ministry of Safety & Security & 
Others 1996 (5) BCLR 609 (CC) (S. Afr.); Austl. Capital Television PTY. Ltd. v. 
Australia, (1992) 108 A.L.R. 577; Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2000). 
 54. E.g., Japan v. Yasuko Nakaya, 42 MINSHÜ 5 (Sup. Ct., 1988), available at 
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/4925672a00027076.nsf/0/a8b3da37b77ca446492
56739001ccb91?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,Gokoku); Emmanuel v. State of 
Kerala, (1986) 3 S.C.R. 518 (India); Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 397 
(1993); Thlimmenos v. Greece, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 15 (2001). 
 55. E.g., Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342 (Can.); R. v. Van Der Peet, [1996] 2 
S.C.R. 507 (Can.); Calder v. Att’y Gen. of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.). 
 56. Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in 
Education in Belgium, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. 252 (1968); Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College 
Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 S.C.C. 717 (India). 
 57. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
1992, 85 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 191 (F.R.G.); 
President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 58. E.g., Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Can.); Smith & Grady v. United 
Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999); Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, 
29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 548 (1999); Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 
(1999). 
 59. E.g., Kennedy v. Ireland, [1987] I.R. 587 (Ir.); Chapman v. United Kingdom, 
33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2001); Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court] 
Mar. 14, 1991, 1991/12689, Erkenntnisse und Beschlüsse des 
Verfassungsgerichtshofes [VfSlg] (Austria) (not available in English). 
 60. E.g., HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 
1; Aydin v. Turkey, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 251 (1997). 
 61. E.g., State v. Vermaas, 1995 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) (S. Afr.); Ogawa et al. v. 
Japan, 33 KEISHÜ 5 (Sup. Ct., 1979), http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/promjudg. 
nsf/766e4f1d46701bec49256b8700435d2e/d6d51d9487926baf49256fe200224cf3?Op
enDocument. 
 62. E.g., State v. Mbatha 1996 (3) BCLR 293 (CC) (S. Afr.); O’Leary v. Att’y Gen, 
[1990] I.R. 363 (Ir.). 
 63. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
1984, 62 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1978, 49 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 89 (F.R.G.); CC decision 
no. 86-207DC, June 26, 1986, Rec. 61 (France). 
 64. E.g., Liversidge v. Anderson, (1941) 2 Eng. Rep. 612 (A.C.); United 
Communist Party of Turk. v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121 (1988); S.R. Bommai v. 
Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1. 
 65. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 14 (F.R.G.); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1961, 12 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 205 (F.R.G.); Re Quebec 
Objection to a Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (Can.). 
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Exploring the jurisprudence of other nations on these and other 
similar constitutional questions, one is struck by the similarity to U.S. 
constitutional law.  This similarity has at least two sources:  a 
commitment to common constitutional norms, and the need to apply 
them to comparable cultural, social, political, and economic 
developments.66  While the various world constitutional systems 
reflect important differences in language, structure, and history, they 
are often committed to the same basic principles as the U.S. 
Constitution.  This is especially true in the field of human rights67 
because the U.S. Constitution has served as a model for human rights 
guarantees around the world.68  While more modern constitutions 
elsewhere have often expanded beyond the U.S. Constitution, 
including explicit guarantees that the U.S. Constitution lacks,69 many 
have looked (often explicitly) to the U.S. Constitution for guidance 
when crafting their own Constitutions.70  Because their constitutional 
                                                          
 66. See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging:  The Role of a Supreme Court in Democracy, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 110-11 (2002) (observing the importance of comparative law:  
“In different legal systems, similar legal institutions often fulfill corresponding roles, 
and similar legal problems (like hate speech, privacy, and now the fight against 
terrorism) arise”); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 519, 535 (1992) (“Every country is grappling with a set of problems that 
are in a general way similar.”). 
 67. See Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?:  Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection 
of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 433 (2005) (noting that human 
rights cases are best suited for comparative analysis as “their essence transcends 
notions of boundaries and nationhood”). 
 68. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 158 (1991); Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American 
Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541 (1988) (“Currently, there is a vigorous 
overseas trade in the Bill of Rights. . . .  When life or liberty is at stake, the landmark 
judgments of the [U.S.] Supreme Court . . . are studied with as much attention in 
New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C.”); Andzrej Rapaczynski, 
Bibliographical Essay:  The Influence of the U.S Constitutionalism Abroad, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS:  THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
ABROAD 405 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990). 
 69. Examples of nations with constitutionally enumerated human rights that go 
beyond those enumerated in the United States Constitution include Canada, 
Germany, and Japan.  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as Part 1 of the 
Constitution Act of 1982 provides for “Mobility Rights,” in Article Six and “Equality 
Rights” in Article Fifteen, which protect against discrimination based on “race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”  Part I 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 
(U.K.) §§ 6 & 15 (emphasis added).  The German Basic Law provides in Article One, 
Section One for “human dignity,” in Article Six for the Rights of Family, and in 
Article Seven for Education rights.  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May 23, 1949, arts. 6 & 7 (F.R.G.).  The 
Constitution of Japan provides in Article Fourteen against discrimination “in 
political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family 
origin,” in Article Twenty-Six for education rights, and in Article Twenty-Seven for fair 
labor practices.  KENPÖ [Constitution], arts. 14, 26 & 27 (emphasis added). 
 70. See Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman:  A Study of U.S. 
Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite’s 
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law embraces comparable basic human rights, it encounters similar 
constitutional questions.  While reliance on the U.S. model for 
structural issues has been less direct, other democracies also share 
some common structural ground, particularly in the delineation of 
separate spheres for legislative, executive/administrative, and judicial 
functions.71  Like the U.S. Constitution, many foreign constitutions 
delineate legislative and executive powers and functions, and their 
legal systems face instances of potential horizontal and vertical 
conflict among internal governmental structures.72 
Not only do other systems share a commitment to similar 
constitutional norms, they also experience similar challenges in 
applying these principles to the realities of contemporary culture.73  
                                                          
Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1483, 1491 (1997) (expounding upon Argentina’s 
constitutional experience and how historically, the Argentine constitutional structure 
drew from the U.S. Constitution and constitutional practice); Rapaczynski, supra 
note 68, at 408-12 (reviewing the influence of the U.S. Constitution in a number of 
countries and regions). 
 71. William Safran, The Influence of American Constitutionalism in Postwar Europe:  
The Bonn Republic Basic Law and the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, in AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM ABROAD:  SELECTED ESSAYS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 95-98, 102 (George Athan Billias ed., 1990) (noting similarities among 
American, French, and German separation of powers). 
 72. See generally Bruce Ackerman, New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 
(2000) [hereinafter Ackerman, New Separation of Powers]; Hirschl, Political Origins, 
supra note 45.  See also Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil 
Service, (1984) 3 Eng. Rep. 935 (H.L.); CC decision no. 86-207DC, June 26, 1986, 
Rec. 25 (France), available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1986/ 
86207dc.htm); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
1978, 49 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 89 (F.R.G.).  
Some notable examples of nations with federalist systems loosely similar to the 
United States are Australia, Germany, Canada, and Switzerland.  See EDWARD 
SCHNEIER, CRAFTING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACIES:  THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN 184 (2006) (including a table depicting the structures of various federated 
democracies). 
 73. See Barak, supra note 66, at 110-11 (remarking on the similar issues that 
constitutional courts around the world face).  Several judges from constitutional 
courts have made similar claims.  See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Réflexions relatives au 
principe de fraternité, Address to the 30th Congress of the Association of French-
Speaking Constitutional Courts (June 20, 2003), available at http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_06-20-03.html (“En un mot on trouve partout 
des juges faisant face aux memes especes de problemes et armes des memes especes 
d’instruments juridiques.”) (“Judges everywhere face the same types of problems and 
use the same types of legal tools.”); Canadian Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship 
Co. Ltd., [1992] 91 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 320 (La Forest, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legal 
system of every society faces essentially the same problems and solves these problems 
by quite different means, though often with similar results.”).  Discussing 
comparative analysis, Justice Anthony Mason of the Australian Supreme Court 
asserts:  “Legal problems, because they often reflect human problems, are not 
unique to any one system of law.  And the appropriate answers must be moulded, at 
least in part, by reference to experience and, in large measure, experience is 
common to all peoples.”  Anthony Mason, The Relationship Between International Law 
and National Law, and its Application in National Courts, 18 COMMW. L. BULL. 750, 753 
(1992). 
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In the twenty-first century, economic and technological 
developments, demographic changes, political, social, cultural, or 
religious issues, and world events often cross national boundaries, 
creating the same sorts of constitutional friction in more than one 
constitutional system.  Thus, for example, nations committed to 
principles of equality have addressed the rights of various subgroups, 
including ethnic and linguistic minorities, women, indigenous 
groups, and non-citizens.74  Nations committed to free expression 
have grappled with the effects of mass media, the Internet, 
distribution of sexually explicit materials, disclosure of government 
secrets, press invasions of privacy, hate speech, and saturated media 
coverage of high-profile criminal trials.75  And nations committed to 
constitutional reproductive and medical privacy have defined the 
scope of those rights in the context of rapid advances in reproductive 
and medical technology.76 
3.  Analytic methods 
Constitutional decision makers often employ similar analytic 
processes.  For example, concepts such as separation of powers, 
standards of review, means-ends analysis, balancing of interests, and 
proportionality77 familiar to American constitutional law have 
counterparts in other constitutional systems.  The principles do not 
have identical meanings or applications in different systems, and 
there are other analytic structures that lack direct U.S. cognates.78  
                                                          
 74. See supra notes 52-62 and corresponding text; see also Minister for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 128 A.L.R. 353 (Australia). 
 75. See supra note 53. 
 76. See supra note 52. 
 77. E.g., Case 122/78, Buitoni SA v. Fons D’Orientation et de Regularisation des 
Marches Agricoles, 1977 E.C.R. 677; Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727; R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103 (Can.); see also K.G. Jan Pillai, 
Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 646 (2002) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s mandate in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997), that 
“[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end”). 
 78. For example, the German Constitution contains concepts that do not inhere 
in the U.S. Constitution.  Article 24 provides that the “Federation may, by legislation, 
transfer sovereign powers to international institutions.”  Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May 23, 1949, art. 24.  
Article 32(3) grants the Laender the power to “conclude treaties with foreign states.”  
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May 
23, 1949, art. 23(3).  Article 34 establishes the affirmative duty of Laender toward 
citizens, who can sue for violation of that duty.  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [GG] [Federal Constitution] May 23, 1949, art. 34.  Article 115g grants 
the German Constitutional Court the power to re-write legislation in some 
circumstances.  Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Federal 
Constitution] May 23, 1949, art. 115g. 
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Nevertheless, there is a definite analytic common ground across 
constitutional systems. 
Additionally, many foreign constitutional tribunals exhibit high 
levels of professionalism, use transparent and fair processes, maintain 
the impartiality and political independence of judges, engage in 
thorough legal reasoning, and display a strong commitment to the 
rule of law.  All of this supports the potential utility of foreign courts’ 
judgments on common questions of law.79  One particularly notable 
feature of comparative constitutional adjudication is the frequency 
and analytic clarity of international courts’ reference to and 
discussion of U.S. precedent on constitutional questions.  In 
Canada,80 Australia,81 Germany,82 the European Court of Human 
Rights,83 Israel,84 India,85 South Africa,86 Japan,87 and elsewhere, judges 
                                                          
 79. See Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law:  A Continental European 
View, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 362 (1998) (“The transfer of legal concepts is facilitated 
when the host accepts the transplant . . . this acceptance is more likely to occur 
where the compared legal systems share socio-cultural, economic, or political 
factors.”); Glensy, supra note 67, at 424 (“A useful comparison can exist only if the 
legal systems have a common ideological basis.”). 
 80. E.g., Morgentaler v. R., [1988] S.C.R. 30 (Can.); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 
697 (Can.); R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.R. 571 (Can.); Chamberlain v. Surrey 
Sch. Dist. No. 36, [2002] S.C.R. 710 (Can.); Trinity Western Univ. v. British Columbia 
College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.R. 772 Can.); see also H. Patrick Glenn, The Use of 
Comparative Law by Common Law Courts in Canada, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY 
COURTS 59, 66 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1997) (noting that the legal 
reasoning process of the Canadian common law courts is inherently comparative and 
these courts—particularly the maritime courts—frequently cite to foreign sources as 
part of their judicial reasoning). 
 81. E.g., Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.); Dietrich v. R. 
(1992) 177 C.L.R. 292 (Austl.). 
 82. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
1975, 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 1 (F.R.G.).  
 83. E.g., Ceylan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (2000) (Bonello, J., concurring) 
(citing Abrahams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), Schenck v. United States, 294 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), Whitney 
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)); Adami v. Malta, No. 17209/02, slip op. (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Jun. 20, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal 
=hbkm&action=html&highlight=adami%20%7C%20malta&sessionid=8882858&skin
=hudoc-en (referencing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1941); Theil v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 328 U.S. 217; and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 433 (1953)); Dickson v. United 
Kingdom, No. 44362/04, slip op. Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 18, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr. 
coe.int//view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Dickson%20%7C
%20united%20%7C%20kingdom%20%7C%2044362/04&sessionid=8882839&skin=
hudoc-pr-en. 
 84. E.g., CA 546/78, Bank Kupat Haam v. Handeles [1980] IsrCR 34(3) 57 (not 
available in English); CA 40/80, Koenig v. Cohen [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 701(not 
available in English); CA 417/89, Alrarbia v. The Custodian of Absentee Property 
[1991] IsrSC 45(4) 641 (not available in English).  
 85. Singh v. Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465 (India) (cited by Knight v. Florida, 120 
S. Ct. 459, 463 (1999)) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Adam 
Smith, Making Itself At Home:  Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence:  The 
Indian Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218, 233 (2006) (discussing influence of 
American law on modern India’s constitution and judicial processes). 
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frequently refer to and discuss U.S. constitutional law and precedent.  
Indeed, the depth of foreign courts’ knowledge and discussion of 
U.S. constitutional precedent contrasts with the dearth of knowledge 
and discussion of comparative sources in most U.S. constitutional law.  
When skilled and thoughtful judges elsewhere deem U.S. 
constitutional law relevant to constitutional issues in their legal 
system, it supports the reciprocal inference that their decisions might 
be relevant to questions of U.S. constitutional law. 
4. Availability 
The final external factor favoring greater use of comparative 
constitutional precedent is its increasing availability.88  Most foreign 
constitutional tribunals maintain detailed and accurate records of 
their proceedings, publish them in accessible formats, and sometimes 
even translate them into English.89  These materials are internationally 
available and in many instances electronically accessible.90  While 
some lag time still exists between decision and publication, it is 
growing progressively shorter, so that it is often possible to acquire 
detailed knowledge of foreign decisions shortly after they are 
rendered. 
These developments combine to create the distinct impression that 
foreign constitutional courts might well have significant potential 
utility as a source for analysis of current U.S. constitutional questions.  
                                                          
 86. E.g., S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.); City Council of 
Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) (S. Afr.); Prinsloo v. Van der Linde 1997 (3) 
SA 1012 (CC) (S. Afr.); Brink v. Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC) (S. Afr.); 
President of the Republic v. Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 87. E.g., Case to Seek Habeas Corpus, 47 MINSHÜ 5099 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 19, 1993), 
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/promjudg.nsf/0/a3f856ed9deed3ee492570ff0037
7a15?OpenDocument; Tsu City Shinto Groundbreaking Ceremony Case, 31 MINSHÜ 
533 (Sup. Ct., July 13, 1977), http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/promjudg.nsf/ 
766e4f1d 46701bec49256b8700435d2e/42?OpenDocument; Nakamura v. Japan, 16 
KEISHÜ 11, at 1593 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 28, 1962), http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/ 
promjudg.nsf/766e4f1d46701bec49256b8700435d2e/6b85d7ccc095bcbc4925673900
0fa74c?OpenDocument (“Except where there is an actual case or controversy, the 
United States Supreme Court has long held that it is not empowered to review the 
constitutionality of a statute.”).   
 88. See generally Lyonette Louis-Jacques, New Rights:  Legal Information In A 
Changing World Wide Web, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 474 (2006) (discussing the increased 
accessibility of foreign legal materials on the Internet).  This increased availability 
extends to law school libraries as well.  For example, the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law maintains a list of which law libraries collect legal resources from 
many countries throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa.  University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law Library, http://www.law.pitt.edu/library/international/foreign 
collections.php) (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). 
 89. See generally Global Courts, http://www.globalcourts.com/mini-oversikt.html 
(providing access to Supreme Court decisions from 123 countries worldwide). 
 90. See Lyonette Louis-Jacques, supra note 88, at 482-83 (providing a host of 
websites where foreign decisions can be found on the Internet). 
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They set the foundation for internal U.S. debate over the legitimacy 
of comparative constitutional analysis. 
B. Internal Factors 
The dearth of comparative discussion in U.S. constitutional law 
extends back in time, though not to the beginning of the Republic.  
In the Supreme Court’s earliest years, it often relied on international 
legal sources,91 particularly the English common law.  However, the 
Supreme Court also occasionally referred to European civil law in 
both constitutional and non-constitutional decisions.92  The early 
Court was definitely an active participant in a wider community of 
courts,93 and its judges made skilled use of international precedent on 
a significant range of issues.94 
Sometime near the middle of the nineteenth century, reliance on 
comparative materials subsided, becoming almost nonexistent in 
constitutional cases by the turn of the century.95  The Court replaced 
                                                          
 91. See, e.g., Glensy, supra note 67, at 365 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s 
“compliance with the laws of nations was an expression of governmental legitimacy to 
the rest of the world”). 
 92. See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 81-82, 91-92 (1807) (citing 
English law); Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 270-71 (1808) (citing English 
law); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 143-44 (1814) (citing English 
law); M’Coul v. Lekamp’s Administratrix, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 111, 117 n.1 (1817) 
(contrasting French civil law with English common law); United States v. Smith, 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 n. h (1820) (relying on the law of nations to define the 
offense of ‘piracy’); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-84 (1823) 
(referencing the laws of colonial European nations); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 66, 116-18 (1825) (citing English law); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
515, 560-61 (1832) (relying on the doctrine of the law of nations). 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 111 introductory note (1987) (“From the beginning, the law of nations, 
later referred to as international law, was considered to be incorporated into the law 
of the United States without the need for any action by Congress or the 
President. . . .”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1825 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, Is International Law Really State 
Law?] (“The early Supreme Court spent much of its time deciding cases under the 
law of nations.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (standing); Talbot 
v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795) (expatriation); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
199, 216, 230-31 (1796) (confiscation of property); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
386, 391 (1798) (ex post facto laws); Ex parte Burford, 7  U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 452-
53 (1806) (habeas corpus); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 121 (1810) 
(disposition of land by state legislature); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 
153, 155 (1820) (piracy); The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1821) 
(seizure of cargo in times of war); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 223 
(1827) (contractual obligations); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 162 
(1833) (pardons). 
 95. See David S. Clark, The Use of Comparative Law by American Courts, in THE USE 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 297 (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1997) 
(suggesting that the Civil War was a turning point in routine usage of comparative 
materials). 
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this practice with greater reliance on the Court’s own precedent, the 
precedent of state and lower federal courts, discussions of American 
political history, and appeals to original intention.96  Some 
commentators have tied these developments to a growing national 
insularity,97 while others have suggested that the shift was influenced 
by “scientific” approaches to legal analysis associated with the 
development of Harvard’s “Langdell” method in American legal 
education.98  It may also have been a natural result of the growing 
maturity of American law. 
For most of the last century, the Court has occasionally alluded to 
international developments (particularly in other common-law 
countries).  Examples include the Court’s examining whether a 
particular interest is “fundamental” to the concept of ordered liberty 
under the Due Process Clause,99 or determining whether a 
punishment is “unusual” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.100  
                                                          
 96. E.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (devoting no 
attention to the then-current treatment of slavery by other nations, notably Great 
Britain, where the institution had been abolished); Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. 
(20 How.) 296, 302 (1857) (arguing that it was not the framers’ original intent to 
limit the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to the eastern seaboard); Ward v. State, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870) (maintaining that it was the framers’ original 
intent to forbid discrimination in state taxation); Keokuk N. Line Packet Co. v. City 
of Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 85-89 (1877) (relying on Supreme Court precedent); 
Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U.S. 677, 687  (1879) (same); Ex parte Baine, 121 U.S. 
1, 12 (1887) (relying on framers’ intent); Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 
(1889) (same); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297 (1930) (discussing 
American political history); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 7-17 (1948) (relying on 
Supreme Court precedent).  But see Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 534 (McClean, J., 
dissenting) (“There is no nation in Europe which considers itself bound to return to 
his master a fugitive slave, under the civil law or the law of nations.”).  The majority 
in Dred Scott dismissed the notion that looking to changed views on slavery elsewhere 
in the world could be relevant to the Court’s decision in the case.  Id. at 426. 
 97. See infra Part III.A-C  (discussing how America’s distinct history, its well-
developed sense of constitutional uniqueness, and its “head start” in the 
development of its constitutional law contributes to American constitutional 
insularity). 
 98. See infra Part III.D (attributing a portion of American constitutional insularity 
to the U.S. legal educational system’s narrow focus on the particulars of American 
law). 
 99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-89 (1966) (referring to the laws of 
countries such as England, Scotland and India (where curbs on interrogation 
methods had long been in place) to demonstrate that the adoption of similar curbs 
on interrogation methods in America would create no significant detrimental effect 
to U.S. law enforcement); Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (noting 
the use of similar rules under the English legal system to bolster support for its 
determination that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases 
was fundamental to the American system of justice). 
 100. See supra note 12 (examining respectively, the constitutionality of authorizing 
the expatriation of a citizen convicted of wartime desertion, the constitutionality of 
applying the death penalty in instances of rape, and the constitutionality of applying 
the death penalty in instances of felony murder where the defendant did not intend 
to kill the victim). 
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However, for most constitutional questions, the Court has treated 
American law as a closed system containing all the relevant resources 
for adjudication.  On those occasions when the Court has considered 
comparative precedent, it has typically limited itself to general 
assertions regarding the state of the law elsewhere and avoided 
engaging in specific analyses of actual foreign rules or decisions.  The 
Court has treated comparative precedent largely as “window-
dressing”⎯ supplemental support for decisions made for other 
reasons.101 
Recent cases such as Lawrence v. Texas102 and Roper v. Simmons,103 
together with some extrajudicial writings and speeches by individual 
Supreme Court Justices,104 suggest that these longstanding habits of 
                                                          
 101. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law:  Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty 
Decision, 47 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 743 (2005) (providing a comprehensive study of the 
Court’s use of foreign materials from its creation to present day); see, e.g., Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 71 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (mentioning that the 
number of hours a laborer should continuously work was a matter of serious concern 
among “civilized peoples” of other nations); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 
(1908) (characterizing foreign legislation and court opinions as “significant” yet 
noting that such legislation and opinions are not binding authority); O’Malley v. 
Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281 n.8 (1939) (referencing a decision of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa construing a South African act that had adopted identical 
language as that found in Article III, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution); Arver v. 
U.S., 245 U.S. 366, 378-79 (1918) (citing an English conscription act to support the 
Court’s finding that the U.S. military draft during World War I did not violate the 
Constitution). 
 102. 539 U.S. 558 (2002). 
 103. 543 U.S. 551 (2004). 
 104. Sandra Day O’Connor, Commentary, Broadening Our Horizons:  Why American 
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW. 20, 21 (1998) (noting that foreign 
law can increasingly be applied in U.S. courtrooms and particularly in choice-of-law 
disputes); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Perspective, Looking Beyond Our Borders:  The Value of 
a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 330 
(2004) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should look to the Supreme Court 
decisions of other nations for guidance, as foreign Supreme Courts have amassed a 
large body of constitutional jurisprudence during the post-World War II era); 
Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law 
Proceedings (Apr. 2-5, 2003) in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 266 [hereinafter 
Breyer, ASIL Keynote] (suggesting that the “comparitivist” view—that which 
embraces the consideration of foreign law—will ultimately prevail due to the fact that 
there is great value in learning from the common experiences of others); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”:  The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Address Before the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa (Feb. 7, 2006) available at http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html (citing the Court’s decision in 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004), where the Court acknowledged the “the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty,” as 
evidence that the “U.S. Supreme Court will continue to accord a ‘decent Respect to 
the Opinions of [Human]kind’”).  Contra Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the 
American Society of International Law Proceedings (Mar. 31-Apr. 3, 2004), in 98 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (espousing the view that “modern foreign legal materials 
can never be relevant to an interpretation of—to the meaning of—the U.S. 
Constitution”). 
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insularity are eroding.  Many of the Justices have regular contacts and 
established professional relationships with their judicial counterparts 
in other nations.105  Several Justices, including Justices O’Connor,106 
Ginsburg,107 and Breyer,108 have registered off-bench support for a 
greater resort to foreign precedent on a range of issues, including 
constitutional questions.  Justice Kennedy often teaches summer 
courses in comparative constitutional law in Austria.109  In addition to 
death penalty and sexual orientation issues, individual Justices have 
alluded to comparative sources in cases involving affirmative action,110 
free speech,111 freedom/establishment of religion,112 abortion rights,113 
                                                          
 105. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 96 (2004) [hereinafter 
SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD] (discussing the involvement of Justices O’Connor, Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Kennedy and Rehnquist in international judicial summits and exchange 
programs); Stephen Breyer, Dedication at the University of Puerto Rico (2001) in 70 
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1015, 1017 (2001) [hereinafter Breyer, Dedication] (noting his 
participation in meetings with foreign judges). 
 106. See O’Connor, supra note 104, at 21 (“I have had the wonderful opportunity 
to participate in several legal exchanges⎯exchanges with judges and lawyers in Great 
Britain, in France, in India, in Canada, and in Australia, for example.  We have 
compared approaches to criminal law, to administrative law, to court management, 
and to constitutional law.”). 
 107. Ginsburg, supra note 104 (“My message tonight is simply this:  We are the 
losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others.”); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action:  An International 
Human Rights Dialogue, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture (Feb. 11, 1999), in 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 (1999) (asserting that “comparative analysis . . . is relevant 
to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights”). 
 108. Breyer, Dedication, supra note 105, at 1017 (“The global revolution demands 
a more uniform law, say, of commercial transactions or intellectual property.  It 
requires us better to understand other systems of law, as we try to universalize the 
protection of human, as well as commercial, rights.”); Breyer, ASIL Keynote, supra 
note  104,  at 266 (suggesting that comparative materials should not be limited 
strictly to formal decisions of foreign courts, but should also include relevant 
documents that can be readily found on the Internet). 
 109. Toobin, supra note 17, at 44. 
 110. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(“The Court’s observation that race-conscious programs ‘must have a logical end 
point,’ accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative 
action.”) (internal citation omitted) (citing the text of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the United 
States in 1994). 
 111. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 566 n.10 (1976) (contrasting 
the differences between the English and American legal systems); Burson v. 
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (noting the widespread use of secret ballot voting 
systems in all fifty states and in numerous Western democracies); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381-82 (1995) (noting that England, Australia, and 
Canada are all examples of foreign democracies that prohibit anonymous 
campaigning). 
 112. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia & Thomas, J. J., 
dissenting) (comparing the majority’s decision to allow public universities to provide 
scholarships for secular instruction but not for religious instruction with a proposed 
French policy that would ban all religious attire in schools); McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia & Thomas, J. J., dissenting) (contrasting 
the European model of separation of church and state, where religion is strictly 
excluded from the public forum, and the American model, where such strict 
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and other issues.  The number and detail of references to 
international rules and precedent are growing.114 
C.  The Terms of the Present Debate 
The judicial position in favor of using comparative constitutional 
resources generally follows the path outlined in Justice Breyer’s 
remarks in the AU conversation.  Justice Breyer supported the use of 
comparative sources based on the pragmatic perception that the 
systems share common constitutional guarantees, endorse common 
principles, face common questions regarding application of those 
principles, and possess sufficiently similar legal and social structure to 
make the experience of one nation potentially relevant to the 
other.115  He maintained that use of comparative precedent should be 
selective, based on its persuasive value, and never binding on the 
Court.116  He regarded it as a source for potential inspiration or 
instruction, not as a source of controlling law.117 
                                                          
separation was never the intention of the framers).  As an example of the differences 
in the two models, Scalia notes that in the United States, Congress begins each 
legislative session with a prayer, whereas in Europe this would be forbidden.  Id. 
 113. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 135-38 (1973) (summarizing the history of 
English abortion law). 
 114. There is also evidence of growing interest in international precedent among 
lower court judges.  For one example, see the arguments of Judge Guido Calabresi in 
United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466-469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring), 
suggesting that in deciding cases under rational basis review, American courts would 
be wise to take note of how foreign constitutional courts have dealt with similar 
situations—particularly situations where laws that were ostensibly rational when 
enacted, appear to become increasingly irrational over time.  Additionally, the 
former Chief Justice of the D.C. Circuit, Hon. Patricia Wald, has spoken out in 
support of comparative analysis.  See Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International Law 
in the American Adjudicative Process, Debate Before the Federalist Society National 
Lawyer’s Conference (Nov. 15, 2003), in 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 441 (opining 
that while American judges should exercise caution and restraint in relying on 
foreign decisions, there should be no absolute bar to this practice).  These 
sentiments are not shared by all other federal judges; for example, Judge Richard 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently contested the use of comparative precedent.  
See Posner, supra note 17 (maintaining that foreign decisions should not be 
considered persuasive authority in deciding U.S. constitutional issues); see also Hon. 
J. Harvie Wilkinson, 4th Cir., The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 
Debate Before the Federalist Society National Lawyer’s Conference (Nov. 15, 2003), 
in 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423 (“When judges rely on foreign sources, especially 
for difficult constitutional questions concerning domestic social issues, they move the 
bases for judicial decision-making even farther from the realm of both democratic 
accountability and popular acceptance.”); O’Scannlain, supra note 34, at 1900-03 
(suggesting that there are unique social, political, and economic realities in America 
that make reliance on foreign constitutional decisions ill-suited in the American 
jurisprudential system). 
 115. AU Conversation, supra note 1, at 527-34. 
 116. Id. at 533. 
 117. See id. at 524 (“The practice involves opening your eyes to what’s going on 
elsewhere, taking what you can learn for what it is worth, and using it as a point of 
comparison where doing so will prove helpful.”). 
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The Justices who support the use of comparative constitutional 
precedent draw strength for their position from a growing body of 
legal scholarship favoring comparative constitutionalism.  Among the 
leading proponents have been Dean Harold Hongju Koh, Professor 
Vicki Jackson, Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Professor Mark 
Tushnet.  These scholars agree on the many benefits to be realized by 
the study of foreign and international law.  At the core of their 
arguments, they share a belief in the inevitability of comparison 
among different legal systems resulting from globalization.118  In 
addition to globalization on an institutional level, they maintain that 
globalization affects judges on an individual level, as increased 
international exposure causes judges to internalize their broader 
understanding of the world, rendering it “impossible for them to 
recabin their intellectual and professional world.”119 
Professor Jackson classifies the benefits of comparative thinking as 
“internal” or “external.”120  A chief “internal” benefit is access to new 
perspectives and information by looking to judicial opinions 
abroad.121  Foreign perspectives can be particularly instructive with 
                                                          
 118. Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:  
Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 583, 600 (1999) [hereinafter Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance] (noting that in nearly 
all instances, people are influenced by what they think they know about other 
countries); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism:  Of Continuities and Comparative 
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 278-79 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, 
Narratives of Federalism] (arguing that because people always make implicit 
comparisons, it is critical that decision makers have an accurate sense of what makes 
the U.S unique or, on the other hand, what makes the U.S. similar to other “civilized 
nations”); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons:  Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 119-20 (2005) [hereinafter Jackson, Constitutional 
Comparisons] (arguing that since judges necessarily have impressions about other 
countries, and these impressions may influence U.S. constitutionalism, it is critical 
for the sake of transparency, that these judges overtly state in their opinions what it is 
they believe to be true of other countries).  Jackson maintains that such overt 
references create accountability and prevent court decisions based on erroneous 
misconceptions from remaining good law.  Id.  See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A 
Brave New Judicial World, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 297-98 
(Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) [hereinafter Slaughter, Brave] (noting that in a 
globalized world, where access to information is readily available and where travel to 
foreign countries is common, it is impossible to insulate judges from the universe of 
ideas stemming from other legal systems). 
 119. Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 297. 
 120. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 255-63 (explaining that 
“internal utility” refers to the “process by which a judge reasons about and decides a 
case for herself,” whereas “external legitimacy” refers to the practice of “invoking the 
decisions of other constitutional courts . . . to enhance the legitimacy of a court’s 
reasoning and result before particular audiences”). 
 121. Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 293-94 (suggesting that studying foreign 
decisions is helpful in that they “may cast an issue in a different and more tractable 
light”). 
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respect to “common areas of human experience,”122 and basic 
concepts such as liberty, equal protection, and privacy.123  
Examination of other nations’ approaches should enable U.S. courts 
to produce better-reasoned and more sophisticated judicial opinions 
by adding depth and breadth to their analyses.  Additionally, it gives 
domestic courts an opportunity to prepare for potential future cases 
that other courts have already addressed124 or to gain insight into the 
consequences of different interpretations and rule adoptions.125  
Further, comparative analysis allows a more refined understanding of 
our own constitutional system by highlighting its differences from 
other systems.126  Dean Slaughter argues that this deeper 
understanding of American law does not necessarily favor uniformity 
as the likely outcome of global dialogue; rather, “informed 
divergence” is just as likely an outcome.127  Finally, comparative study 
allows courts to examine whether the assumptions of American 
jurisprudence are as essential as we believe them to be.128 
In addition, several scholars argue that comparative constitutional 
law promises additional benefits related to the global perception of 
the United States.  They dispute the contention by opponents of 
comparative analysis that looking abroad will impair the legitimacy of 
U.S. courts, instead proposing that such analysis “could actually 
strengthen the Court’s legitimacy”129 and “enrich” American law.130  
                                                          
 122. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 254-61 (suggesting that 
comparing constitutional experiences can “provide[] a basis against which divergent 
judgments can be tested”). 
 123. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 
47 (2004) [hereinafter Koh, International Law] (arguing that the United States has 
always shared basic concepts of liberty, equal protection, and privacy with other 
systems). 
 124. Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 293-94 (noting that the examination of 
foreign decisions is particularly useful when the foreign decisions come from 
countries with comparable legal standards). 
 125. See Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 255-61. (suggesting that 
“the experience of other nations can have significant internal utility for legal 
interpretation by demonstrating different approaches to similar ‘functional’ 
questions”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 295 (defining informed divergence as 
“a deliberate decision to pursue an explicitly idiosyncratic path in the face of global 
trends in the other direction,” and noting that there are a host of uniquely American 
justifications available to judges to justify divergence from the prevailing trends in 
global constitutional jurisprudence). 
 128. See Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and 
Fiss-ian Freedoms, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 265, 292 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson, Holistic 
Interpretations] (noting that comparative analysis suggests that U.S. courts’ 
interpretations of freedom of speech could be altered “without impairing a robust 
constitutional democracy”). 
 129. See Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 261 (describing the 
possibility of comparative analysis to “enhance the legitimacy of a court’s reasoning 
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Further, they believe that greater interaction with foreign authority 
will protect the Court’s international stature “against charges of 
ignorance.”131 
The leading scholars favoring comparative constitutionalism offer 
unique perspectives on the study of comparative constitutional law.  
Dean Harold Hongju Koh is a leading advocate of legal 
globalization,132 who centers much of his work on transnational and 
international litigation.133  He builds his argument in support of 
comparative constitutionalism on the premise that U.S. courts should 
look to “international law standards out of a decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind.”134  He urges the development of a 
“transnationalist jurisprudence,” which includes “understanding and 
making reference to foreign constitutional precedents” as an aid to 
constitutional interpretation135⎯not just as an aid to drafting.136 
                                                          
and result before particular audiences”); Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 292 
(arguing that citing foreign decisions neither undermines the Court’s legitimacy nor 
jeopardizes the Court’s integrity). 
 130. Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 299. 
 131. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 263. 
 132. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 305 
(2001) [hereinafter Koh, Globalization of Freedom] (characterizing “the globalization of 
human freedom” as the “most profound social revolution of our time,” and citing the 
fact that the existence of democratic nations across the world has increased nearly 
five fold over the past three decades as evidence of this ongoing revolution). 
 133. E.g., Koh, International Law, supra note 123 (advocating the view that ignoring 
international law standards in U.S. constitutional interpretation would constitute a 
drastic reversal of American jurisprudential history); Harold Hongju Koh, How Are 
International Human Rights Enforced?, Addison C. Harris Lecture (Jan. 21, 1998), 
in 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999) [hereinafter Koh, Harris Lecture] (discussing the role of 
the transnational legal process—that is, the interaction, interpretation, and 
internalization of human rights laws into domestic legal systems—in the enforcement 
of human rights laws); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture:  Bringing 
International Law Home (Apr. 8, 1998), in 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998) [hereinafter 
Koh, Frankel Lecture] (examining the possible reasons why nations obey 
international law); Koh, International Law, supra note 123 (arguing that international 
law should be treated as federal law); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) [hereinafter, Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law?] (examining why nations obey international law); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991) [hereinafter Koh, 
Transnational Public Law] (discussing the role of U.S. courts in handling public 
litigation suits brought by foreign litigants challenging violations of international 
law); Harold Hongju Koh, Judge Wilkey’s Contributions to International Law and the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 1985 BYU L. REV. 647 (1985) (examining the 
opinions of Judge Malcolm Wilkey and chronicling the legacy of this famed 
globalist). 
 134. Koh, International Law, supra note 123, at 44; see also Koh, Transnational Public 
Law, supra note 133, at 2355-56 (noting Justice Marshall’s repeated mandate that the 
United States adhere to the law of nations). 
 135. Koh, International Law, supra note 123, at 53. 
 136. Id. at 54 (“Construing U.S. constitutional law by referring to other nations’ 
constitutional drafters, but not their constitutional interpreters, would be akin to 
operating a building examining the blueprints of others on which it was modeled, 
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Koh’s scholarship highlights an emerging body of transnational law 
that is fundamentally public in character, “rooted in shared national 
norms and emerging international norms, that have similar or 
identical meaning in every national system.”137  This “transnational 
public law,” Koh says, “encourag[es] dialogue between domestic and 
international law-declaring institutions [and] moves us closer to a 
unitary, ‘monist’ legal system, in which domestic and international 
law are integrated.”138  He identifies a “cycle of interaction, 
interpretation, and internalization” of international law in the 
transnational legal process and finds that “[j]udicial internalization 
occurs when litigation in domestic courts provokes judicial 
interpretation of international law norms into domestic law, statutes, 
or constitutional norms.”139  In response to the argument that 
comparative constitutionalism runs counter to democratic principles, 
Koh notes that U.S. courts have a long tradition of unelected judges 
applying law that was made in other jurisdictions.140 
Professor Vicki Jackson advocates what she has termed an 
“engagement model” of comparative constitutional law.141  This 
model approaches constitutional law as a “site of engagement” 
between domestic and foreign sources, and although foreign 
precedent is not viewed as binding⎯or even as necessarily 
persuasive⎯the model admits the utility of comparative analysis.142  
When considering foreign precedent, courts should view it as 
“relational authority,” because courts can use foreign decisions to 
distinguish one country’s legal norms from another’s,143 an approach 
not adequately “foreshadowed by the term ‘persuasive authority.’”144 
Jackson particularly supports comparative constitutional law for 
individual rights questions, but she acknowledges that issues 
centering on federalism might not have as much to gain from foreign 
                                                          
while ignoring all subsequent progress reports on how well those other buildings 
actually functioned over time.”). 
 137. Koh, Globalization of Freedom, supra note 132, at 306. 
 138. Koh, Transnational Public Law, supra note 133, at 2397. 
 139. Koh, Harris Lecture, supra note 133, at 1411, 1413. 
 140. Koh, International Law, supra note 123, at 1852-53 (“Every court in the United 
States . . . applies law that was not made by its own polity whenever the court’s own 
choice-of-law principles so direct.”). 
 141. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons, supra note 118, at 124. 
 142. Id. at 114, 124.  Jackson contrasts her Engagement Model with the 
“Convergence Model,” which views constitutions as “sites for implementation of 
international law or for development of transnational norms” and the “Resistance 
Model,” which views constitutions as no place for foreign influence.  Id. at 112-13. 
 143. Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. 
Court:  Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271, 280, 283 (2003) [hereinafter Jackson, 
Transnational Discourse]. 
 144. Id. at 283. 
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precedent.145  Other issues that can particularly benefit from 
comparative analysis are those that engender “deep controversy over 
internal norms,” and those that turn on matters “of particular 
concern to legal communities beyond the country of decision,” such 
as treatment of foreign nationals.146  Finally, Jackson asserts that the 
legitimacy of comparative constitutional law varies with the issue, and 
courts must consider the quality of reasoning, degree of 
comparability, and institutional origin when determining the weight 
to give foreign precedent.147 
Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter views comparative constitutional 
analysis as part of a broader globalization or “disaggregation of the 
state.”148  Chronicling the growing cross-border exchange among 
national courts with international or supranational tribunals, 
Slaughter characterizes these horizontal and vertical networks as a 
growing “community of courts.”149  She identifies five types of judicial 
interaction that reflect a transactional judicial community:  
constitutional cross-fertilization, collaboration on global human 
rights law, judicial exchange, transnational litigation, and in-person 
meetings.150  Slaughter explains further that international dialogue 
proceeds “through mutual citation, as well as through increasingly 
direct interactions, both face to face and electronic.”151  The outcome 
is an “emerging global jurisprudence.”152 
As comparative judicial dialogue materializes, Slaughter stresses the 
critical importance of actual citation and discussion of foreign 
                                                          
 145. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational 
Judicial Discourse, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 91, 95-96 (2004) [hereinafter Jackson, 
Comparative Constitutional Federalism]; Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, 
at 272. 
 146. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 320-21. 
 147. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons, supra note 118, at 125. 
 148. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks:  the Heart of the Liberal 
Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Gregory 
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Government Networks] 
(describing the disaggregation of the state and the emergence of global government 
networks). 
 149. SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD, supra note 105, at 67-68. 
 150. Id. at 68-69. 
 151. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
191, 195 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter, Global Community] (arguing that “these 
interactions both contribute to a nascent global jurisprudence on particular issues 
and improve the quality of particular national decisions, sometimes by importing 
ideas and sometimes by insisting on an idiosyncratic national approach for specific 
cultural, historical, or political reasons”).  Slaughter goes on to argue that these 
judges are cognizant of the debate in which they are engaging—“the use[] and 
abuse[] of ‘persuasive authority’ from fellow courts within other national legal 
systems.”  Id. 
 152. Id. at 193. 
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authority.153  When courts look to foreign colleagues for inspiration, 
the only way to avoid deception is for judges to cite the materials they 
rely upon as persuasive.154  Courts need to be judicious in their 
determination of which foreign authority is persuasive; the existence 
of a comparable governmental structure and a sense of common 
enterprise is likely needed to render a foreign opinion instructive.155  
Finally, to support the growing inclination of U.S. judges to look 
abroad, Slaughter argues that American lawyers must expand their 
analysis,156 and legal education must adapt accordingly.157 
Professor Mark Tushnet has identified three approaches where the 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution would gain from comparative 
constitutional analysis:  functionalism, expressivism, and bricolage.158  
Functionalism treats constitutional provisions as creating 
“arrangements that serve particular functions in a system of 
governance.”159  Functionalist comparative analysis reveals the ways 
different constitutional provisions accomplish the same purpose in 
various countries.160  Expressivism views constitutions as a mirror to a 
country’s political identity.161  “[S]eeing how things are done in other 
constitutional systems may raise the question of the Constitution’s 
connection to American national character more dramatically than 
                                                          
 153. See Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 292 (stating that U.S. judges’ views will 
be forever changed by their exposure to foreign law, thus “it is far better to be able to 
trace the evolution of their views through citations than to guess at it”). 
 154. See id. at 297 (noting the importance of citation, Slaughter considers “[t]he 
worst of all worlds would be for judges to be deeply but secretly influenced by any set 
of sources”). 
 155. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 99, 127 (1994) [hereinafter Slaughter, Typology] (noting that “[a]ctual 
citation of a foreign authority as persuasive authority . . . assumes that the audience 
for a particular decision will recognize the foreign court as sufficiently like the 
national court, or at least sufficiently embodying [its] aspirations . . . to give weight to 
its words”). 
 156. See Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 148, at 207 (“As American 
lawyers find judges more receptive to foreign law, they will search out foreign 
decisions that support their arguments; judges will then have these citations ready to 
hand for inclusion in their opinions.  It is the beginning of a virtuous circle that may 
finally open the US judiciary and legal profession to the rich wealth of learning and 
experience in other legal systems.”). 
 157. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The International Dimension of the Law School 
Curriculum, 22 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 417, 417 (2004) [hereinafter Slaughter, 
International Dimension] (arguing that as opposed to law schools requiring students 
take international law, it may be more effective for law schools to strongly 
recommend that students take it). 
 158. See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999) [hereinafter Tushnet, Possibilities] (arguing it is a more 
systematic approach to learning comparative constitutional law). 
 159. Id. at 1228. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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reflection on domestic constitutional issues could.”162  “Bricolage” is 
the notion that a constitution has been assembled, not by a well-
structured design, but by borrowing materials that are at the 
“bricoleur’s” disposal.163 As bricoleurs, constitution drafters and 
interpreters utilize the first concept that solves the current legal 
problem.164  Tushnet argues that the U.S. Constitution “licenses 
reliance on experience elsewhere” through each of these 
approaches.165  Although he offers some notes of caution for 
institutional and doctrinal reasons,166 he concludes that these 
reservations do not dictate a rejection of comparative analysis.167 
Tushnet views the reaction against comparative constitutional law 
as unwarranted, because foreign precedent is neither binding on the 
United States, nor has it led the Supreme Court to different results 
than it would have reached analyzing domestic precedent alone.168  
Accordingly, the “unduly heightened rhetoric [against comparative 
constitutionalism] . . . seems strikingly out of proportion to what has 
actually happened on the ground.”169  Comparative constitutionalism 
is not a threat to U.S. sovereignty because the United States is 
perfectly capable of deciding when its interests as a sovereign nation 
are advanced by looking beyond its borders for ideas.170  Similarly, 
comparative constitutionalism does not threaten democratic integrity 
because democratically appointed judges decide to consult foreign 
law.171  Tushnet argues that comparative analysis is consistent with 
                                                          
 162. Id. at 1285. 
 163. Id. at 1229. 
 164. Id. at 1286. 
 165. Id. at 1230. 
 166. See Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively:  Some Cautionary 
Notes, With Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649, 650-61 (2004) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Interpreting] (discussing the importance of the compatibility 
between a constitution’s substantive values and its institutional structure, as well as 
the need to consider doctrinal context when using comparative materials). 
 167. See id. at 650 (noting that concerns about the relevance of comparative law do 
not preclude such analysis entirely). 
 168. See generally Tushnet, Possibilities, supra note 158 (describing three approaches 
that would help contribute to the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution); Tushnet, 
When Is Knowing Less Better?, supra note 34 (discussing three main arguments against 
referencing non-U.S. law). 
 169.  Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
239, 267 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic]; see also MARK 
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 142-64 (2003) (“We have seen little 
effects of globalization on constitutional doctrine because, in the new constitutional 
order, large-scale developments generally have small-scale effects.”). 
 170.  See Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic, supra note 169, at 261-62 (noting that 
nations, taking into account their interests, can limit their sovereignty through 
agreements with other nations). 
 171.  See id. at 262 (noting that when U.S. decision makers apply international law, 
there is no threat to sovereignty); Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better?, supra note 
34, at 1286 (noting that no Supreme Court decision has used foreign authority as 
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originalism where evidence indicates that the Framers intended 
courts to look abroad.172  The risk of “cherry-picking” is no more 
prevalent when the “cherries” are foreign precedents than when they 
are legislative history,173 and in many respects use of foreign 
precedents is “indistinguishable” from citation to other nonbinding 
sources.174 
Finally, Tushnet argues that the role of the United States as an 
influence on the world community depends in part on the willingness 
of U.S. courts to engage with the courts of other countries.175  Even if a 
“reciprocal pay-off about constitutional policy” fails to materialize, 
comparative study remains valuable as an exercise in training and 
intellectual interest.176 
Just as Justice Breyer’s AU conversation remarks capture the 
affirmative view of using comparative constitutional precedent, 
Justice Scalia’s response, and the confirmation testimony by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, equally encapsulate the opposing 
position.  Justices Scalia, Roberts, and Alito argue that U.S. 
constitutional principles are inherently unique, deriving from the 
history of their creation and popular ratification as part of the United 
States Constitution.177  This view renders foreign precedent simply 
irrelevant, even when it addresses similar concerns, because it is not 
rooted in the American constitutional experience and does not 
concern American legal institutions.178  Justice Scalia’s commitment to 
                                                          
precedent to interpret the U.S. Constitution); see also Tushnet, Interpreting, supra note 
166, at 649 (dismissing the “emerging conservative critique” that distrusts the 
ramifications of comparative analysis on democracy). 
 172. See Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better?, supra note 34, at 1279 (using as an 
example the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 
which the Supreme Court has held must be interpreted by the common standards of 
decency, which can be gleaned from positions held in other countries). 
 173. Id. at 1280-81 (referring to Judge Roberts’s comment arguing that judges will 
use those foreign sources that support their position while ignoring those that do 
not). 
 174. Id. at 1288 (using as an example a citation to a law review article). 
 175. Id. at 1292 (“Perhaps merely explaining ourselves might have been enough in 
1776 or 1862.  But today, others will not listen unless we display some reciprocity.”). 
 176. Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest:  Observations on Some Putative Benefits of 
Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 349 (1998) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Returning]; see also Tushnet, Interpreting, supra note 166, at 663 
(promoting comparative constitutionalism “because the subject has an intrinsic 
intellectual interest, and because knowing more rather than less is generally a good 
thing”). 
 177. AU Conversation, supra note 1, at 521 (“[W]e don’t have the same moral and 
legal framework as the rest of the world, and never have.  If you told the Framers of 
the Constitution that we’re to be just like Europe, they would have been appalled.”) 
(Scalia response). 
 178. Id. at 526 (“[A judge should look to] the standards of decency of American 
society . . . not the standards of decency of countries that don’t have our 
background, that don’t have our culture, that don’t have our moral views.”).  Scalia 
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a textualist interpretation of original intention as the sine qua non of 
U.S. constitutional interpretation reinforces his position against using 
comparative constitutional precedent.179  Obviously, the search for 
original intention is not aided by consideration of modern 
comparative constitutional adjudication unless the creators of the 
American constitutional norm in question signified an intention to 
use such comparative materials as a guide.180  Finding no such 
intention, Justice Scalia and other originalists reject the entire 
enterprise of comparative constitutional reasoning.  Justice Scalia’s 
advice to Justice Breyer in the AU conversation captures this position:  
“Look, I’m not preventing you from reading these [foreign] 
cases. . . .  Just don’t put [them] in your opinions!”181 
Building on this negative argument, Chief Justice Roberts has 
added the observation that reliance on foreign precedent creates a 
danger of judicial unaccountability, since the judges in other systems 
are not accountable to the American people, and that reliance on 
comparative precedent cloaks result-oriented decisions, as judges 
selectively cite only that comparative law which supports their 
decisions.  Justice Alito has added concerns about the difficulty of 
understanding foreign precedent, which necessarily arise from 
unfamiliar legal, political, and governmental terrains. 
While there has been less academic scholarship registering clear 
opposition to the use of comparative precedent, the negative position 
finds support in testimony before Congress by Michael Ramsey, as 
well as recent articles by Professors Roger Alford, Eugene 
Kontorovich, and Steven Calabresi, and others.182  Along with the 
                                                          
also argued that looking to European law was inappropriate in Lawrence v. Texas 
because that law was established “not as a consequence of some democratic ballot 
but by decree of the European Court of Rights.”  Id. at 531. 
 179. Id. at 537 (“Now if you’re following an originalist approach, you ask, what did 
the Framers believe constituted due process of law? . . . Whereas if you just say due 
process of law is an invitation for intelligent judges and lawyers and law students to 
imagine what they consider to be due process and consult foreign judges, then, 
indeed, you do not know what you’re saying when you swear to uphold and defend 
the Constitution of the United States. It morphs. It changes.”) (Scalia response). 
 180. But see Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”:  
Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic 
Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1309-15 (2004) (arguing against 
the usage of foreign law, even in human rights cases and where one must apply 
natural law). 
 181. AU Conversation, supra note 1, at 534. 
 182. See generally Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American 
Law:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 18-28 (2004) (testimony of Michael Ramsey) (arguing that use of 
foreign materials when making moral and social policy should be left to the 
legislature and exceeds prescribed judicial powers); Roger P. Alford, In Search of a 
Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639 (2005) [hereinafter 
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judicial and legislative developments mentioned in the Introduction, 
there has been a recent outpouring of commentary opposing the use 
of comparative constitutional materials.  Professors Robert Delahunty 
and John Yoo recently declared that “[f]oreign and international law 
cannot be legitimately used in an outcome-determinative way to 
decide questions of constitutional interpretation.”183  This statement 
reveals the persistent concern among commentators that reference to 
foreign law is the functional equivalent of deference to that law.  
Professor Ernest Young, for example, has argued that the Supreme 
Court’s Roper analysis “swell[ed] the denominator”184 by including 
foreign jurisdictions to articulate a global consensus about the death 
penalty for juveniles when a domestic consensus proved elusive.185  
Others have contended that ascribing authoritative weight to foreign 
                                                          
Alford, In Search of a Theory] (discussing the propriety of constitutional interpretation 
under four theories—originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and pragmatism); 
Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675 (2003) (proposing a method by which federal courts can decide 
how much deference to give to international decisions); Alford, Misusing International 
Sources, supra note 34 (arguing that using international sources in interpreting the 
Constitution violates the Supremacy Clause); Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, The 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law:  An 
Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004) (concluding that the use of 
foreign materials is “most relevant to good policy-making or to assessments of 
reasonableness and least relevant to questions of interpretation”); Donald E. 
Childress III, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 
53 DUKE L.J. 193 (2003) (arguing that the correct political order can not be achieved 
through the judiciary alone); Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291 (2005) (arguing that foreign materials cannot be used to 
determine constitutional questions unless the text of the Constitution itself refers to 
international law); Donald J. Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail 
Party of International Law:  The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and 
International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 507 (2006); Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 
17; Larsen, supra note 180; John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 303 (2006) (arguing that judges should not assume international law is 
“intrinsically good” and should therefore not utilize such sources, which are not 
formulated in the same democratic process); Ramsey, supra note 17; Carlos F. 
Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 269 (2003) (arguing that borrowing foreign law should be limited for 
constitutional design and not used for constitutional interpretation); Ernest A. 
Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005). 
 183. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 182, at 296. 
 184. Young, supra note 182, at 153. 
 185. Id. at 151 (arguing that “including foreign jurisdictions in the denominator 
of noses that count accords authoritative weight to their choices”).  “In this situation, 
those choices—for example, to adopt or reject the juvenile death penalty—have legal 
significance without regard to the reasons for the choice.”  Id. 
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decisions186 grants persuasive weight to the results of foreign law 
without any regard to the reasons behind those results.187 
Scholarship opposing the use of comparative materials in 
constitutional decision-making articulates several recurring themes:  
(1) comparative analysis represents a threat to democracy and 
sovereignty, (2) comparative materials have only been used 
haphazardly and opportunistically, and (3) the Supreme Court lacks 
the institutional capacity to properly interpret foreign and 
international law. 
Critics of comparative constitutional analysis often perceive it as a 
threat to democracy.188  Looking to judicial decisions and laws abroad 
effects a countermajoritarian allocation of decision-making power to 
foreign bodies when their views conflict with domestic values.189  For 
example, Judge Richard Posner objects to the citation of foreign 
judicial decisions by pointing to the lack of democratic legitimacy of 
foreign judges in the United States.190  Donald Childress sees 
comparative analysis as a symptom of excessive judicial power here, as 
“the Court sets itself up to usurp the law from its organic ground:  the 
American people.”191  Related to the subversion of democracy through 
reference to foreign law is the argument that comparative analysis 
                                                          
 186. See, e.g., Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 34, at 60 (stating that 
“Atkins thus reaffirms the international countermajoritarian difficulty:  the global 
consensus does not provide content to the national consensus and the global 
consensus is of no relevance in the absence of a national consensus”). 
 187. See, e.g., Young, supra note 182, at 155 (contending that “[t]he Court is not 
persuaded by new rationales, but rather by the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions 
take a particular view.  It has not ‘learned’ anything from looking abroad . . . [i]t is 
deferring to numbers, not reasons”); Larsen, supra note 180, at 1291-92, 1297 
(observing that the Rehnquist Court resisted reason-borrowing and instead 
employed the more problematic method of moral fact-finding when examining 
foreign law; in Lawrence, for example, “it was the mere fact that other nations . . . had 
accepted the right the petitioners sought that the Court deemed important”).  But see 
Calabresi, supra note 182, at 1105 (regarding determinations of reasonableness, “this 
nose-counting inquiry is entirely appropriate, although it may not always be 
dispositive”). 
 188. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz, supra note 182, at 285 (arguing that Argentina’s 
experience of borrowing from the U.S. Constitution is comprised of collective 
choices made by the United States); Kochan, supra note 182, at 507 (declaring 
citation of foreign law as “inappropriate, undemocratic, and dangerous”). 
 189. See Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 34, at 58 (defining the 
countermajoritarian misuse of comparative analysis as occurring “when the ‘global 
opinions of mankind’ are ascribed constitutional value to thwart the domestic 
opinions of Americans”). 
 190. Posner, supra note 17. 
 191. Childress, supra note 182, at 217; see also Delahunty, supra note 182, at 309-10 
(arguing that “[b]y relying on foreign sources of law to interpret the Constitution, 
the Court undermines the very delegation of authority that gives it the power of 
judicial review”). 
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destroys American separation of powers192 and undermines national 
sovereignty.193  As Donald Kochan has asserted, “[a] Nation should 
have the freedom to control the development of its own laws.  The 
elected branches, which develop U.S. law, lose that control if judges 
are able to exhort extraterritorial and extra-constitutional sources for 
the determination of legally applicable standards.”194 
In addition, some criticize that use of comparative constitutional 
law is opportunistic and haphazard.195  Professor Ramsey notes that 
“[i]f we are serious about the project of using international materials, 
we must ‘take the bitter with the sweet,’ and use international 
materials to contradict, not merely confirm, our own view of rights.”196  
Moreover, Ramsey argues that “[t]he most trenchant critique of this 
use of international materials is that it serves as mere cover for the 
expansion of selected rights favored by domestic advocacy groups, for 
reasons having nothing to do with anything international.”197  
According to this view, judges “cherry-pick” only those foreign 
authorities that suit their personal legal preferences.198  Further, some 
commentators believe that the haphazard citation of foreign 
authority creates uncertainty about the law.199  Several critics, 
including Ramsey, have sought to provide elaborate guidelines to 
ensure more systematic references to foreign law.200 
                                                          
 192. See Kochan, supra note 182, at 539 (providing that “[i]f the United States is to 
have an independent but limited judiciary, the courts must feel constitutionally 
constrained from searching for, and then applying, extraterritorial sources for 
purported authority in reaching decisions”). 
 193. See, e.g., Delahunty, supra note 182, at 299 (stating that deference to foreign 
law “would subject American citizens to the judgments of foreign and international 
courts”). 
 194. Kochan, supra note 182, at 541-42. 
 195. See, e.g., Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 34, at 69 (arguing 
that “[i]f international and foreign sources are arrows in the quiver of constitutional 
interpretation, those arrows should pierce our constitutional jurisprudence to 
produce results that we celebrate and that we abhor.  Put simply, . . . the results will 
by no means herald a capacious enhancement of civil liberties in this country”); 
Ramsey, supra note 17, at 76 (contending that comparative analysis must “not be 
used only in support of rights-enhancing outcomes”). 
 196. Ramsey, supra note 17, at 77. 
 197. Id. at 69. 
 198. Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better?, supra note 34, at 1280. 
 199. See Kochan, supra note 182, at 543 (stating that the effect of determining 
which international law should be used as authority is that the law loses 
predictability). 
 200. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 17, at 69-70 (articulating four guidelines for the 
use of international materials in defining domestic constitutional rights:  (1) creating 
a neutral theory by which to select international sources and their relevance; 
(2) using sources that do not support the position as well as those that do; (3) 
utilizing empirical inquiry rather than broad generalizations; and (4) avoiding 
materials that rely on “unrepresentative proxies”). 
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A related indictment of the Supreme Court’s reference to foreign 
authority asserts that the Court lacks the institutional competence to 
critique international law.201  Judge Posner has pointed to language 
barriers and insufficient judicial understanding of the legal and 
political circumstances surrounding foreign law.202  Additionally, 
Professor Young argues that both decision costs and error costs are 
likely to be high when courts use comparative materials due to lack of 
international legal training as well as language and cultural 
barriers.203 
Nevertheless, many scholars cautioning against the use of 
comparative materials in constitutional law stop short of taking an 
absolute position; rather, they acknowledge limited instances when 
comparative analysis may properly aid courts.204  For example, 
Professor Larsen considers both expository and empirical uses of 
foreign law to be justifiable and views substantive reason-borrowing to 
be superior to moral fact-finding.205  In addition, several anti-
comparative scholars admit the value of negative use of foreign 
materials, specifically by examining a foreign rule and expressly 
taking a different path.206 
These arguments against comparative constitutionalism have been 
amplified by the public reaction in the wake of Roper v. Simmons.207  In 
introducing a proposed congressional resolution condemning the 
use of foreign precedent, Senator Cornyn effectively characterized 
much of the larger public negative view.  The resolution itself asserts 
“that judicial interpretation regarding the meaning of the 
                                                          
 201. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 182, at 320 (arguing that in order to use 
international law, judges would have to also do a comparative analysis of both the 
culture and legal systems); Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 34, at 64-
65 (noting this weakness makes judges susceptible to an undue reliance on foreign 
legal advocacy). 
 202. See Posner, supra note 17 (suggesting that legal translations are particularly 
susceptible to misunderstandings). 
 203. Young, supra note 182, at 165-67. 
 204. See, e.g., id. at 151-52 (stating that the benefit of persuasive authority stems 
from “engagement with the reasons for a practice or decision”); Calabresi, supra note 
182, at 1106 (maintaining that “foreign court decisions are relevant to policy making, 
but not to interpretation”); Childress, supra note 182, at 204 (noting that “even the 
most committed textualist encounters times where it is necessary to plug holes in the 
process of interpretation”). 
 205. See Larsen, supra note 180, at 1295-96 (noting that such use is permissible 
because it looks “to the judgments and practices of foreign nations and international 
agreements to determine what the content of the domestic constitutional law should 
be”). 
 206. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz, supra note 182, at 290 (stating that negative use of 
international materials is permissible because a judge’s decision to do so is an 
autonomous one that confirms the differences between constitutional systems). 
 207. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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Constitution of the United States should not be based in whole or in 
part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions 
unless such judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an 
understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States.”208  In advocating the resolution, Cornyn decried the 
trend toward judicial use of foreign precedent as eroding the control 
of the American people over “what our laws and our Constitution 
mean, and what our policies in America should be.”209  He equated 
the use of foreign precedent with delegation of American judicial 
power to foreign courts.210  He also suggested that judges who look to 
foreign law may be violating their oath to discharge their 
constitutional duties.211  He asserted that such a step offends the 
democratic process because international law is not accountable to 
the American people.212  He also asserted that the use of foreign 
precedent was “selective, not principled,” and motivated by an 
ideological agenda that threatens to interfere with the powers of the 
President and Congress over the direction of foreign policy.213 
II. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL INSULARITY 
Contemporary negative reactions to the use of comparative 
constitutional precedent tap into a longstanding tradition of 
exceptionalism and particularism in American attitudes toward 
foreign law.  There are at least four reasons why the United States has 
been insular in the development of constitutional law for so much of 
its legal history:  (1) a broader historic tradition of separateness that 
has characterized all American law, politics and foreign policy, (2) a 
well-developed sense of the United States’ own constitutional 
uniqueness, (3) its long “head start” in the development of its 
constitutional law and the resulting advanced state of U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence, and (4) the habits and practices of 
American legal education. 
                                                          
 208. S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 209. Gebe Martinez, Cornyn Suggests “Political Decisions” May Be a Factor in Recent 
Incidents at Courthouses, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 5, 2005, at A7. 
 210. 151 CONG. REC. 3109, 3111 (2005). 
 211. Id. at 3110. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  These arguments prompted a stinging response from Justice Scalia, who 
made clear that he believes Congress is going too far in trying to tell judges how to 
adjudicate cases.  See Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Minds its Own Business, 
WASH. POST, May 19, 2006, at A19 (stating “[t]he proposed legislation ‘is like telling 
us not to use certain principles of logic,’ . . . ‘Let us make our mistakes just as we let 
you make yours’”). 
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A. Tradition of Separateness 
The United States, for much of its history, has chosen an insular 
path in the development of law and politics.214  This insularity no 
doubt originally had much to do with U.S. geographic separation.215  
Recent technological advances have erased much of that sense of 
physical separation.216  Nevertheless, physical separation has 
influenced the historical development of U.S. law. 
Accompanying that physical isolation was the national sentiment of 
uniqueness.  For example, American cultural tradition is closely 
associated with such icons as the pioneer spirit, manifest destiny, and 
the metaphor of the United States as a moral and political “beacon 
on a hill,” committed to the development of a transformed society 
fundamentally different in character from its European forebears.217  
In this view, the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights (along with the 
Declaration of Independence) are salient expressions of the unique 
character of American democracy.  Thus, they are venerated to an 
extent rarely extended to similar legal documents in other political 
systems.218  For example, the national bicentennial celebrations of the 
                                                          
 214. See ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:  ITS ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT 13-19 (6th ed. 1983) (illustrating the formation of local governments 
in the colonies). 
 215. See ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMPLE, AMERICAN HISTORY AND ITS GEOGRAPHIC 
CONDITIONS 1 (1903) (stating that America’s location opposite Europe was an 
important geographical fact in its history and that its location opposite Asia would 
lend its future history). 
 216. See John King Gamble, New Information Technologies and the Source of 
International Law:  Convergence, Divergence, Obsolescence and/or Transformation, 41 
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 170, 205 (1998) (stating that the technology evolution “will 
make state institutions less formidable and the barriers between states more 
porous”); Manfred Lachs, Thoughts on Science, Technology and World Law, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 673, 679-80 (1992) (attributing a growing international interdependence in 
law to the development of technology). 
 217. See generally PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 
(rev. ed. 1998); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA:  A SHORT HISTORY 75-80 
(2002) (discussing how Puritanism influenced ideas of crime and punishment); 
Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:  The Insular Cases 
(1910-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 284-99 (1996) (discussing the collective 
psychology underlying manifest destiny and its effect on American jurisprudence). 
Professor Tushnet argues that the view of the United States as a “shining city upon a 
hill” feeds courts’ reluctance to look beyond our borders for guidance. Mark 
Tushnet, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”:  Referring to Foreign Law to 
Express American Nationhood, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 809, 811 (2006).  The traditional 
viewpoint is that a nation thus situated is one to which other should look, but 
Tushnet argues that “[i]t is not unreasonable to think that in a post-imperialist world 
they will be more willing to emulate us when we demonstrate to them that we take 
them seriously.” Id. at 812. 
 218. This view of the Constitution began with the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, who felt the eyes of the world on them.  CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, 
MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 134 (1966).  Indeed, “Europe for her part kept a watchful 
eye on the American States.”  Id.; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 2 (1988) (noting that Madison viewed the Constitution as a 
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Declaration of Independence in the 1970s and of the Constitution in 
the 1980s were unprecedented.  The federal statute requiring U.S. 
law schools receiving federal funds to set aside Constitution Day in 
September for special Constitution-related legal instruction further 
demonstrates this reverence.219 
Flowing from these traditions of independence and separation has 
been a fairly consistent habit of insularity in foreign policy and 
attitudes toward foreign law.220  From the beginning there have been 
strong political currents resisting U.S. involvement in international 
affairs, especially in situations requiring substantial cooperation with 
other nations and incorporation of their views into American 
policy.221  Since World War II, that attitude has changed significantly, 
as the United States has become a leader on the world political stage, 
but long habits of insularity and independence have left their marks 
on American law, including American constitutional doctrines. 
The effect on law has been a prolonged resistance to foreign 
influence.  Foreign laws and the “law of nations” have had a place in 
American law since the beginnings of the Republic,222 but reliance on 
foreign judgments and legal principles has always proceeded with 
caution, subject to a variety of limiting doctrines affording American 
courts discretion to disregard foreign law in circumstances where 
they deem it to be inconsistent with American interests and 
policies.223  Even areas of shared doctrine with other common law 
nations, such as torts, property, and commercial law, have witnessed a 
                                                          
possible vehicle for promoting “the cause of Liberty throughout the world”).  
Professor Paul W. Kahn has noted that this viewpoint persists today.  Paul W. Kahn, 
American Hegemony and International Law Speaking Law to Power:  Popular Sovereignty, 
Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2000) (stating 
“America’s relationship to the rest of the world still seems to us to be one of 
example:  the ‘city on a hill’ that the rest of the world is to imitate”). 
 219. See 36 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 220. See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 149, 191 n.136 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) 
(noting that “many senators—most notably Senator Bricker—were deeply concerned 
about the tendency of state and federal courts in the late 1940s to cite international 
treaty commitments in support of domestic human rights claims”). 
 221. See Harlan Grant Cohen, The American Challenge to International Law:  A 
Tentative Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 551, 556-60 (2003) (discussing 
generally American resistance to involvement in international affairs). 
 222. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text; see also Calabresi & Zimdahl, 
supra note 101, at 743 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Roper v. Simmons, where 
she stated that notions of human dignity are not “wholly isolated from, nor 
inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other countries”). 
 223. Vicki Jackson has suggested that foreign precedent be viewed as relational 
authority to advance the notion that courts are connected through their shared 
challenges, even though they are not bound by each other’s decisions.  See Jackson, 
Transnational Discourse, supra note 143. 
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strong resistance to influence from foreign legal principles or 
precedent.224 
B. Constitutional Uniqueness 
Perhaps in part because Americans regard the United States as 
fundamentally different from all other nations, they also regard the 
Constitution as unique among world organs of government.225  The 
drafters and ratifiers of the U.S. Constitution initiated this view when 
they declared that the U.S. Constitution broke new ground in world 
political history.226  The delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
self-consciously treated their efforts as a fundamental departure from 
the predominant governmental practices of Europe.  They frequently 
told each other that the entire world would be watching this 
extraordinary experiment in true popular self-government, which if 
successful would serve as a model for the rest of human kind.227 
From this perspective one might infer that the constitutional law of 
other nations should be irrelevant to American constitutional 
principles.228  Because the Constitution was designed from the start to 
be different, the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting it should also be 
unique.  Borrowing principles or concepts from other nations could 
introduce a corrupting influence, drawing U.S. constitutional law 
                                                          
 224. See, e.g., O’Scannlain, supra note 34, at 1903 (arguing that U.S. property law 
grew out of the colonies’ unprecedented access to land, and is thus not appropriate 
for comparative analysis); Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial 
Review, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 23, 50 (2004) (arguing that foreign influence has no 
place in tort law, and speculating that “the Atkins Court’s willingness to strike down 
punishments it personally deems excessive may lead to a similar expansion of the 
Court’s interference with state tort law”); Jens C. Dammann, The Role of Comparative 
Law in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 513, 526 n.55 
(2002) (questioning the appropriateness of referencing foreign authorities in 
commercial law). 
 225. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181-82, 
188-93 (1999) (discussing how the United States Constitution is an expression of 
American character); see also Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification:  
Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 830-32 
(1999) (defining “legal particularlism” as a doctrine which emphasizes that “legal 
norms and institutions generally . . . emerge from and reflect particular national 
circumstances, most centrally a nation’s history and political culture”). 
 226. See Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 255-61 (describing 
American constitutional exceptionalism and the theory that the U.S. Constitution 
enabled a more progressive form of government than any other political system in 
the world). 
 227. Id. 
 228. For example, Justice Scalia made his feelings on comparative analysis clear in 
numerous opinions.  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justice Scalia noted that that “[w]e 
must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we 
are expounding.”  487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988).  Similarly, in Printz v. United States, 
Justice Scalia suggested that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution.”  521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997). 
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back into the swamp of outmoded forms and ideas its creators sought 
to escape.229  One detects some of this attitude in the negative 
arguments of Justice Scalia, Senator Cornyn and others described 
above, as well as in some of the conservative criticism Justice Kennedy 
received in the wake of the Roper and Lawrence decisions.230 
In addition to this sense of conscious difference, the widely shared 
understanding of the Constitution as a social contract, adopted by 
and for the people of the United States,231 stresses indigenous control 
over the meaning and application of the Constitution by individuals 
and institutions accountable (directly or indirectly) to popular 
control.232  Regard to foreign constitutional interpretations, even 
when devoted to identical language or principles, arguably risks 
improper delegation of constitutional control to agents independent 
of such constitutional accountability.  How could law from another 
society outside the American political and social contract add to the 
development of American constitutional law?  Once again, this 
viewpoint appears in Chief Justice Roberts’s233 and Senator Cornyn’s 
remarks,234 as well as in some of the academic criticism of comparative 
constitutionalism.235  Presence of these views over a long period has 
                                                          
 229. Justice Scalia made this very point in his discussion with Justice Breyer at 
American University.  AU Conversation, supra note 1; see also quotations, supra notes 
4, 177 (maintaining that “we don’t have the same moral and legal framework as the 
rest of the world”). 
 230. See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Supreme Court 5 Runs Roughshod Over Will of the People, 
COPLEY NEWS SERV., Mar. 14, 2005 (“[M]ost other countries don’t allow jury trials or 
other Bill of Rights guarantees, so who knows if the accused ever gets what we would 
call a fair trial?  Over 90 percent of jury trials are in the United States, and we 
certainly don’t want to conform to non-jury-trial countries.”); Stuart Taylor Jr., The 
Court, And Foreign Friends, as Constitutional Convention, NAT’L J., Mar. 5, 2005. 
And if international standards are to be our guide, what of the facts that—by 
decree of the Supreme Court—the United States alone broadly bars 
prosecutors from using illegally seized evidence; is one of only six countries 
to allow abortion on demand until the fetus is viable; and is quite 
exceptional in requiring strict separation of church and state? 
 231. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see Paul L. Kahn, American Exceptionalism, Popular 
Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 198, 
198 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (stating that the Constitution “produces the 
absolute bedrock of the American political myth:  the rule of law is the rule of the 
people”). 
 232. Chief Justice Roberts voiced this concern in his confirmation hearing, noting 
that “If we’re relying on a decision from a German judge about what our 
Constitution means, no president accountable to the [U.S.] people appointed that 
judge and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that judge.”  Roberts 
Hearing, supra note 18, at 201. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See supra note 19 (questioning how the Supreme Court can strike down state 
death penalty laws while relying on foreign laws). 
 235. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz, supra note 182, at 285 (describing constitutional 
borrowing as a “deferral of the final word to others in constitutional matters”); 
Kochan, supra note 182, at 546-49 (pointing to democracy concerns arising from the 
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contributed significantly to the United States’ sense of constitutional 
isolation. 
Adding to this sense of isolation have been historically important 
political differences in the structure of American government, 
together with social and cultural differences that set many of the 
constitutional challenges facing the United States apart.  With respect 
to political difference, probably the most salient factor was the 
division of American government between the national government 
and the states, with the accompanying doctrine of federalism that 
colors a wide range of American constitutional questions.236  Until 
very recently, no other government had such a system for vertically 
dividing sovereignty.237  Even in those foreign systems where 
significant political subdivisions did exist, none enjoyed the kinds of 
autonomy typically enjoyed by the American states.238  With respect to 
society and culture, factors such as American racial divisions, the 
presence and continual influx of immigrant populations, national 
expansion and settlement of new territory, upward (and downward) 
economic mobility, and religious diversity seemed to set American 
society apart, particularly from those European nations that might 
otherwise have seemed a potential source of constitutional 
thinking.239 
                                                          
use of foreign authority); Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 182, at 709-10 
(viewing comparative theory as weak in its ability to support democratic, majoritarian 
goals). 
 236. See Keith Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism:  A Lesson from 
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2000) (“Both of 
the Constitution’s central structural principles—federalism and the separation of 
powers—reflect this aspiration of balance between the ideals of effective government 
and limited government.”); Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1191, 1198-08 (2003) (discussing the notion that the Supreme Court has 
taken federalism too far in some recent constitutional cases). 
 237. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AMERICA THE UNUSUAL 8 (1999) (pointing out the 
division between the national, state and local governments, and noting that each 
division reserves a certain set of powers). 
 238. See id.  (“In contrast to the unitary system found in some other countries, in 
which regional governments are simply administrative units of the central 
government, the American federal system provides for states to have their own 
sovereign powers.”). 
 239. Id.; see Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy:  The 
Establishment Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 868 
(2005) (discussing the Establishment Clause as a reflection of America’s unique 
approach to religious diversity); Daniel P. Franklin, American Political Culture and 
Constitutionalism, in POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM:  A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 43, 45 (Daniel P. Franklin & Michael J. Baun eds., 1995) (stating that the 
common immigrant experience unifies American society and culture). 
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C. A Constitutional Head Start 
As matters played out, the United States had roughly a 150-year 
head start on other nations in the development of constitutional 
principles, especially those concerning human rights.240  This 
occurred because other nations (even democratic ones) simply did 
not have anything like the U.S. system of constitutional rules, 
principles, and judicial interpretation during the nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth century.241  For that long period, the 
U.S. Supreme Court largely had to rely on itself.  The Court drew on 
its own thinking, plus historical American materials, because there 
was no other source.242 
Thus, by the postwar period when other international 
constitutional courts first significantly arose, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had already built a substantial domestic body of precedent on a wide 
range of constitutional issues.  So much American precedent had 
accumulated that there seemed to be little need to resort to the 
decisions of other nations’ courts.  American constitutional law 
ranged far ahead of other national systems in its development of 
detailed and nuanced constitutional doctrine, particularly 
concerning human rights.243  The Court’s own prior decisions thus 
provided more relevant and instructive teaching than anything that 
could have been gleaned from other jurisdictions.  On constitutional 
questions, U.S. law was considerably ahead of the rest of the world.244 
In addition, partly as a result of its long period of relatively solitary 
constitutional adjudication, American courts developed modes of 
constitutional analysis that tied them even more tightly to domestic 
law.  There are deep roots to this insular analytical approach.  For 
                                                          
 240. See Ackerman, supra note 37, at 780-87 (describing the problems faced by 
India, Hungary and Russia in devising a constitution while tackling difficult human 
rights issues). 
 241. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. 
 242. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks (1989), in 
GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW:  PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN 
SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (stating that 
U.S. courts could not look to foreign courts for nearly a century and a half because 
foreign courts lacked the power of judicial review); Sarah K. Harding, Comparative 
Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 422-23 (2003) (noting that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has historically expanded the rights of American citizens 
without guidance from foreign precedent). 
 243. See Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1971, 1989 (2004) (arguing that American lawmakers believed 
“[i]nternational human rights were American rights”). 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 1987-90 (indicating that continental Europe looked to 
American law for guidance after World War II); Louis Henkin, Rights:  American and 
Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (1979) (stating that the development of 
international human rights relied heavily on American constitutionalism). 
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example, the treatment of the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison245 as 
a form of law that is in most respects comparable (though superior in 
a case of conflict) to statutes encouraged the use of interpretative 
techniques similar to those employed in statutory analysis.  These 
techniques treat constitutional principles as artifacts of domestic law 
and the product of domestic legal and political processes.246  Under 
Chief Justice Marshall’s leadership, the Court adopted a largely 
positivist interpretative approach which typically emphasized the 
particulars of constitutional text in political and historical contexts.247  
Following the practices of common law legal method, the Court also 
treated its own prior judicial decisions interpreting the same 
provisions as law, in the form of controlling judicial precedent.248  In 
addition, the Court’s emphasis on originalism (the idea that the views 
of the Framers should be consulted in determining the meaning of 
constitutional texts), historicism (the notion that constitutional 
principles should be understood in light of the events that gave rise 
to them and the specific legal issues to which they responded), and 
pragmatism (the notion that constitutional interpretation should be 
guided by considerations of practicality and workability in the context 
of actual governmental experience) all contributed to an inward-
looking jurisprudence to which foreign precedent would have little if 
anything to contribute.249 
                                                          
 245. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 246. Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 
729, 767-69 (2005) (emphasizing Chief Justice Marshall’s fundamental belief that the 
Constitution was not only a political document, but the paramount law of the United 
States). 
 247. Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States largely 
defined and later influenced the Court’s standards for interpreting the Constitution.  
Regarding these standards, Justice Story quoted Thomas Jefferson: 
On every question of construction [we should] carry ourselves back to the 
time, when the constitution was adopted; recollect the spirit manifested in 
the debates; and instead of trying, what meaning may be squeezed out of the 
text, or invented against, conform to the probable one, in which it was 
passed. 
Joseph Story, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 390 
(1833); see also HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-
1835 61 (1997) (discussing Justice Marshall’s belief that it was important to consider 
the Framers’ intentions when interpreting the Constitution). 
 248. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, 
114-15 (1988); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:  SUSTAINABLE 
DIVERSITY IN LAW 237 (2000). 
 249. See LEVY, supra note 218, at 322-87 (examining the constitutional 
jurisprudence of original intent); Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror:  
Rethinking the Use of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 539 
(2006) (suggesting that rather than using historicism to further isolate ourselves, 
jurists should engage in “deliberative” historical analysis in the comparative context); 
Catherine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition:  The 
Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 551 (1988) 
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D. Insularity and Exceptionalism in American Legal Education 
Finally, a portion of American constitutional insularity is the result 
of American legal education.  While the best-trained lawyers in the 
early republic read continental and Roman law as well as English 
common law,250 by the late nineteenth century, U.S. legal education 
was far more narrowly focused on the particulars of American law.251  
Whether through study of famous treatises like those authored by 
Kent, Story, and Cooley,252 or through the later study of American 
decisional and statutory law under the guiding principles of the 
Langdell method,253 the emphasis in American legal education 
focused with increasing narrowness and specificity on indigenous 
American sources of law.  As attention to American laws and 
precedents increased, attention to foreign legal sources subsided.254  
                                                          
(“[P]ragmatism provides a theory of meaning that limits meaningful discourse to 
statements saying something about actual or potential experience.”). 
 250. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 
1850S TO THE 1980S 3 (1983) (discussing Litchfield Law School, the “most famous” of 
the law schools established after the Revolutionary War, and how it based its course 
of study on the work of Blackstone); 1 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL 303, 339, 355, 436-37 (1970) (discussing how foreign law was part of the 
Harvard Law School curriculum during its early days); see also M. H. HOEFLICH, 
ROMAN AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 142 (1997) (noting that some American lawyers and jurists 
studied Roman and civil law during the late eighteenth until early twentieth 
centuries). 
 251. See WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE:  THE ORIGIN OF MODERN 
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 59-60, 111 (1994) (discussing how American lawyers 
increasingly shunned Roman and English law and focused on learning American 
law); Stevens, supra note 250, at 39, 48 nn.39 & 41 (discussing Harvard Law School’s 
sporadic use of “international law” in its curriculum after 1899 and how most law 
schools emulated Harvard’s curriculum). 
 252. Story, supra note 247; JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1873); 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (1880). 
 253. See STEVENS, supra note 250, at 69 n.48 (noting Dean Langdell’s belief that 
English and American law should be studied on its own, without interference from 
government, economics, international law, or Roman law); CHARLES W. ELIOT, A 
LATE HARVEST:  MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS WRITTEN BETWEEN EIGHTY AND NINETY 54 
(1924) (explaining Langdell’s teaching method, which resembled “the laboratory 
method of teaching physical science, although he believed that the only laboratory 
the law school needed was a library of printed books”); Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, 
and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059, 1074 (1999) (discussing Dean 
Langdell’s notion that American law is a science rather than an art, marked by its 
logic, methodology and subject matter). 
 254. See Koh, U.S. Constitution and International Law, supra note 34, at 45 (pointing 
out the heavy reliance by early U.S. courts on international law, and subsequent 
abandonment of international law except for a narrow group of situations); 
Rehnquist, supra note 242, at 412 (“For nearly a century and a half, courts in the 
United States exercising the powers of judicial review had no precedents to look to 
save their own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority.”); see also 
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 251 (observing that as the U.S. 
Supreme Court built a large body of precedent dealing with constitutional questions, 
it relied less on the decisions of foreign constitutional courts); Jackson, Ambivalent 
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By the turn of the twentieth century, it was entirely possible for an 
American lawyer or jurist to be regarded as highly learned in the law, 
without knowing anything at all about law outside the United States, 
save for a few tidbits of English common law still relevant to the 
functioning of the American common law system. 
The growth of legal realism during the twentieth century further 
undermined the importance of foreign law in American legal 
education.  While some leading academic legal realists took 
inspiration from comparative sources,255 the legal realist view of 
human rights rejected concepts of natural law that had played a 
significant part in the formation of the U.S. Constitution, had 
animated some early American constitutional precedent, and 
supplied a platform for some comparative constitutional analysis.  In 
the mid-twentieth century, realist Justices such as Hugo Black and 
William O. Douglas argued strenuously against reliance on principles 
of natural law in constitutional adjudication, claiming that they 
disturbed the separation of powers by inviting unrestrained judicial 
activism.256  The concept of general or shared transcendent 
constitutional principles of a kind that might acquire meaning from 
consideration of comparative sources was anathema to their 
politically positivist view of American constitutional analysis.257  As 
many commentators have noted, over the last fifty years or so legal 
realism has become the dominant viewpoint in American legal 
                                                          
Resistance, supra note 118, at 592-99 (questioning the Supreme Court’s current 
ambivalence about looking to other constitutional courts for precedent); George P. 
Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 690-95 
(1998) (explaining why comparative law has little influence as an academic 
discipline).  Contra Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 101, at 755 (finding “a steady 
escalation in citation of foreign law” in U.S. Supreme Court cases). 
 255. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, 72 (1986) (indicating 
that the Yale faculty incorporated comparative law into its curriculum); see also 
WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 107-09 (1973) 
(discussing Llewellyn’s interest in German law and connection with German legal 
studies); DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND:  PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 179 (1974) (observing 
Pound’s discontent with the refusal by American lawyers to consider comparative 
sources). 
 256. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“For application of this natural law concept, whether under the terms 
‘reasonableness,’ ‘justice,’ or ‘fair play,’ makes judges the supreme arbiters of the 
country’s laws and practices.  This result, I believe, alters the form of government our 
Constitution provides.”); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (“All of these so-called tests represent nothing more or less 
than an implicit adoption of a Natural Law concept which under our system leaves to 
judges alone the power to decide what the Natural Law means.  These so-called 
standards do not bind judges within any boundaries that can be precisely marked or 
defined by words for holding laws unconstitutional.”). 
 257. See Twining, supra note 255, at 70 (noting Llewellyn’s “rejection of a general 
definition of ‘law’”). 
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education, and the foundation for much of the modern law school 
curriculum.258 
As a result, the American bar, upon whom the American bench 
ultimately depends for information regarding sources of law, has 
been thoroughly trained not to look beyond American law in its 
search for advocacy materials.259  In modern legal education, this 
training begins in the first year where students learn how to conduct 
research on American statutory law and decisional precedent in 
American federal and state courts, but typically receive no instruction 
whatsoever on methods for research in other legal systems.260  Courses 
on legal methods typically omit any discussion regarding use of 
international sources or comparative analysis.261  When students are 
taught to draft persuasive briefs and legal memoranda, in first-year 
legal writing courses, upper level appellate advocacy courses, or moot 
court programs, they are instructed in the persuasive characteristics 
and deployment of American precedent.  Only with rare exceptions 
(such as the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court 
Competition) do students have an opportunity for written or oral 
advocacy involving international or comparative resources.262 
                                                          
 258. See, e.g., Gerald R. Ferrera, Ethics in Legal Education:  An Augmentation of Legal 
Realism, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 893, 893-94 (1991) (arguing that incorporation of legal 
ethics into the law school curriculum is a natural extension of the legal realism 
movement); Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 118, at 592 n.43 (discussing the 
relation between legal realism and international and comparative law within the law 
school curricula); Thomas Hayes, Comment, A Good Judge is Hard to Find:  An Essay on 
Legal Realism and Law School Casebooks, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 216 (2004) (pointing out the 
role of legal realism in first-year contracts). 
 259. See Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 118, at 592-95 (arguing that 
although rates of enrollment in international and comparative law classes are on the 
rise, lawyers still neglect comparative materials when presenting arguments to 
judges). 
 260. For example, students at Temple University Beasley School of Law, where I 
teach law, are assigned two primary textbooks for their first year courses in Legal 
Research & Writing:  RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL 
WRITING:  STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE (4th ed. 2001), and AMY Y. SLOAN, BASIC 
LEGAL RESEARCH:  TOOLS AND STRATEGIES (2d ed. 2003).  These books teach legal 
novices about the sources of law, the relative weight of authority, and how to begin a 
search for legal materials.  In Neumann’s text, a sub-chapter titled “How Courts 
React to Foreign Precedent,” jointly discusses turning to out-of-state and out-of-
country precedent, suggesting that “[c]ases from other jurisdictions are consulted 
only for guidance and only where a gap appears in local law.”  NEUMANN, supra, at 
124-27.  Sloan’s text does not discuss foreign law at all. 
 261. See, e.g., JANE C. GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS:  CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 
2004) [hereinafter GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS] (presenting no discussion of foreign 
law); RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW METHOD (1997) (same). 
 262. See, e.g., FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 
(Christopher T. Lutz & William Pannill eds., rev. ed. 2004) (including no discussion 
of comparative materials); MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY (2002) (same). 
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International and comparative law are, of course, included in the 
curriculum as elective courses in most law schools.  But until recently, 
law schools encouraged students to think of these courses as a 
discipline apart from domestic law, using entirely different materials 
and for completely different purposes with more emphasis on 
international diplomacy or international politics than on the 
intersections and interactions with domestic law.263  Comparative law, 
in particular, has been treated as a subject of almost purely academic 
interest.  As the globalization of law advances, these patterns are 
undergoing dynamic change.264  However, the vast majority of today’s 
practicing lawyers were trained during times when the international 
and comparative courses in law school had little to do with the 
development of domestic American law, and nothing to do with 
advocacy.265 
Law libraries and legal research tools reinforce the sense of 
division between international and domestic law.  Practitioner-
oriented bar and law firm libraries often omit international material 
entirely.  Law school libraries frequently have limited international 
and comparative collections.  Until recently most practitioners largely 
excluded international and comparative resources from their 
research tools.  Indexing systems, compendia, major legal treatises, 
and other similar research tools concerned themselves exclusively 
with American law and precedent.  Electronic legal databases, such as 
                                                          
 263. For example, when I attended law school, Yale Law School had an entirely 
separate library for international materials, located in an entirely different part of the 
law school building from the main law library (this has since been changed).  Many 
students (myself included) never made it there during their entire legal education.  
See Ugo Mattei, Some Realism About Comparativism:  Comparative Law Teaching in the 
Hegemonic Jurisdiction, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 96-97 (2001) (finding a significant 
“degree of europhilia” among comparative law professors and in textbooks). 
 264. Koh, Globalization of Freedom, supra note 132, at 309-10 (discussing innovative 
ways in which American law schools have recently begun to acquaint students with 
foreign law); Michael P. Waxman, Teaching Comparative Law in the 21st Century:  
Beyond the Civil/Common Law Dichotomy, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 305, 306 (2001) (proposing 
an introductory course called “Law in Comparative Cultures,” as an alternative to 
standard comparative law courses); Judith Welch Wegner, The Curriculum:  Patterns 
and Possibilities, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 433 (2001) (finding a growing number of law 
school courses offering comparative or foreign law in a wide array of substantive 
areas); M.C. Mirow, Globalizing Property:  Incorporating Comparative and International 
Law into First-Year Property Classes, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183, 186-88 (2004) (proposing 
that law schools incorporate aspects of comparative law into first-year property 
classes). 
 265. See Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 343 (stating that most 
U.S. judges and lawyers today received little or no training in international law while 
in law school and in practice); Stephen Zamora, The Cultural Context of International 
Legal Cooperation, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 462, 464-65 (2001) (observing that most law 
students graduate from law school without a basic understanding of international 
law, despite the ample opportunities to take international law classes). 
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Westlaw and Lexis, that have become the means of choice for most 
practical and advocacy-oriented legal research initially followed suit.  
The available international materials tend to be highly specialized 
and relatively difficult for most practicing lawyers to obtain.266  
Further, they do not typically include foreign constitutional law.267  A 
lawyer seeking comparative constitutional materials will encounter 
significant difficulty finding them.268 
With such limited legal training and sources for legal research, it is 
little wonder that comparative precedent rarely appears in American 
legal decisions.  For relevant legal materials, courts depend on the 
counsel before them,269 who seldom provide the court with any 
international materials.270  True of all legal issues, this is especially 
true of constitutional questions.  If presented with a case involving an 
unsettled constitutional question, the typical American advocate:  
(1) would not think to ask whether comparative or international 
material might bear on the resolution of the question; (2) if she did 
ask, would not know how to go about looking for relevant 
comparative precedent; (3) if she did look, would encounter great 
difficulty in finding it; and (4) if she actually found it, would have 
little idea how to use it.271  Consequently, when members of the bar 
fashion constitutional legal arguments, they systematically omit any 
relevant discussion of foreign law.  Because courts depend on counsel 
to provide them with both the relevant legal materials for rendering 
                                                          
 266. On both Lexis and Westlaw, foreign law searches are difficult to complete.  
To find available material, one must work through multiple links to reach a search 
prompt that grants access to the laws of only one nation at a time. 
 267. There is no decisional law from non-English speaking nations on either Lexis 
or Westlaw, and only a small amount of law available from English speaking 
countries.  Searches for foreign constitutional law are restricted to (most) 
Commonwealth countries and the European Court of Human Rights. 
 268. See Andrew Grossman, Towards Cooperation in Access to Foreign Primary Law, 30 
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 1 (2002) (“In the United States particularly, acquisition of 
foreign materials has perceptibly declined since the early 1980s.”).  But see Mary 
Rumsey, Foreign and International Law Librarianship (2006), available at http://www. 
aallnet.org/sis/fcilsis/rumseyFCILarticle.pdf (“Increasingly, large law firms have a 
librarian who specializes in international and foreign legal research.”). 
 269. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30-32 
(Harold Berman ed., 1961) (pointing out that the legal advocate must persuade the 
judge through careful selection of arguments and materials); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, 
JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120 (1978) (“[The adversary system’s] essential 
feature is that a decision is made by judge, or judge with jury, who finds the facts and 
determines the law from submissions made by partisan advocates on behalf of the 
parties.”). 
 270. See Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 343 (finding that 
because law schools do not train lawyers to use international materials, lawyers are 
reluctant to give these sources to judges in the course of litigation). 
 271. See Rumsey, supra note 268, at 5 (“The variety of sources used in international 
law can overwhelm researchers, and the field lacks a clear hierarchy of authority.”). 
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decisions and persuasive arguments about how to use them,272 the 
ignorance of the bar regarding comparative constitutional resources 
contributes to near-equal ignorance on the bench.  Although courts 
are not precluded from seeking such materials themselves, in practice 
they are unlikely to do so. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 
The American tradition of legal and constitutional isolation is 
slowly breaking down and will continue to do so.  There are several 
factors contributing to this development, including the increasing 
globalization of American law, the interaction and exchange among 
judicial officials of different nations, the international convergence of 
constitutional norms, and the increasing sophistication and 
progressivism of foreign constitutional courts. 
A. Globalization and its Constitutional Implications 
Globalization of the law is eroding American constitutional 
isolation.273  Globalization of American law has advanced along many 
fronts, most notably in areas related to trade and finance, but also in 
environmental law, intellectual property, and other important 
domains.274  Where globalization has occurred, it has introduced into 
the American judicial process a new need for attention to 
comparative legal analysis.275  While most of these developments do 
not have direct constitutional implications, they carry overtones that 
can indirectly introduce a comparative element into American 
constitutional discourse. 
For example, the United States has agreed to abide by and enforce 
a variety of international legal principles that constrain domestic 
discretion both to adopt restrictive policies toward foreign trade and 
to provide preferential treatment for domestic competitors in global 
markets.276  Two prominent examples are U.S. participation in the 
                                                          
 272. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 382-
84 (1978). 
 273. Professor Annelise Riles has defined globalization, with respect to the law, as 
“a condition of interconnected, overlapping legal regimes, a proliferation of 
information technologies which mediates and engineers an awareness of this 
condition.”  Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box:  Comparative Law in the Era of 
Information, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 221, 222 (1999). 
 274. Id. at 222-23. 
 275. See Koh, Globalization of Freedom, supra note 132, at 310-12 (arguing that the 
spread of democracy requires comparative legal academics to speak up and inform 
policy makers and judges on ways to shape globalization). 
 276. See Robert E. Dalton, National Treaty Law & Practice:  United States, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 773-74 (Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. Blakeslee & 
L. Benjamin Ederington eds., 2005) (describing the Trade Act of 2002, where 
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World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  Such agreements introduce comparative elements into 
U.S. judicial decisionmaking.  They create the possibility of conflict 
between their terms and domestic laws, contracts, or other legal 
arrangements.  When that occurs, U.S. courts will be called upon to 
interpret the language of the multinational agreements, determine 
the extent (if any) of their legally cognizable conflict with domestic 
laws or regulations, and decide how the conflict will be resolved.277 
Conflict between international trade arrangements and domestic 
law has constitutional overtones because, under Article VI’s 
Supremacy Clause, such international free trade obligations become 
part of the “supreme law of the land” in the United States, binding 
upon government and private citizens alike.278  Under the 
constitutional doctrine of preemption, the international trade 
obligations adopted at the national level displace conflicting state 
and local law.279  They also become judicially binding in domestic as 
well as international commercial arrangements, for example by 
rendering certain contractual arrangements illegal or defeating 
claims based on domestic protective legislation that conflicts with 
international legal commands. 
Globalization of this sort obliges greater consideration of 
transnational and comparative principles and materials in American 
courts.  It not only promotes awareness of international and 
comparative precedents, but it also creates a pressure for conscious 
complementarity of decisionmaking between American and foreign 
tribunals, which in turn requires comparative analysis.  In litigation 
over domestic application, American courts must interpret the 
international agreements in question.280  When they do so, they must 
                                                          
Congress established objectives with respect to seventeen areas of foreign trade, 
including improvement of the WTO and other multilateral trade agreements and 
reduction of border taxes). 
 277. See Koh, Transnational Public Law, supra note 133, at 2371 (suggesting that 
U.S. courts should not decide unilaterally how such conflicts will be resolved, but 
should instead engage in a “process of institutional dialogue among various domestic 
and international, judicial and political fora to achieve ultimate settlement”); 
Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160, 163 (2004) (referring 
to this process as the application of “transnational law”). 
 278. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES’ 
111 cmt. d (1987) (discussing how international agreements have binding domestic 
legal force). 
 279. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (“Valid executive 
agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are.”). 
 280. See Dalton, supra note 276, at 765, 789-90 (“When an Act of Congress and an 
international agreement relate to the same subject, the Executive Branch and the 
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be aware that other foreign national tribunals will also interpret the 
same agreements, and that international tribunals may exist to 
provide final authoritative interpretation of disputed questions.281  
The U.S. courts thus may well have occasion to consider:  (1) how 
other world tribunals have interpreted the provisions of the 
international agreement in question; (2) whether similar domestic 
law conflicts have been detected in other participating nations; and 
(3) if so, how other court systems have chosen to resolve those 
conflicts.  At a minimum, U.S. courts probably would not want to give 
the international norms more restrictive effect in the United States 
than they received abroad.  And while the U.S. courts might not be 
required to interpret the international agreements in the same way as 
foreign courts, divergent interpretation could trigger various forms of 
international conflict.  This conflict may range from international 
litigation, to legal and diplomatic responses by other nations (or in 
some cases even by foreign corporations or citizens) whose interests 
are harmed by the U.S. interpretation, to economic or legal 
retaliation by foreign states whose interests are negatively affected by 
the U.S. decision.282 
Given the prospect for such international consequences, it would 
behoove American courts to attend carefully to potential 
interpretative divergences from foreign tribunals.283  At a minimum, 
American courts need to know what foreign and international courts 
have said regarding the trade provisions in question before adopting 
a different interpretation.  Where possible, the American courts 
should probably harmonize U.S. interpretation with the weight of 
                                                          
courts will endeavor to:  (1) construe them so as to give effect to both; or 
(2) reconcile the international agreement and an Act of Congress, with the ‘later in 
time’ generally prevailing in domestic law.”). 
 281. See, e.g., Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), 
aff’d, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (looking to the 
positions of foreign governments in striking down a Massachusetts law that restricted 
the ability of Massachusetts and its agencies to purchase goods and services from 
companies that do business with Burma). 
 282. Naturally, these concerns run both ways, as illustrated by the Case 
Concerning Elettronica Sicula, S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20), 
in which the United States sued Italy, alleging violations of the 1948 U.S.-Italy FCN 
Treaty.  For a discussion of this case, see generally Wendy Huey, International 
Litigation:  United States and Italy FCN Treaty and I.C.J. Jurisdiction Over Disputes—
United States v. Italy, 1989 I.C.J. 15 (1989), 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 236 (1991). 
 283. See Reem Bahdi, Globalization of Judgment:  Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of 
International Law in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555, 556-57 (2002) 
(outlining five reasons why judges pay attention to international law, including 
concern for the rule of law and to avoid negative consequences from the rest of the 
world). 
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interpretation elsewhere;284 alternatively, they should have good 
cause, solidly grounded in U.S. law and policy, for adopting any 
interpretation that is at odds with comparative precedent.285  In either 
event, they need to know what comparative law is on the 
interpretative issues in question in order to make an intelligent 
decision.  They should not depart from comparative precedent 
lightly, let alone ignorantly or absent-mindedly. 
Ultimately, of course, authoritative U.S. interpretation of disputed 
provisions in international trade agreements becomes the 
responsibility of the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court is most likely to 
take up this duty where the terms of the agreement are subject to 
competing plausible interpretations.286  That possibility could emerge 
(as with domestic statutory law) through a conflict in interpretation 
by lower federal courts, or between federal and state tribunals.  In the 
case of international agreements, it could also arise because of a 
conflict in interpretation between a lower U.S. court and a foreign 
tribunal. 
In such a case, the Supreme Court’s interpretation will perform the 
important constitutional function of providing uniformity in federal 
law.287  But the Court’s choice among competing interpretations of 
international agreements will carry additional constitutional 
significance.  This occurs both because the choice will affect how the 
provision in question preempts other American laws, and because the 
choice will have implications for the exercise of national legislative 
and executive powers.288  Although the Court may not be technically 
                                                          
 284. See Bahdi, supra note 283, at 590 (2002) (discussing how the desire to avoid 
being viewed negatively by other countries inspires comparative analysis); cf. AU 
Conversation, supra note 1, at 521 (quoting Justice Scalia as stating, “But I thought 
that the object of a treaty being to come up with a text that is the same for all the 
countries, we should defer to the views of other signatories, much as we defer to the 
views of agencies—that is to say if it’s within the ballpark, if it’s a reasonable 
interpretation, though not necessarily the very best”). 
 285. Id. 
 286. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (resolving a 
question of whether the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico 
prohibits international abductions); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 537 (1995) (examining the intersection of the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act and the Hague Rules, and “declin[ing] to interpret our version of 
the Hague Rules in a manner contrary to every other nation to have addressed this 
issue”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006) (settling a dispute over 
foreign detainees by interpreting Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations). 
 287. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that 
the Supreme Court had authority over state courts in matters of federal law in order 
to guarantee a uniform system of law). 
 288. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386 (2000) 
(recognizing weighty foreign policy and separation of powers concerns involved in 
interpreting the Massachusetts Burma Law). 
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required to consider foreign interpretations of the disputed treaty 
language, there are powerful constitutional policy reasons for doing 
so.  A decision at odds with international precedent, for example, 
could affect the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy by 
triggering international litigation, inviting retaliatory measures by 
other states, or leading to sanctions against the United States in 
international tribunals.289 
As globalization progresses, and as U.S. participation in 
international agreements proliferates, the circumstances in which 
both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts need to be aware of 
foreign precedents will increase.  As they do, judicial demand for 
information about foreign law will grow, as will the need for both 
advocates and judges proficient in understanding and utilizing 
international and foreign precedent.290  Over time, the inevitable 
effect will be more extensive knowledge and use of foreign legal 
decisions in American courts. 
Globalization also has an impact on the interpretation of domestic 
law.  For example, when U.S. courts are called upon to apply 
domestic trade regulations, intellectual property rules, and 
commercial law principles in contexts that have international 
implications, they will need to do so in ways that harmonize with 
international trade agreement obligations and avoid potential 
violations of international norms.291  Once again, awareness of 
comparative law interpretations of the trade provisions in question 
will become essential to informed judicial decisionmaking about 
related domestic questions. Although these interpretative questions 
                                                          
 289.  
[T]he EU and Japan have gone a step further in lodging formal complaints 
against the United States in the World Trade Organization (WTO), claiming 
that the state Act violates certain provisions of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement [citation omitted], and the consequence has 
been to embroil the National Government for some time now in 
international dispute proceedings under the auspices of the WTO.  In their 
brief before this Court, EU officials point to the WTO dispute as threatening 
relations with the United States . . . . 
Id. at 383. 
 290. See O’Connor, supra note 104, at 21 (predicting that judges will become 
increasingly interested in foreign law, and urging attorneys to embrace foreign law in 
their arguments); Slaughter, Government Networks, supra note 148, at 207 (discussing 
Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Breyer’s willingness to refer to European Court of 
Justice decisions). 
 291. See, e.g., Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, supra note 93, at 1842 
(“[W]hen customary international norms are well-defined, the executive branch has 
regularly urged the federal courts to determine such rules as matters of federal 
law.”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms 
in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735 (2001) (recognizing the 
recent implementation of international norms in copyright law). 
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under U.S. international agreements do not directly involve 
constitutional norms, their proximity to important issues of 
constitutional authority will generate exposure to similar issues in 
other constitutional regimes.  Thus, they will lead American courts 
into the domain of comparative constitutional thinking. 
B. International Judicial Interaction 
A concomitant of globalization has been increased interaction 
between American judges and their foreign counterparts.  The 
interaction comes from several sources.  Some American jurists have 
been tapped for service on international tribunals, and those who 
have often return to the United States actively committed to 
enhancing international judicial exchange.292  In addition, 
international law organizations and societies,293 private non-
governmental organizations, professional bar associations,294 law 
schools,295 and others sponsor international judicial exchange 
                                                          
 292. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Women of the Courts Symposium, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces:  
One Woman Judge’s Journey to the Bench and Beyond, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 979, 991-93 
(2005) (describing her two-year appointment as a judge on the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia after leaving the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia); Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging:  At 
Home and Abroad, Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Mar. 30, 
2004), in 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 219 (2004) (comparing the role, power, and 
motivations of judges who serve in national courts and those who serve in 
international courts and concluding that international judges must be held 
accountable for their decisions and make a greater effort to engage in international 
judicial dialogue). 
 293. See, e.g., Ron Brown, Legal Exchange With China, 1995 HAW. BAR J. 22 (Dec 
1995) (discussing the U.S.-Asia Law Institute’s legal exchange program); Feature, New 
Judicial Conference Committee Created, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8 (Apr. 1994) (“Chief 
Justice Rehnquist established the committee to plan and administer the activities of 
federal judges in international exchange and educational programs.”).  
 294. See ABA Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, http://www.abanet. 
org/ceeli/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (creating liaisons with foreign judiciaries and a 
forum for discussion among international jurists). 
 295. For example, Temple University Law School has a dynamic international law 
program, which brings international students to the United States, and has legal 
semester abroad programs in Italy, Japan, and China.  See International Law 
Programs, http://www.law.temple.edu/servlet/RetrievePage?site’TempleLaw&page’ 
Degrees_International_Programs (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) (explaining that 
international law has permeated every aspect of the law and international programs 
will give students access to resources that will help them meet the needs of this new 
legal reality).  Also, Yale Law School established a seminar for members of foreign 
constitutional courts for the purpose of promoting intellectual exchange among 
judges.  Yale Law School Establishes Seminar on Global Constitutional Issues, 4 INT. JUD. 
OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2 (noting that the first semester hosted fourteen justices 
from around the world).  In 1995, NYU Law School implemented the Global Law 
School Program aimed at internationalizing legal education by bringing important 
legal figures from other nations to teach law in the United States.  See Norman 
Dorsen, Achieving International Cooperation:  NYU’s Global Law School Program, 51 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 332, 332 (2001) (tracing the origins of the program to the realization 
that globalization would impact the legal field and increasingly make foreign law 
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programs designed to introduce American jurists to their foreign 
counterparts (and vice versa), and to increase mutual understanding 
and respect among jurists from different legal systems.296  Even the 
U.S. Department of State has participated in promoting international 
judicial exchange.297  As a result, the level of contact between 
American jurists and those of other nations has increased appreciably 
over the past two decades. 
These contacts have increased American judicial familiarity with 
foreign law and judges.  In this case, familiarity generally breeds 
respect.  American jurists usually come away from the experience 
with heightened appreciation for the talents and professionalism of 
their foreign counterparts, as well as greater awareness of the degree 
to which judges worldwide encounter similar legal issues in their 
work.298  Over time, this familiarity translates into increased 
understanding, which translates into an increased willingness to learn 
from one another’s work.  The natural sciences, medicine, 
mathematics, art, and music have long been internationalized 
professions where colleagues share work and insight across national 
boundaries.  Law is finally beginning to follow suit. 
C. Constitutional Convergence 
The opportunity for judges from different nations to use one 
another’s work has been enhanced by a convergence in constitutional 
legal norms.299  World constitutional democracies are coming 
together in important ways.  One significant feature of this 
development is the spread of judicial review, a doctrine with links to 
Marbury v. Madison that Robert Reinstein and I have discussed 
                                                          
relevant to U.S. jurisprudence); Hauser Global Law School Program, http://www. 
nyulawglobal.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (describing the program, providing links 
to the various events and papers on international subjects, and introducing the 
diverse international faculty).  Harvard Law School hosted part of the Anglo-
American Exchange, where judges and lawyers from the United States and the 
United Kingdom met to discuss various judicial issues and developments.  James G. 
Apple, British, U.S. Judges and Lawyers Meet, Discuss Shared Judicial, Legal Concerns, 2 
INT’L JUD. OBSERVER, Jan. 1996, at 1. 
  296.    MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 109-21.  
 297. E.g., American Judges Eager to Set Up Exchange Programs With Ukraine:  
New Program Would Follow Model of U.S.-Russian Judicial Exchange, http:// 
usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/Aug/04-428459.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2005) 
(discussing future U.S. and Ukraine judicial exchange programs and noting U.S. 
judges have engaged in similar exchanges in over forty five countries). 
 298. See supra note 105 and corresponding text. 
 299. See Breyer, ASIL Keynote, supra note 104, at 266 (articulating that 
globalization has spread similar problems, rights, and concerns, such that courts 
across the world are dealing with similar legal issues). 
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elsewhere.300  Another feature has been integration, sometimes 
through deliberative international lawmaking and sometimes 
through conscious domestic adaptation of common constitutional 
norms into multiple national legal systems. 
This process has been most advanced in Europe, but it is evident 
elsewhere as well.  In Europe, members of the Council of Europe are 
obliged to incorporate specific organic principles and human rights 
guarantees into their domestic laws.301  An even more aggressive 
convergence is apparent in the European Union.  Although the 
adoption of the European Union Constitution has proven elusive,302 
promulgation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
later protocols has been accomplished with enforcement at both the 
national and supranational levels.303  Constitutional convergence is 
also apparent in the conscious selection of common constitutional 
norms by newly organized constitutional democracies, such as South 
Africa and several former Communist Bloc and Soviet republics,304 
and in the development of shared constitutional norms by former 
                                                          
 300. Reinstein & Rahdert, supra note 246, at 828-33.  See generally Gardbaum, supra 
note 37, at 712-16 (tracing the creation of constitutional courts and development of 
judicial review throughout Europe and North Africa after World War II). 
 301. See generally European Court of Human Rights, How the Execution of 
Judgments Works, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/ 
Execution/How+the+execution+of+judgments+works/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2006) 
(stating all member states have an obligation to follow the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights and to codify the rights and freedoms in Section 1 
of the European Convention on Human Rights). 
 302. See, e.g., Daniel Dombey et al., Opposition Widens:  European Constitution Facing 
Oblivion, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at 6 (discussing the delays to ratifying the 
European constitution and negative votes by member states).  But see Graham 
Bowley, No Fanfare as Luxembourg Plans to Vote on European Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, July 
10, 2005, at 3 (re-enforcing the dedication and support of the people of 
Luxembourg for the passage of the European Constitution despite some anxiety 
about the no votes from France and Germany). 
 303. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 005, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 (requiring, under Article 1, all member states to guarantee the rights 
enumerated in the Convention to all individuals within their nations). 
 304. The most successful areas of constitutional growth have been in Eastern 
Europe and former Commonwealth nations.  Other world regions have gone a 
separate way.  For example, most states with a predominately Muslim citizenry have 
authoritarian rather than liberal democratic forms of government.  Additionally, 
although there has been some constitutional convergence in Africa and South 
America, durability and enforceability of constitutional norms has proven 
problematic.  See generally Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and 
Comparative Case Law:  Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 103, 113-18 (2002) (observing that judiciaries in Africa charged with 
securing and upholding constitutionally protected human rights face issues of 
cultural legitimacy and respect among their governments). 
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British Commonwealth nations such as Canada, India, and 
Australia.305 
The constitutional drafting process in South Africa after the fall of 
apartheid is particularly instructive.  The drafters charged with 
creating a new constitution systematically studied various world 
constitutions, international agreements and conventions, and other 
sources for constitutional norms.  From these, they selected 
principles, and sometimes even the particular language, deemed to 
be most suitable for inclusion in the new South African system of 
government.306  The drafters also surveyed the interpretation of 
constitutional guarantees in other nations (including the United 
States), often drawing from those interpretations additional 
guarantees that they addressed explicitly in the South African 
Constitution.307  In recognition of this overt borrowing, the South 
African Constitution authorizes its constitutional courts to consider 
comparative and international law in interpreting South African 
constitutional guarantees.308 
Just as modern building methods contributed to the development 
of a worldwide “international style” in architecture, the use of 
common organic principles and human rights guarantees contributes 
to a growing “international style” of constitutional governance that 
                                                          
 305. See generally Brian R. Opeskin, Constitutional Modeling:  The Domestic Effect of 
International Law in Commonwealth Countries:  Part 2, 2001 PUB. L. NO. 97, 98-99 (2001) 
(noting that even as former colonies adopted constitutions, they retained the 
principles of the British Empire, such as vesting the Queen with the power to enter 
into treaties). 
 306. See D. M. Davis, Constitutional Borrowing:  The Influence of Legal Culture and Local 
History in the Reconstitution of Comparative Influence:  The South African Experience, 1 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 181, 186-88 (2003) (discovering that the South Africa Constitution 
contains numerous provisions and rights modeled after or copied from the 
constitutions of the United States, Canada, Germany, and Malaysia). 
 307. See id. at 188 (discussing the South African drafters’ concern with the United 
States Constitution’s differentiation between a deprivation of property and an 
expropriation, and their eventual adoption of a clause similar to the Malaysian 
Constitution, which added public purpose and prior payment requirements for 
expropriation). 
 308. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 233 (“When interpreting any legislation, every court 
must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law.”); e.g., Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) S.A. 401 (CC), at ¶¶ 35-40 (S. 
Afr.) (exploring conflicts between defamation cases in Canada, Germany, Australia, 
and the United States to analyze whether an action for defamation requires a 
showing that the statement was false); S. v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (CC) (S. 
Afr.) (declaring the death penalty unconstitutional in South Africa and considering 
the laws of numerous nations in its rationale); S. v. Williams 1995 (3) S.A. 632 (CC) 
(S. Afr.) (finding that juvenile whipping has been characterized throughout the 
world as a degrading and violent form of punishment and therefore abolishing the 
practice to fall in line with international consensus). 
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fits governmental form to function.309  For example, although 
separation of powers is not uniformly required by world constitutions, 
the delineation of distinct legislative, executive/administrative, and 
adjudicative functions is a common and widely shared attribute of 
twenty-first century constitutional democracies.310  While important 
technical and substantive differences between systems remain, the 
commonality of governmental processes and services has contributed 
substantial common ground to world constitutionalism. 
D. Relative Sophistication:  A Shift in the Constitutional Learning Curve 
Globalization and the convergence of constitutional norms are 
necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions to comparative 
constitutional analysis.  Even where constitutional guarantees are 
identical, comparative constitutional analysis would be of little use 
unless it offered the opportunity for new and helpful insights beyond 
what might be gleaned from domestic law.  For much of the post-
World War II period, the prospect of new insight seemed (in 
American eyes) not to exist311 because American constitutional law 
had advanced beyond the level of other nations.312  This U.S. 
“constitutional advantage” arguably existed along three dimensions:  
results, reasoning, and timing of new issues.313  As to results, American 
constitutional law had progressed beyond comparative sources, in 
both its delineation of governmental powers and its interpretation of 
human rights.314  In addition, U.S. courts could draw on decades of 
detailed precedent, much of it crafted by U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
who ranked among the world’s leading jurists.  Because U.S. 
constitutional law was so much more developed, new questions and 
potential applications were likely to occur first in the United States.  
Thus, we were (by our own estimation) ahead of the curve.315  The 
                                                          
 309. KENNETH FRAMPTON, MODERN ARCHITECTURE:  A CRITICAL HISTORY 248-61 
(1992). 
 310. See generally Ackerman, New Separation of Powers, supra note 72 (analyzing the 
parliamentarian, presidential, and constrained parliamentarian frameworks for the 
separation of powers that represent numerous governments throughout the world). 
 311. See supra notes 37-44 and corresponding text. 
 312. Cf. Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and 
the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 351-52 (2005) (discussing how 
the American “court-led rights revolution” inspired other nations to empower their 
judiciaries and improve their human rights standards). 
 313. See infra notes 314-317 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 237-249 and accompanying text. 
 315. See Alito Hearing, supra note 18 (arguing that because the United States was 
the one of the first and foremost to develop individuals rights, judges should only 
look to U.S. precedent in interpreting the Bill of Rights). 
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rest of the world might well learn from the United States,316 but we 
thought that we had little to learn from them.  Some opponents of 
using comparative constitutional precedent, including Justice Alito, 
still maintain this American “constitutional advantage” as a reason 
not to look at constitutional precedent from beyond the our shores.317 
But the learning curve on constitutional questions is shifting.  
Other nations have begun to encounter important constitutional 
questions before they emerge in the United States, or at least 
contemporaneously with their emergence here, and in some areas 
their jurisprudence has equaled or even occasionally surpassed that 
of the United States in sophistication or new direction.318  On shared 
novel questions of constitutional law, other courts have sometimes 
pressed substantively beyond the limits of U.S. constitutional law.  
Thus they have established constitutional principles that the United 
States has yet to discover, dealing with applications that have not yet 
arisen here, or developing constitutional principles that are less fully 
advanced in the United States.  In other areas, foreign courts have 
established constitutional doctrines that may not surpass those of the 
United States in their development, but that arrive at substantively 
different conclusions from those reached in the United States with 
comparably well-developed reasoning.319 
This seems particularly true in the area of human rights where 
thirty years of relatively conservative U.S. rights jurisprudence 
arguably has put the United States out of step with some of its closest 
economic and social world constitutional counterparts.320  Areas of 
U.S. divergence include many hot-button social questions that have 
provoked a sharp U.S. conservative-liberal divide on comparative 
constitutional analysis.  Some examples are:  gay rights and other 
issues pertaining to sexual orientation, where Canada has affirmed 
                                                          
 316. See BLAUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 11-13 (remarking that the U.S. Constitution, 
the world’s first national constitution, was the model for the rest of the world). 
 317. Alito Hearing, supra note 18 (stating that because “the structure of our 
government is unique,” comparisons to other constitutions would not be helpful). 
 318. See supra notes 321-328 and accompanying text. 
 319. See, e.g., Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, supra note 128, at 291-92 (discussing 
how Germany and Canada interpret freedom of speech guarantees differently from 
the United States, denying protection for certain speech that threatens equality). 
 320. See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model:  The United States Constitution and the 
“Rise of World Constitutionalism” 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 607-12 (2000) (citing cases 
from South Africa, Germany, and Canada in which constitutional courts have 
explicitly rejected the interpretations and reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court); 
Larry Cata Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of Fundamental Rights:  First 
Amendment Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts of America and European Alternatives, 
36 TULSA L.J. 117, 120-22 (2000) (lambasting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the rights of expression and association in comparison to several 
European courts). 
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rights of gay marriage,321 and where the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (“ECJ”) has prohibited discrimination 
against the transgendered;322 the death penalty, which has been 
outlawed or deeply curtailed in France, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, and elsewhere;323 rights of racial, ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious minorities, such as the rights of indigenous groups in 
Australia or French-speaking minorities in Canada;324 rights to 
education, now recognized as fundamental in many nations, but not 
in the United States;325 privacy rights, where European law puts more 
extensive limits on government civil access to and disclosure of 
private information;326 and gender discrimination, where U.S. law lags 
behind other nations in recognizing gender equality in military 
service.  In these and other areas, constitutional courts around the 
world have recognized constitutional guarantees that have either 
gone unrecognized or have been affirmatively rejected by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.327  In other contexts, such as abortion and religious 
liberty, foreign courts have labored over many of the same issues as 
the United States, but have arrived at different conclusions that are 
often less protective of the rights in question.328  Often these courts 
                                                          
 321. Civil Marriage Act, 2005 S.C., ch. 33, § 4 (Can.) (declaring that the fact the 
spouses are the same sex is not grounds for invalidating a marriage). 
 322. E.g., Case C-13/94, P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. I-2143 (holding that termination of a 
transgender employee is a violation of the right not to be discriminated against on 
the basis of sex). 
 323. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1998) (“The death penalty has 
been abolished in West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and all of the 
Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason 
in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.  Juvenile executions are also prohibited in 
the Soviet Union.”). 
 324. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 325. E.g., nález Ústavního soudu j. 25/94/1995/ Sbírka nálezu a usnesení 
Ústavního soudu (Czech Rep.) in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1247, 1247-49 (Norman Dorsen et al. eds, 2003) (noting the fundamental 
right to free education, as provided in Art. 33, ¶ 2 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Basic Freedoms). 
 326. See, e.g., Tax Data Case, Constitutional Tribunal (Poland), decision dated 24 
April 1997 (K. 21/96) in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:  CASES AND MATERIALS, 
supra note 325, at 588 (holding that the publication of tax payments and tax arrears 
of individual taxpayers violates the right to privacy, which encompasses protection of 
personal information). 
 327. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 328. E.g., Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
1993, 88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 203 (F.R.G.) 
(sanctioning more limited access to abortions than is available in the United States); 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1975, 41 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 29 (F.R.G.) (holding that 
parents do not have the right to demand that Christian references be eliminated 
from public schools). 
RAHDERT.OFFTOPRINTER 1/30/2007  12:44:23 PM 
614 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:3 
have explicitly considered, criticized, and rejected U.S. precedent, 
ultimately reaching different substantive conclusions.329 
IV. THE MERITS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The preceding Part discussed a variety of factors that create 
favorable conditions for comparative constitutional analysis.  Taken 
together, the factors afford a greater opportunity for comparative 
constitutional decisionmaking and increase the likelihood that it will 
occur.  They do not, however, answer the ultimate question of 
whether comparative constitutional analysis is appropriate or 
desirable.  In this Part, I will evaluate some of the arguments for and 
against the use of comparative analysis in the adjudication of U.S. 
constitutional law.  Ultimately, this analysis supports the selective and 
open-textured comparative analysis advocated by Justice Breyer and 
other Supreme Court Justices, though not without acknowledging 
some legitimate “factors counseling hesitation”330 raised by 
comparative constitutionalism’s critics that circumscribe (but do not 
defeat) the role comparative constitutional analysis ought to play. 
A. The Benefits of Comparative Constitutional Reasoning 
Comparative constitutional decisionmaking is worthwhile only if its 
benefits outweigh its costs.  In making this determination, one should 
focus on systemic advantages that contribute positively to the quality 
of domestic constitutional decisionmaking and that are unique to 
comparative constitutional law.  Those benefits will accrue only if 
comparative constitutional material does more than merely duplicate 
insights available from domestic resources.  Consequently, in this 
discussion I will concentrate on benefits of comparative constitutional 
analysis that are not equally achievable domestically.  I find at least 
seven significant benefits:  constitutional curiosity, shared 
institutional responsibility, opportunities for constitutional dialogue, 
rule rejection and rule alignment, de-politicization, ability to return 
to first principles, and judicial cross-fertilization. 
1. Constitutional curiosity 
The immediate trigger for looking at comparative constitutional 
precedent is simple curiosity.  Judges in one nation’s constitutional 
courts may be naturally curious what counterparts in other nations 
                                                          
 329. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
 330. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). 
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are doing on similar issues.  For many scholars331 and jurists,332 such 
curiosity supplies ample motivation to engage in comparative 
analysis. 
Like the curiosity of the proverbial cat, this curiosity reaps 
satisfaction.  Because of constitutional convergence, American and 
foreign constitutional courts address similar constitutional issues 
requiring interpretation of shared constitutional norms in the 
context of comparable governmental systems.333  Where that sort of 
commonality exists, one court can learn from another’s treatment of 
the issues their systems share.  Simple human intellectual curiosity is 
thus the prime motive for comparative constitutional analysis, and for 
individual judges satisfaction of that curiosity is an immediate, 
perhaps sufficient reward. 
2. Shared institutional responsibility. 
The assertion that one nation’s constitutional court can learn from 
the work of another depends upon two assumptions:  (1) that the 
different courts are in fact dealing with similar issues, and (2) that 
looking at what other nations’ courts are doing can tell a 
constitutional judge something new.  The former assumption 
requires a sufficient similarity of systems, principles, norms, and 
questions to make comparative decisions relevant,334 and it requires 
some common points of legal reasoning.335  Some critics of 
comparative constitutionalism contest this assumption of common 
ground with arguments I address below.336  Here, I will assume the 
existence of common ground in order to examine the validity of the 
                                                          
 331. See supra notes 118-176 (discussing the opinions of scholars who are 
proponents of comparative analysis). 
 332. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted) (noting that, despite our differences, other countries’ 
“experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of 
different solutions to a common legal problem”); Barak, supra note 66, at 110 
(observing that as a judge, “[t]he case law of the supreme courts of the United States, 
Australia, and Canada, of United Kingdom courts, and of the German Constitutional 
Court have helped [me] significantly in finding the right path to follow”). 
 333. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text (citing foreign constitutional 
law). 
 334. Here, I generally mean that before engaging in comparative analysis, 
American courts should ask whether a potential donor country is a liberal 
democracy.  Where it is, comparative analysis is permissible.  Alternatively, where it is 
not, comparative analysis should be avoided. 
 335. See Glensy, supra note 67, at 407-08 (concluding that U.S. courts engage only 
in comparative analysis with other democracies); Slaughter, Global Community, supra 
note 149, at 194 (“The global community of courts does not . . . include all courts 
from all countries.”). 
 336. Ramsey, supra note 17, at 73 (“[A]s a matter of legal interpretation, there is 
no obvious connection between the U.S. Constitution and foreign court opinions.”). 
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second assumption, namely that comparative constitutional analysis 
can tell us something new. 
The similarity of issues, principles, and systems alone is not enough 
to demonstrate that comparative constitutionalism is advantageous to 
jurists.  If it was sufficient, one might well end up with the “look but 
don’t tell” position Justice Scalia rather playfully tossed at Justice 
Breyer in their AU conversation.337  Comparative constitutional 
precedent would have some interest, but little more relevance than, 
say, an editorial in a leading major periodical, a minister’s sermon, or 
a spirited dinnertime conversation on the constitutional question at 
hand.  These sources all tell how others think about the 
constitutional question, yet none ranks as the sort of discussion that 
ought to receive systematic official attention or play a structural role 
in the court’s decisionmaking.338  What sets comparative precedent 
apart from these other “sources?” 
Foremost, comparative precedent is legal discourse.  It follows 
precepts of legal reasoning, engaging in the same kind of rigorous 
analytical process that U.S. courts are expected to follow.339  That may 
not be true of all foreign constitutional precedent, but because of the 
transparency, procedural regularity, impartiality, and professionalism 
in many systems, it is true in a growing number of foreign tribunals.340  
Where it is true, the foreign precedent has a relevance to American 
                                                          
 337. AU Conversation, supra note 1 (“I’m not preventing you from reading these 
cases. . . . Just don’t put it in your opinions!”).  Dean Slaughter points out the danger 
of Justice Scalia’s suggestion and advocates citation to comparative materials as 
persuasive to promote transparency, noting that “[t]he worst of all worlds would be 
for judges to be deeply but secretly influenced by any set of sources.” Slaughter, 
Brave, supra note 118, at 297. 
 338. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189-90 (1987) (noting that the traditional 
sources of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking are constitutional text, 
history, structure, and theory). 
 339. See Breyer, ASIL Keynote, supra note 104, at 267 (“These growing institutional 
and substantive similarities are important because to a degree they reflect a common 
aspiration . . . for judicial institutions that, through guarantees of fair treatment, help 
to provide the security necessary for investment and, in turn, economic prosperity.”); 
Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 344 (recognizing that foreign 
constitutional courts consider the same governmental and public implications and 
consequences as the U.S. Supreme Court when analyzing a constitutional issue and 
rendering a decision); Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 118, at 636 
(concluding that “foreign constitutional decisions might be worthy of consideration 
because they reflect reasoned judgments of other judges faced with similar 
problems”). 
 340. Cf. Rehnquist, supra note 242, at 412 (“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly 
grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking 
to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative 
process.”); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Review Essay, From Democracy to Juristocracy, 38 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 611, 612-13 (2004) (stating that over eighty countries have the 
power of judicial review and constitutional interpretation). 
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constitutional discourse that transcends the non-legal sources 
mentioned above.  Comparative precedent more nearly resembles 
discussions of the issues in such legal sources as law review articles, 
scholarly treatises, commentaries, restatements of the law, or even 
published student notes or comments; all materials to which 
American courts frequently turn even though they carry no official 
legal significance or formal precedential weight.341 
If comparative material simply replicated what was available from 
these domestic sources, it might not be worth the effort required to 
extract and apply it.  But comparative constitutional precedent has a 
distinct advantage over domestic sources:  it represents the 
considered judgment of a tribunal shouldering the same (or very 
similar) burdens of governmental responsibility as the American 
courts.342 
Like U.S. judges, foreign constitutional jurists face national 
accountability for their decisions.343  Within their own legal systems 
they possess the obligation of striking a balance among the dictates of 
constitutional theory, institutional and personal intellectual 
consistency, pragmatism and political reality, and commitment to the 
rule of law.344  They have a duty to make constitutional law work for 
their society, and they take responsibility for the legal, economic, and 
social results of their judgments.345  Like the Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, foreign constitutional jurists sit on the constitutional 
“hot seat” of ultimate accountability to their government and their 
people.346 
                                                          
 341. It is not uncommon to see citations to amicus briefs discussing foreign law in 
cases where the Court looks to foreign law for guidance.  E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 567-68 (2003) (referring to academic writings and amicus briefs which 
criticize the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
576-77 (2005) (citing numerous briefs that support the prohibition of capital 
punishment for juveniles and note that the United States is one of only two members 
of the United Nations that had not abolished it). 
 342. See Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons, supra note 118, at 116 (noting that 
constitutional courts that “perform similar functions” have “similar concerns”); 
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 155, at 128-29 (emphasizing each constitutional 
court’s responsibility to interpreting and applying its own constitution). 
 343. For example, German constitutional judges are appointed by both houses of 
parliament and serve only for non-renewable, twelve-year terms.  Sir Basil Markesinis 
& Jorg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 134 (2005). 
 344. Barak, supra note 66, at 59, 126-27. 
 345. See id. at 28-36 (charging judges with the responsibility for evolving law and 
constitutional interpretation with the changing values of society, yet taking care to do 
so transparently and when the balance is strongly in favor of such a change). 
 346. See id. at 50-53 (noting that while judges are not accountable in the 
traditional sense like the legislature and politicians, they are accountable because the 
legislature has the ability to nullify their decisions, their legal reasoning may be 
appealable, and they are impeachable for judicial misconduct). 
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This responsibility gives the decisions of foreign constitutional 
courts an unique perspective.  Unlike the parties or amici before the 
court, their views are not colored by the result orientations that 
derive from profit or ideological motives.347  Unlike scholars, they take 
responsibility for consequences and thus are unlikely to engage in 
flights of academic fancy or commit to rigid theoretical structures 
that will not work in actual practice.348  Unlike lower domestic courts, 
they are not relieved of the burden of final decisionmaking and 
cannot take comfort in the thought that their errors will be corrected 
further up the line.349  Foreign decisions thus supply an opportunity 
to learn how other tribunals that are charged with final national 
constitutional decisionmaking responsibility acquit that charge.350 
This perspective yields a number of potentially illuminating 
inquiries, not only about the result the foreign court reached, but 
about the reasoning by which that result was achieved.  How, the 
American court can ask, did the foreign constitutional court frame 
the issues?  What facts did it deem to be particularly relevant?  What 
weight did it assign to the parties’ competing arguments, and why?  
What weight did it assign to its own precedent and past governmental 
practice?  What social implications did it perceive?  How did it thread 
its way through the competing policy puzzles that inhere in most 
constitutional principles?  How did it reconcile principle with 
pragmatism? How broadly or narrowly did it rule?  What political and 
juridical results attended its decision?  The answers to such questions 
are likely to be both informative and persuasive, though rarely (if 
ever) authoritative.  An American court need not follow the foreign 
tribunal, but it may use the tribunal’s thinking as a catalyst for 
viewing American constitutional issues in a different light. 
Asking such questions about a foreign court’s decision can assist an 
American court in projecting the impact of different potential 
                                                          
 347. See Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 342-43 (noting that 
looking to foreign precedent allows a judge to step outside of her own country’s 
tradition, open her eyes to new approaches, and makes her “more likely to respond 
by reasoning rather than by an instinctive assumption that one has the right 
answer”). 
 348. See Fuller, supra note 272, at 366 (asserting that the judge assumes a “burden 
of rationality” unique to that position). 
 349. See Barak, supra note 66, at 102 (confirming that the final interpretation of 
statute and law lies with the highest court).  But see id. at 134 (recognizing that 
legislatures can overcome the finality judicial decisions by enacting further 
legislation to specifically override the constitutional court). 
 350. Id. 
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resolutions for an American constitutional question.351  A review of 
foreign materials might convince the American court that a decision 
in line with foreign law would be wise, or conversely that such a 
decision should be rejected because of undesirable legal or social 
consequences.352  In between these poles, consideration of foreign 
precedent might persuade an American court to adjust its framing of 
the issues, to broaden or narrow its view of relevant facts, to take 
various policy factors elucidated by foreign precedent into account, 
to weigh them similarly or differently, or even to reject them as 
irrelevant.353  However the American court responds, because of 
shared institutional responsibility, it can learn lessons from a foreign 
decision that cannot be taken as directly from any domestic source. 
In American domestic law, there is a loose counterpart that gives 
some idea of the potential value of considering the decisions of other 
constitutional courts:  state constitutional law.354  In addressing novel 
questions of state constitutional interpretation, state supreme courts 
often evaluate the decisions of their counterparts in other states.355  
They also often treat federal constitutional precedent as relevant to 
determination of state constitutional rights.356  As a purely formal 
                                                          
 351. See Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 258 (“[T]he approaches 
of foreign nations can help identify the consequences of different reasonably 
justifiable interpretations plausibly open to the decisionmaker.”). 
 352. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism:  The Case 
for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models, 1 INT=L J. CONST. L. 
296 (2003) (arguing that constitutional comparison permits new countries to reflect 
upon existing constitutional designs, provisions, possibilities to which they would like 
to aspire and those to which they are averse); Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra 
note 118, at 258 (emphasizing that foreign case law can “illuminate” the 
consequences of different potential decisions). 
 353. See generally Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 260-61 
(commenting that regardless of the actual decision, the consideration of foreign 
precedent will enhance the quality and depth of the argument and reasoning). 
 354. See J.M. Balkin & Stanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of 
Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1004 & n.131 (1998) (implying that the 
U.S. Constitution may be compared to state constitutions as they contain similar 
provisions and rights). 
 355. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity:  States and 
Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 19-20 (2004) [hereinafter 
Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue]. 
 356. For example, when the United States Supreme Court refused to recognize 
the existence of a right to equal educational resources in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973), some state courts found such a 
right in their state constitutions.  E.g., MacDaniels v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 
(Ga. 1981) (conceding the Georgia Supreme Court’s lack of expertise in 
understanding the financial foundations of the local school systems and therefore 
deferring to the Supreme Court’s analysis of the fundamental right to education in 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez).  But see Cathe A. v. Doddridge 
County Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340, 346 n.3 (W.Va. 1997) (explaining that the West 
Virginia Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to education, which must be 
provided for all children on an equal basis). 
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matter, a constitutional guarantee under one state’s constitution 
need not correspond to a similar guarantee in another state, or even 
coincide exactly with the scope of a comparable federal guarantee.357  
Nor is there any formal reason to treat precedent from another 
state’s courts as relevant.358  Yet state courts routinely look across state 
boundaries, and to federal courts, for inspiration regarding the 
interpretation of shared constitutional norms.359 
Of course, the analogy to comparative constitutional precedent is 
inexact because states share a common legal system, participate in a 
union committed to a unified vision of republican government, and 
partake of a common history rooted in principles emanating from 
the nation’s founding and the Civil War.  This makes regard for the 
decisions of sister states easy, familiar, and almost automatic.360  
However, when one asks why Pennsylvania might look at New Jersey 
or Arkansas at California on a question of the forum state’s law, the 
same reason emerges.  The court in one state, though not required, 
consults the decisions of a court in another state because the other 
state court has faced a similar question and context with the same level 
of institutional responsibility.  Its decision and the aftermath therefore 
helpfully illuminate the forum state’s analysis. 
3. Opportunities for constitutional dialogue 
Another advantage of comparative constitutional analysis is the 
opportunity for constitutional dialogue that it affords.361  This 
                                                          
 357. Compare Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (holding that a 
restrictive definition of “family” for residential zoning purposes is not a violation of 
the U.S. Constitution; most states follow this precedent), with Charter Twp. of Delta 
v. Dinolfo, 351 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1984) (holding that the restrictive definition of 
“family” upheld under the U.S. Constitution in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas violates 
Michigan’s state constitution). 
 358. See CAPPALLI, supra note 261, at 177 (stating that judicial decisions from other 
state courts are persuasive and given weight “because of the wisdom they display”). 
  359.  Further, many state courts look to foreign law when “interpret[ing] and 
mak[ing] common law” and when interpreting statutes with “foreign roots.”  Mark 
Wendell DeLaquil, Foreign Law and Opinion in State Courts, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 697, 699-
700 (2006). 
 360. See GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS, supra note 261, at 6 (noting the “important 
influence of outstate decisions as persuasive authority in American law”).  
 361. See Harding, supra note 242, at 424-27 (discussing the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s discussion and analysis of American jurisprudence relative to its own 
constitutional issues); Choudhry, supra note 225, at 855-65 (explaining that through 
a comparative constitutional approach, courts develop a better perspective of the 
assumptions and norms from which they analyze and create jurisprudence); 
Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?:  Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 503-10 (2000) 
(analyzing the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
dialogue that courts of the individual members countries engage in with each other 
and the European Court for Human Rights); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial 
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opportunity may not be as easily obtained from domestic sources.  
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee362 established the principle of nationally 
uniform interpretation and application of federal law, including 
federal constitutional law.363  This means that once the Supreme 
Court has spoken, constitutional interpretation on that particular 
question is fixed, unless and until the Constitution is amended or the 
Court overrules its own precedent.  Alternative contested 
interpretations of the particular constitutional issue can be 
entertained and applied by different lower courts before the 
Supreme Court’s decision, but not after.  This is the foundation of 
Justice Jackson’s famous quip linking finality with “infallibility” in 
Supreme Court adjudication.364 
While finality serves important uniformity interests, it has a 
downside:  once the Supreme Court decides a question, further 
judicial discussion or experimentation with that question is cut off.  
The merits of the Court’s decision remain subject to popular and 
academic criticism, and those critiques can be used in subsequent 
cases testing the further implications of the rule.365  However, until 
the Court changes course, all subsequent judicial discourse must 
assume that the Court’s determination was correct on its own terms 
and within its own sphere.  This is, in part, what the judges’ oath366 to 
defend the Constitution has come to mean.367  It necessarily 
influences the direction of all future analysis because future courts 
must at some level accept the legitimacy of the decision, and must 
accord an equivalent level of merit to its essential reasoning. 
Not so, however, with foreign constitutional courts.  They may 
debate the merits of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on common 
                                                          
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000) (noting that courts all over the world are 
beginning to work in a global legal system, where they look to super-national courts, 
constitutional courts, and jurists from around the world for developing trends and 
interpretations). 
 362. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 363. Id. at 352-54. 
 364. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
 365. See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156 (2002) (“At its best, persuasive legal 
scholarship displays a power to elucidate the logic of doctrinal practices in 
enlightening ways, to engage audiences, and to motivate legal and social change.”); 
Larry Alexander, What We Do, and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885, 1886-88 (1993) 
(discussing five purposes for legal scholarship, including “normative scholarship” 
aimed at “prescrib[ing] doctrinal changes” in the law). 
 366. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000). 
 367. The scope of the judicial oath of office was discussed during the confirmation 
hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts.  Then-Judge Roberts declined to denounce 
use of foreign precedent as a violation of a judge’s pledge to uphold the 
Constitution.  Supra note 18. 
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constitutional questions.368  They may reach different, even 
diametrically opposed, results.369  In the process, they may identify 
arguable flaws in the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis, whether errors of 
logic, incorrect assumptions, overvaluation of certain interests, 
neglect of others, or failure to perceive unfortunate consequences.370  
When foreign constitutional courts do so, they enter into a judicial 
dialogue with the U.S. Supreme Court over the proper direction for 
shared constitutional principles.371  Over time, this dialogue might 
convince the Supreme Court to alter its position on the disputed 
question as it realizes the flaws in its own reasoning and/or the merits 
of the alternative positions outlined by other constitutional courts.  
Conversely, it might impel the Court to summon additional support 
for its conclusions, answer the foreign court’s objections, and 
reaffirm commitment to its original rule.  In either event, the 
dialogue would produce a useful dialectic making positive 
contributions to the development of American law. 
It may be partly for this reason that the Court’s most prominent 
use of foreign precedent has occurred in decisions like Roper and 
Lawrence that actually overruled prior Supreme Court decisions.372  
Those earlier decisions had cut off further development of the law in 
the United States, but not abroad.  When the Court considered the 
foreign developments and their trajectory, it concluded that its own 
                                                          
 368. See, e.g., Truth About Motorways Party Ltd. v. Macquarie Infrastructure 
Investment Mgmt. Ltd. (2000) 200 C.L.R. 591 (Austl.) (looking to U.S. Supreme 
Court case law to resolve a question of standing under the Australian Constitution); 
Australian Conservation Found. v. The Commonwealth (1980) 146 C.L.R. 493 
(Austl.) (discussing and analyzing major U.S. Supreme Court cases on standing); 
Amalgamated Soc’y of Eng’rs v. Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 C.L.R. 129, 
147-48 (Austl.) (noting that the differences between the foundations and history of 
Australia and the United States make reliance on U.S. federalism cases futile); S. v. 
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 56 (S. Afr.) (“The United States jurisprudence 
has not resolved the dilemma arising from the fact that the constitution prohibits 
cruel and unusual punishments, but . . . contemplates that there will be capital 
punishment. . . . The difficulties that have been experienced in following this 
path . . . persuade me that we should not follow this route.”). 
 369. E.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (holding that hate speech is 
not constitutionally protected speech, a decision in direct conflict with the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)). 
 370. See id. at 738-44 (surveying First Amendment jurisprudence and finding 
inconsistencies in its treatment of hate speech and propaganda). 
 371. See Rebecca Lefler, Note, A Comparison of Comparison:  Use of the Foreign Case 
Law as Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and the High Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165 (2001) 
(concluding that this dialogue is, more often than not, only one-way, with the U.S. 
Supreme Court declining to engage). 
 372. See Koh, U.S. Constitution and International Law, supra note 34, at 48-50 
(suggesting that the Court’s recent citations to foreign precedent in Atkins and 
Lawrence signal a trend towards constitutional dialogue); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses 
of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 89-90 (2004). 
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prior decisions were incorrect, and that outcomes more nearly in line 
with comparative rulings were in fact more faithful to American 
constitutional principle.373  It also realized that those rulings did not 
produce the sorts of untoward effects for society that the Court had 
feared.374  Foreign constitutional precedent played an instrumental 
role in facilitating these corrections. 
When the Court revises American constitutional principles based 
in part on inspiration from foreign sources, it is neither slavishly 
following foreign precedent nor surrendering responsibility for 
resolution of an American constitutional question to a foreign 
tribunal.  Rather, it is using the foreign decision and analysis as an 
instrument for re-evaluation of the American constitutional norm.  
Decisional responsibility remains with the American court, and its 
analysis remains an analysis of American constitutional law.  The 
Court’s discussion in Lawrence v. Texas supplies a potent example.  
There, Justice Kennedy employed foreign precedent on the de-
criminalization of same-sex sexual relations as a device for exposing 
flaws in the reasoning of the majority and concurring opinions375 in 
Bowers v. Hardwick.376  The Court was able to isolate incorrect 
assumptions about the historical legal treatment of homosexual 
sodomy,377 and it was able to identify flaws in the Bowers Court’s 
treatment of international and comparative norms regarding 
homosexual sodomy.378  These errors in the Bowers Court’s analysis 
weakened its force as precedent under established American norms 
of stare decisis,379 and this in turn enabled the Court to conduct a 
                                                          
 373. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing the European 
Union’s disapproval of the death penalty for mentally retarded persons as support 
for finding the sentence unconstitutional in the United States); Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (noting that the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 
has been widely rejected by states and other nations alike and that the United States, 
like other nations, must also recognize the right of homosexual adults to engage in 
intimate conduct). 
 374. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (acknowledging that there has been no 
reliance on the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick that would make its reversal 
inequitable). 
 375. See id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981)) 
(using the European Court of Human Rights’ invalidation of laws prohibiting 
homosexual sodomy in all member-countries of the European Union as evidence 
that the Bowers court was mistaken in asserting that there existed a far-reaching 
tradition of condemning same-sex sexual relations). 
 376. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that homosexual individuals did not have a 
fundamental right to engage in acts of consensual sodomy). 
 377. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567-72 (correcting the Bowers Court’s statement that 
the prohibition of sodomy has historical roots by acknowledging that such a history 
does not exist in American jurisprudence or law). 
 378. Id. at 572-73. 
 379. Id. at 577-78. 
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fresh examination of the issue.380  Foreign law was a catalyst for 
reconsideration, but it neither forced nor directed the Court to a new 
outcome.381  That outcome was entirely a result of the Court’s 
independent evaluation of American due process principles, even 
though it was significantly facilitated by analysis of comparative 
constitutional materials.382 
Contrary to popular belief, constitutional dialogue with foreign 
constitutional courts has neither a liberal nor a conservative bias.  
While the most recent examples of comparative constitutional 
reasoning in the Supreme Court have pushed American law in 
politically liberal directions, the liberal impact is coincidental.  There 
are many contexts in which leading foreign constitutional precedents 
strike relatively conservative positions, including such high-profile 
social issues as abortion rights, freedom of expression, and religious 
freedom.383  Indeed, if one were to forecast an inherent bias to 
foreign constitutional decisions, it would probably be in a 
jurisprudentially conservative (and politically neutral) direction, 
since most foreign constitutional courts are considerably less 
aggressive than the U.S. Supreme Court in exercising powers of 
judicial review and hence are more likely to uphold laws that are 
challenged under various constitutional norms.384 
4.  Rule rejection and rule alignment 
The effects of comparative constitutionalism are most apparent in 
circumstances involving agreement with or adaptation of comparative 
precedents under U.S. law.  But there is another important advantage 
that arises from conscious rejection or differentiation of 
constitutional rules adopted elsewhere.  An American court, looking 
                                                          
 380. Id. at 573-79. 
 381. It is possible to remove all mention of recent foreign law from the Court’s 
opinion and arrive at the same result.  In fact, only three paragraphs from the 
Court’s seventeen-page decision engage in transnational constitutional dialogue. 
 382. See Mortimer N. S. Sellers, Comment, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United 
States of America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 82 (2006) (concluding that the Court’s 
decision in Lawrence v. Hardwick was based on changes in society’s notion of liberty 
and the fact that there was no detrimental reliance on Lawrence). 
 383. See, e.g., Alford, Misusing International Sources, supra note 34, at 67 (noting that 
many countries reject the right to abortion, guaranteed in the United States by Roe v. 
Wade); Ramsey, supra note 17, at 77 (“World practice (even in Europe) often may be 
less protective of speech than the U.S. First Amendment” but “[i]f we are serious 
about the project of using international materials, we must ‘take the bitter with the 
sweet,’ and use international materials to contradict, not merely confirm, our own 
view of rights.”). 
 384. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword:  A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 80 
(2005) [hereinafter Posner, Foreword] (“Not that foreign constitutional courts are 
unaggressive; but, as we shall see, it is aggression with a soft bite.”). 
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at the work of a foreign counterpart, can treat it as an example of 
what not to rule.385 
This is an option that typical uses of domestic precedent do not 
regularly afford.  When American courts consider valid American 
precedent on a constitutional question, they generally take one of 
three positions regarding its application:  (1) that it is directly 
controlling and should be followed, (2) that it is not controlling but 
is relevant and indirectly supports or harmonizes with the decision 
being taken, or (3) that it is not relevant and therefore should be 
distinguished.  In all three instances, the court assumes that the 
precedent is, on its own terms, correct.  Rarely does a court use 
existing valid domestic precedent negatively⎯that is, to show that the 
outcome is wrong, depends on flawed reasoning, or produces 
undesirable consequences. 
However, negative use of precedent is not entirely missing from 
domestic law.  Thus, instances of negative use contribute significantly 
to legal analysis.  For example, negative uses of precedent occur when 
one lower court openly disagrees with another lower court on an 
issue the Supreme Court has yet to consider.386  Federal circuit court 
conflicts have this quality, and such open disagreement among 
respected jurists often plays an important part in the Supreme 
Court’s resolution of the issue.  Sometimes, negative uses of domestic 
precedent occur with respect to an invalid precedent.  In these 
situations, a court adopts an interpretation in order to avoid a once-
controlling but now-discredited ruling.  For example, after Nebbia v. 
New York,387 many subsequent Supreme Court decisions warned 
against the dangers of returning to the economic due process 
reasoning of the now-discredited Lochner approach.388  Negative 
                                                          
 385. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 283; see also David Fontana, 
Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 551 (2001) 
(suggesting that the Court does one of two things when it looks at foreign law:  either 
positive comparative analysis when the Court looks to foreign precedent with 
approval, or negative analysis when the Court turns to foreign precedent as an 
example of what not to do).  For examples of where the Court actually engaged in 
such analysis, see id. at 551 n.58 (citing Justice Breyer’s dissent in Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997), as an example of positive analysis), and at 551 
n.59 (citing a law review article by Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial 
Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998), as an explanation of negative analysis). 
 386. See, e.g., In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig., 130 F.3d 309, 315 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(refusing to follow the authority of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits as to the 
question of whether non-fraud securities claims must be pled with particularity 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). 
 387. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 388. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (explaining that the Court 
has “returned to the original constitutional proposition” that courts do not substitute 
their will for the judgment of legislative bodies). 
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discussion also occasionally occurs when precedent is distinguished 
and a court uses doubt about a ruling as a reason for not extending it 
to new situations.  And negative use of precedent occurs in those still-
exceptional situations where the Supreme Court actually overrules a 
prior decision. Though fairly rare, these examples illustrate the 
potency of negative precedential reasoning.389 
Foreign constitutional precedent can also be used in this explicitly 
negative way.  American courts can use constitutional decisions from 
abroad as an example of what should not be done in the United 
States.  The foreign decision may embrace constitutional principles 
that Americans do not share.  For example, it may be based on a 
social order that it inconsistent with that of the United States, it may 
flow from what Americans deem to be an inadequate (or, more 
rarely, overzealous) commitment to liberty or democracy or rule of 
law, it may be inconsistent with countervailing American 
constitutional principles, or it may produce consequences that would 
be unacceptable in the United States.  Foreign decisions may also rest 
on erroneous assumptions (ones that would be erroneous in the 
United States), may conflict with other constitutional norms that 
operate here but not abroad, or may utilize flawed reasoning.  In 
these situations, “comparative” constitutional law transforms into 
“contrastive” or perhaps “corrective” constitutional law, illustrating 
not what we should do, but rather what we should avoid doing. 
In some situations, negative and positive use of foreign 
constitutional precedent might combine to produce constitutional 
alignment.  The American court can say, in effect, “our rule comports 
with nations A, B, and C, which share American constitutional values, 
but runs contrary to nations X, Y, and Z, which do not.”  While this 
approach may involve identifying “friends in a crowd,” as Chief 
Justice Roberts put it,390 it follows a pattern of conscious alignment 
that is an embedded practice in the American common law tradition 
and that promises significant positive benefits.  The court can clarify 
its reasoning by identifying the factors of similarity in the one group 
of nations and of difference in the others that justify its choice, 
                                                          
 389. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (permitting the 
segregation of railway cars on the grounds that the cars were “separate, but equal”), 
with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (overruling Plessy because 
segregated schools are “inherently unequal”). 
 390. Adam Liptak & Adam Nagourney, Judge Alito the Witness Proves a Powerful 
Match For Senate Questioners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A1 (quoting Justice Roberts 
during his testimony as saying that “[l]ooking at foreign law for support . . . is like 
looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends.  You can find them.  They’re 
there.  And that actually expands the discretion of the judge”). 
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engaging in a selective process that illuminates the aims and values 
underlying the court’s decision regarding the American 
constitutional position.391 
5. De-politicization 
Sometimes, constitutional issues in the United States get drawn 
into partisan politics.  When this happens, positions on the issues can 
be colored by partisan political affiliations.392  Political candidates or 
parties appeal for voter support over a constitutional question, such 
as the status of flag-burning, abortion, the rights of the terminally ill, 
or the posting of the Ten Commandments, to cite a few recent 
examples.393  When this occurs, there is a risk that courts and judges, 
who are supposed to maintain independence from partisan matters,394 
will get drawn into the political vortex and let political considerations 
dictate their judicial decisions.  Indeed, as the processes of judicial 
appointment and confirmation become more openly politicized, the 
prospect for such politically dictated judicial decisionmaking may be 
increasing.395  Judges who have been nominated and confirmed 
because of their views on certain fundamental constitutional 
questions396 may feel some sense of obligation to deliver rulings that 
                                                          
 391. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism, supra note 118, at 259-60 (asserting that 
Justice Scalia considered the experiences of foreign democracies in his analysis of the 
constitutionality under the First Amendment of a ban on anonymous 
pamphleteering). 
 392. See STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 
28 (2002) (arguing that the lower federal courts are a battleground between more 
liberal Carter and Clinton appointees versus the more conservative Reagan and Bush 
appointees); Moravcsik, supra note 220, at 183-86 (noting that congressional voting 
patterns on human rights issues are dictated by political party affiliation); William P. 
Marshall, Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 530 (2005) 
(highlighting the Reagan Justice Department’s efforts to achieve conservative judicial 
rulings by appointing conservative judges to the federal bench). 
 393. See Carl Hulse, Senate Emphasis on Ideology Has Some in G.O.P. Anxious, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A1 (describing the skepticism of several rank-and-file 
Republicans over the “long-held belief among Republican leaders that highlighting 
issues like same-sex marriage, flag desecration and abortion speaks to the party’s 
convictions and carries concrete political beliefs”). 
 394. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST AND 
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 431 (Scott, E.H. ed., 1898) (describing in FEDERALIST 
NO. 79 how judicial lifetime tenure provides for judicial independence).  In addition, 
the judge’s oath requires judges to affirm that they will “faithfully and impartially 
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon [them].”  28 U.S.C. § 453 
(2000). 
 395. See Charles Babington & Amy Goldstein, Alito on Day 1:  ‘A Judge Can’t Have 
Any Agenda,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at A01 (noting that the questions posed to 
now-Justice Samuel A. Alito during his confirmation hearing split along party lines). 
 396. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process:  Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1202, 1203-04 (1988) (explaining that the President’s nominating decisions 
are entirely political); Gerald Walpin, Take Obstructionism Out of the Judicial 
Nominations and Confirmations Process, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 89, 92 (2003) (noting, for 
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satisfy their political supporters’ expectations and frustrate those of 
their opponents.397  Judges in lower courts seeking “promotion” to a 
higher court may be tempted to curry political favor by ruling in line 
with prevailing popular beliefs.398  Judges with long-established 
political affiliations may be tempted to decide particular questions 
with an eye toward their impact in the next round of elections.399  The 
American system is designed to guard against this sort of political 
influence,400 yet undoubtedly it sometimes occurs.  In a highly 
politicized atmosphere, it may be difficult for judges to isolate and 
eliminate political overtones from their thinking, and even if they do, 
others are likely to attribute political motives to their most politically 
charged decisions. 
While this political element may never be excised completely from 
judicial decisions on politically controversial constitutional questions, 
consideration of foreign precedent may supply a partial antidote to 
politicization of the American judiciary.  Foreign judges naturally 
function outside U.S. politics.401  Their decisions may be colored by 
                                                          
instance, that President Lincoln appointed Salmon Chase to the Supreme Court 
because Chase would “sustain what has been done in regard to emancipation”); see 
also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777-78 (2002) (discussing 
possible meanings of “impartiality” in the judicial context, the majority finding that 
the term could mean “lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal 
view”). 
 397. Alexander Hamilton argued that Presidential appointees may perform their 
jobs with bias toward the President, and that the Senate confirmation process exists 
to prevent extreme patronage. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  Many commentators cited this passage when arguing 
that Harriet Miers, President Bush’s second nominee to succeed Justice O’Connor, 
was a poor candidate to fill O’Connor’s vacancy on the Supreme Court.  See Randy E. 
Barnett, Cronyism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at A26 (asserting that Harriet Miers’ lack 
of judicial experience confirms that her nomination was politically motivated); 
Welcome to The Hackocracy, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 17, 2005, at 21; see also Laura E. Little, 
Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 716 (1995) 
(explaining that a judge nominated to the federal bench incurs a “social obligation” 
to those who nominated him or her). 
 398. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, Judicial Activism, Judges’ Speech, and Merit 
Selection:  Conventional Wisdom and Nonsense, 68 ALB. L. REV. 557, 562 (2005) (warning 
that judges may make up their mind before considering the merits of a case). 
 399. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint:  A Judge’s Perspective 
on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988) (articulating a 
concern that the election of judges would foster a system with an appearance of 
impropriety because judges would be able to find out who contributed to their 
campaign). 
 400. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 76, 79, at 417, 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the Senate confirmation process in THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 76 and 79 as a safeguard on judicial nominee patronage towards the nominating 
President and life tenure as a preserve of judicial independence). 
 401. It is certainly possible that a constitutional judge in another country may 
decide a case with an eye toward American reaction, especially given that liberal 
democracies like the United States sometimes place economic sanctions on those 
countries which deny their citizens basic human rights or which transgress important 
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the political issues of the day in their own countries, but they are 
unlikely to be influenced by the ebb and flow of politics in the United 
States, and are thus unlikely to be determined by the partisan 
political effects of a particular result in the United States. 
As a consequence, foreign decisions may serve as a background 
check against domestic political pressures on the judiciary.  American 
judges can test their reasoning and results against the decisions and 
rationales of foreign counterparts.  Where there is common ground, 
the American courts can use foreign precedent to buttress their 
arguments and demonstrate the political impartiality of their 
decision.  Where there are differences, the American judges may 
consider whether the difference is attributable to political concerns 
and, if so, whether according weight to such political factors requires 
correction.  They may also be prompted to explain why their decision 
differs.  Over time, this could help American courts to detect and 
correct for political influences in their thinking, and thus to preserve 
a greater measure of independence from partisan politics.402 
6. Return to first principles 
As I mentioned above, one of the traditional barriers to using 
foreign precedent has been the high level of development of 
American constitutional law.  Typically, that development is an 
advantage, but not always.  Sometimes, it bogs American courts down, 
miring them in the obligation to apply increasingly voluminous, 
detailed, sometimes conflicting, and overly formal or technical 
precedent,403 rather than focusing on the first principles that ought to 
govern decisionmaking in the area.  The Constitution itself may not 
                                                          
transnational legal norms.  However, this concern is likely outweighed by the judge’s 
allegiance to (or fear of) his or her own nation’s government.  In any event, political 
reaction in the United States is unlikely to be a foreign constitutional judge’s 
paramount concern.  Cf. Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice?  Reconciling Universal 
Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1100 (2004) (outlining how, in 
essence, Chilean citizens were governed by British and Spanish judges when judges 
in Britain and Spain decided to enforce the Torture Convention against the former 
Chilean President, General Augusto Pinochet). 
 402. See Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 320-21 (“The presence 
of deep controversy over internal norms . . . might be itself a particular reason to 
look outside—not for the purpose of adopting external norms, but rather to critically 
interrogate our own instincts or predispositions . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 403. The doctrine of stare decisis is a guiding principle in the American legal 
system.  Although the Court is not absolutely bound to follow precedent, the Court 
requires that “a departure from precedent . . . be supported by some special 
justification.”  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (quoting United 
States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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take on the “prolixity of a legal code,”404 but the precedent applying it 
does.  While meticulous application of precedent has the virtues of 
promoting predictability and narrowing the scope of future dispute,405 
at times it can become stultifying,406 particularly in a system where 
constitutional amendment (which theoretically provides an escape 
from burdensome or misguided precedent) is especially difficult.407  
Unduly prolix precedent is also subject to manipulation, particularly 
when the proliferation of precedent has produced conflicting sets of 
doctrinal rules that plausibly apply to the same questions.408 
Occasionally, the Supreme Court cuts loose from burdensome 
precedent by declaring new rules,409 organizing principles,410 forms of 
analysis, or other substantial departures from a restraining judicial 
mold.  Such landmark departures are rare, and are often highly 
controversial in their own time.  However, they are also important 
watershed moments in the development of American constitutional 
law.  It is not easy for a court habituated to following its own most 
                                                          
 404. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
 405. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (acknowledging that stare 
decisis is essential to the stability of the law but rejecting the notion that this 
principle should always be invoked to justify judicial holdings); GINSBURG, LEGAL 
METHODS, supra note 261, at 94-95 (explaining that the principle of stare decisis 
dictates that a decision in one case should govern in subsequent cases with similar 
facts). 
 406. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is 
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled 
right.”). 
 407. See Darren R. Latham, The Historical Amendability of the American Constitution:  
Speculations on an Empirical Problematic, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 149 (2005) (comparing 
the number of constitutional amendments that have been formally proposed (eleven 
thousand) versus the relatively small number of amendments that have passed both 
houses of Congress with a two-thirds majority (thirty-three)); Jackson, Narratives of 
Federalism, supra note 118, at 277 (noting that amending the United States 
Constitution is immensely more difficult than amending the constitutions of other 
nations). 
 408. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I do 
not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases; but I do 
believe that we should be consistent rather than manipulative in invoking the 
doctrine.”). 
 409. See id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not 
correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (“The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California . . . cannot 
be supported, and that decision is therefore overruled”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate 
but equal’ has no place.”). 
 410. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63, 568 (1996) 
(establishing guideposts for determining whether punitive damage awards are 
sufficiently excessive to constitute a violation of Due Process); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 218 (1977) (establishing intermediate scrutiny as the test for gender 
classifications); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(establishing two different kinds of Due Process scrutiny depending upon the nature 
of the right in question). 
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immediately and specifically applicable precedent to step back from 
the trees for a new and different view of the forest.  Yet in retrospect, 
these departure points are among the most productive and important 
developments in constitutional law.411 
Foreign constitutional precedent can assist this process.  Foreign 
courts, of course, have no obligation to apply U.S. precedent, so they 
run no risk of getting caught in the minutiae of domestic 
precedential applications that sometimes swamp the U.S. courts or 
warp their decisions.  Additionally, in many foreign systems, the 
constitutional courts do not have the same obligation to follow their 
own prior decisions.412  Courts from civil law jurisdictions, for 
example, do not regard past decisions as binding law in the way that 
common law courts traditionally do.413  Constitutional courts from 
other jurisdictions may also have fewer and more general precedents 
to apply.414  As a consequence, foreign courts are less apt to decide a 
new constitutional question simply by consulting, applying, and 
manipulating precedent, and they are more apt to engage discussion 
of fundamental constitutional first principles as the foundation for 
their reasoning.415 
Given this tendency, the decisions of foreign constitutional courts 
become a useful mirror for gauging whether applicable U.S. 
precedent reflects fidelity to shared first principles.  Where precedent 
comports with principle, foreign precedent can reinvigorate the 
connection.  Where U.S. precedent has lost its compass or become 
mired in detail, foreign precedent can help identify the problem, 
measure the variance between existing precedent and controlling 
constitutional values, and model the means for restructuring 
American law.416  Alternatively, foreign constitutional precedent can 
                                                          
 411. See H. Jefferson Powell, Grand Visions in an Age of Conflict, 115 YALE L.J. 2067, 
2081 (2006) (stating that the seminal civil rights case, Brown v. Board of Education, 
ushered in a new era of Equal Protection jurisprudence). 
 412. See GINSBURG, LEGAL METHODS, supra note 261, at 70 (indicating that there is 
no concept of stare decisis in many foreign courts). 
 413. See id. (positing that civil law jurists are willing to interpret the civil code 
“generously” in part because its articles are drafted in general and broad terms). 
 414. See id. (noting that French jurists look to previous cases “not for binding 
precedents with similar facts but rather for general principles of law and for specific 
interpretations of particular provisions of law”). 
 415. See id. at 69-70 (noting that a typical French case begins not with a detailed 
exposition of the facts, but instead builds upon a statement of applicable general 
principles of law).  Additionally, jurists in civil law jurisdictions look more to “la 
doctrine,” i.e., legal scholarship, than to cases.  Id. at 72. 
 416. See id. at 71-72 (analogizing the importance of learning a foreign language to 
the study of foreign law because both are increasingly important in an age of 
globalization and increased world travel). 
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serve as a departure point for setting a new U.S. constitutional 
direction when that becomes an appropriate step. 
7. Judicial cross-fertilization 
A final advantage of comparative constitutional precedent is what 
may be called “cross-fertilization,” of perspectives and ideas by 
individual jurists.417  This is similar to the constitutional dialogue 
concept, but it occurs at an individual rather than institutional 
level.418  When cross-fertilization occurs, a particular jurist in the 
United States learns something from a foreign court that alters the 
American jurist’s view of U.S. constitutional law.419  The lesson can be 
as broad as a different perspective, methodology, or constitutional 
vocabulary, or it can be as narrow as a fine point of reasoning on a 
particular question.  In any event, it stimulates the American judge to 
rethink principles or priorities in ways that alter the American jurist’s 
constitutional perspective. 
The general advantages of cross-fertilization among jurists can be 
observed by looking at U.S. courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  I have discussed elsewhere the importance of “personality” in 
judging.  Indeed, the notion of cross-fertilization serves to bolster the 
theory that the personalities of judges are paramount because 
                                                          
 417. See Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons, supra note 118, at 119 (noting that 
engaging with foreign sources can be a “partial intellectual substitute for 
conversation”); SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD, supra note 105, at 71 (employing the 
phrase, “cross fertilization,” to describe the interplay of ideas between foreign and 
U.S. judges). 
 418. See Christine Bateup, Assessing The Normative Potential of Theories of 
Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1164-65 (2006) (positing that 
individual Americans may become more involved in civic life if there were a way to 
incorporate their views into a constitutional dialogue similarly to the way that judges 
are having a constitutional dialogue). 
 419. Since 1971, nine Supreme Court Justices have attended sessions at the annual 
international judicial seminar at the Schloss Leopoldskron (“the Schloss”) in 
Salzburg, Austria.  Toobin, supra note 17.  Justice Kennedy frequents the Schloss to 
meet foreign counterparts from around the globe, such as a recent meeting with 
Richard Goldstone, a former justice of the South African Constitutional Court.  Id.  
Indeed, Justice Breyer has said: 
[I] have found discussions with foreign judges increasingly valuable with 
respect to institutional matters.  In the past few months, several of us have 
met with members of the Supreme Court of India and discussed at some 
length the problem of overcrowded dockets . . . .  I thought we might have 
something to learn from a mediation program I observed in 
Gujarat . . . .  Judging from the lines outside the clinic, the twenty-four hours 
a day work schedule, and the settlement rate, the program seemed to work 
well.  I could not help but wonder if we in the United States did not have 
something to learn from this cross-disciplinary, problem-based, approach. 
Breyer, ASIL Keynote, supra note 104, at 266-67; see Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, 
supra note 118, at 596 n.49 (explaining that U.S. judges are increasingly traveling 
abroad to visit with their counterparts around the world). 
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interactions with foreigners will likely influence, at least to some 
degree, judges’ views of humanity and of the law.420 
Although the role of judicial personality seems to be declining, the 
Supreme Court remains one place where it still has palpable 
significance, especially in the development of constitutional law.421  
Each new Justice brings to the Court new issues, modes of analysis,422 
ideas,423 and sometimes a new lexicon.424  Other Justices respond to 
their new colleagues and change as well.425  It is an important process 
of institutional renewal, and a significant, even if indirect, check on 
the direction of the Court.  It is part of the reason we take events such 
as the recent appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
so seriously.426 
That check is losing some of its force because of the increasing 
longevity of service by the Justices.  Changes in Supreme Court 
personnel used to occur about once every two years.  Over the last 
twenty-five or thirty years changes have slowed considerably and may 
slow even further in the future.427  Chief Justice Roberts’s 
appointment to the Court, for example, was the first change in Court 
personnel in over a decade.428  With the slowing of change in Court 
                                                          
 420. See Mark C. Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope:  Justice Blackmun and the Freedom of 
Religion, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (lamenting the fact that law is taught and 
practiced as if the judges themselves are not a critical force in the development of 
the law). 
 421. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED:  THE REHNQUIST COURT AND 
THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 104-29 (2005) [hereinafter TUSHNET, A COURT 
DIVIDED] (analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s legal career and the way in which her 
personal experiences were brought to bear in shaping the Court’s decision in United 
States v. Virginia (the “VMI case”)). 
 422. Id. at 174-75 (citing Justice Kennedy’s reliance on international law in 
Lawrence to overrule Bowers). 
 423. Id. (documenting how Justice Thomas brought his belief in “natural law 
jurisprudence” to the Court). 
 424. Id. at 149 (quoting Justice Scalia’s concurrence in County of Sacremento v. Lewis 
where he does a riff on Cole Porter:  “[T]oday’s opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra, 
the Napolean Brandy, the Matatma Ghandi [sic], the Cellophane [sic] of subjectivity, 
th’ ol’ ‘shocks-the-conscience’ test”). 
 425. See David M. Levitan, The Effect of an Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice, 28 
U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 76 (1996) (positing that certain influential Justices impact the 
course of constitutional law far beyond their votes on a single case, in particular, 
Justice John Marshall who authored the opinion in 519 cases out of a total of 1,106 
decided during his stay on the Court). 
 426. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text. 
 427. See Tony Mauro, Coming to Terms With Supreme Court Tenure, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 
3, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=110415 
4537063 (explaining that the average length of service on the current Court is 18.7 
years, but that a new justice appointed at the age of 53 would be expected to serve 24 
years). 
 428. There was no change on the Supreme Court from August 3, 1994, the day 
Justice Breyer took his seat on the Supreme Court, to September 29, 2005, the day 
John Roberts was sworn in as Chief Justice.  That means the Court had no change in 
personnel for eleven years, one month and twenty-six days.  See Bush Nominates Roberts 
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personnel comes a slowing of domestic judicial cross-fertilization at 
the Supreme Court level.  Unless the Justices now sitting on the Court 
are able to find ways of renewing their own thinking, new 
perspectives and ideas will enter the Court at a slowed pace, which 
will get even slower as medical technology enhances the longevity of 
life appointment. 
For these institutional reasons, the Supreme Court is in growing 
need of external sources that renew its own stock of constitutional 
ideas.  One potentially valuable source of renewal is the work of 
foreign jurists, who are likely to approach common questions from a 
different perspective.  Attention to those differences may well 
stimulate the Justices to view American constitutional issues in a 
different light.  Unless one thinks Supreme Court Justices should stop 
learning when they join the Court, this opportunity for cross-
fertilization should prove beneficial for the development of American 
constitutional law. 
Whether, and how, American judges use these opportunities for 
cross-fertilization depends on the personality and intellectual 
position of the individual judge.  A judge with firmly fixed positions 
at one end or another of the American jurisprudential spectrum is 
unlikely to seek (or find) much enlightenment from considering the 
different views of others.  On the other hand, a judge with a more 
flexible jurisprudential stance and an open or unsettled mind is more 
likely to find value in jurisprudential exchange.  An example of such 
a difference is clear from the perspectives of Justices Breyer and 
Scalia in their AU conversation.  Breyer, a centrist and 
compromiser,429 sees many controversial American constitutional 
questions as close calls and engages in a more eclectic process of 
constitutional reasoning.430  Thus, he is more likely both to pursue 
and find benefit from comparative cross-fertilization of constitutional 
                                                          
to Supreme Court, CNN, July 20, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/07/19/ 
scotus.main/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006) (noting the lengthy interval 
between nominations). 
 429. See Ken I. Kersch, The Synthetic Progressivism of Justice Stephen Breyer, in 
REHNQUIST JUSTICE:  UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 241, 249-50 (Earl M. Maltz 
ed., 2003) (discussing Justice Breyer’s pragmatic judicial style and noting that Breyer, 
unlike Justice Thomas, does not adhere to “categorical jurisprudence”); Paul 
Gewirtz, The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer, 115 YALE L.J. 1675, 1678 (2006) 
(quoting Justice Breyer as saying that he is, by temperament, one who values 
“participating and cooperating” with others). 
 430. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 121-22 (2005) (outlining his 
reasoning in several Establishment Clause cases and noting that he considers the 
long-term social consequences in his analysis of a particular case). 
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ideas.431  On the other hand, Scalia regards few if any of those same 
questions as close, and develops his views by a more firmly fixed and 
formalized system of constitutional reasoning.  This leaves less 
inclination and less jurisprudential room to look for influences from 
abroad.  Thus the one Justice views comparative constitutionalism as 
beneficial while the other sees it as either pointless or pernicious. 
B. “Factors Counseling Hesitation”432 
There are some “factors counseling hesitation”433 in the use of 
comparative constitutional reasoning.  Some derive from ways in 
which the U.S. Constitution is sufficiently different from its foreign 
counterparts to retard the effectiveness of constitutional 
comparison.434  Others concern ways in which foreign constitutional 
differences make direct comparison potentially misleading.435  Still 
others concern the challenges and complexities of obtaining and 
digesting comparative constitutional material.436  These concerns do 
not render comparative constitutional analysis either useless or 
improper, but they do suggest some limits on the ways in which 
comparative analysis might be employed. 
1. Relevance 
The main objection opponents to the use of foreign precedent 
make is that it is essentially irrelevant to American constitutional law.  
These objections come in two different intensities.  One asserts 
complete across-the-board irrelevance.437  This seems to be the view of 
                                                          
 431. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Changing Relationships Among European Constitutional 
Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2000) (“[W]hile the more obvious 
comparative study of substantive constitutional law (‘free speech’ law, for example) is 
important, such substantive law is not the only kind worth serious examination.  One 
must look as well at the comparative aspect of the structural, or governance-related, 
characteristics of constitutional courts.”). 
 432. This phrase is drawn from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 
396 (1971). 
 433. Id. 
 434. See supra Part II.B. 
 435. See McGinnis, supra note 182, at 311 (arguing that citations to foreign law in 
Supreme Court decisions may unfairly suggest that the case is authoritative by virtue 
of its appearance in a Supreme Court decision); Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra 
note 182, at 697 (“[I]n searching for commonalities among and between 
constitutional courts, the Court patently risks ignoring the distinctions.”). 
 436. See supra notes 182-187 and accompanying text. 
 437. Proponents of this view include Justice Scalia and Judge Richard Posner.  See 
AU Conversation, supra note 1 (rejecting the use of foreign law in U.S. jurisprudence 
in large part because other nations may not have the same “moral and legal 
framework” as the United States); Scalia, Keynote Address, supra note 104, at 307 (“It 
is my view that modern foreign legal materials can never be relevant to an 
interpretation of—to the meaning of—the U.S. Constitution.”); Posner, Foreword, 
supra note 384, at 81 (indicating that the use of foreign law would increase the 
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the various Justices and Senators who have publicly decried the use of 
comparative constitutional precedent.438  The other objection asserts 
partial irrelevance on some issues.439  In my view the former objection 
is misguided but the latter carries some weight. 
Those who maintain that foreign precedent is completely 
irrelevant usually offer three reasons.  First, they argue that since the 
Constitution is adopted and ratified by the people of the United 
States, the views of foreigners who are not part of its social compact 
have no bearing on what the U.S. Constitution means.  Thus, any 
reliance on foreign views effectively surrenders control over the 
Constitution to outsiders.440  This view could be called the Social 
Covenant argument.441  Chief Justice Roberts offered a variant of this 
view in his Supreme Court confirmation testimony.442  Second, they 
assert that the meaning of the U.S. Constitution should be 
determined primarily by reliance on original intention of its framers 
and ratifiers, an inquiry on which foreign discussion cannot shed any 
valuable light.443  This view could be called the Originalist argument 
and is apparent particularly in Justice Scalia’s portion of the AU 
                                                          
amount of research that advocates and judges would have to conduct because of the 
large number of foreign courts in existence and the inherent difficulty in locating 
the decisions handed down from these courts located all over the world). 
 438. See, e.g., Senator Jeff Sessions, Senate Floor Statement:  Judge Samuel Alito 
Supreme Court Confirmation (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://sessions.senate.gov/ 
pressapp/record.cfm?id=251075 (asserting that judges should look to legislative 
history, not European law, if there is any ambiguity in interpreting American law). 
 439. Proponents of this view include Richard Alford and, to a lesser extent, Vicki 
Jackson.  See, e.g., Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 182, at 712-13 (explaining 
the comparative constitutionalism is particularly applicable to natural law but not 
helpful in analyzing the constitutional theory of majoritarianism); Jackson, 
Comparative Constitutional Federalism, supra note 145, at 95-102 (noting that while 
comparative constitutionalism is valuable for questions of individual rights, its 
usefulness is limited with regard to issues of federalism). 
 440. Cf. Remarks at The University of Chicago Law School, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 289, 296 
(2006) (quoting Attorney General Alberto Gonzales:  “[P]aying careful, scrupulous 
attention to foreign sources would inevitably sacrifice some attention to traditional 
sources.  Will it become necessary for us to omit discussion of an older United States 
precedent in order to explore thoroughly the relevance of a more recent Chilean 
precedent to our Constitution?”). 
 441. Brigid Kennedy-Pfister, Continuity and Contradiction in the Theory and Discourse 
of Dependence, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 667, 669 (2001) (suggesting that the Social 
Covenant theory not only concerns the extent of state infringement on and 
protection of market economy, but also the rights that people relinquish and obtain 
as members of society). 
 442. Supra notes 18, 20 and accompanying text (noting that the application of 
foreign law in U.S. courts will circumvent the established judicial process and will 
unduly broaden judicial discretion). 
 443. See ERIC D. HARGAN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS 
OF TWO RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, http://www.fed-soc.org/Intllaw&%20 
AmerSov/hargensov.pdf (positing that foreign law is irrelevant because the 
Constitution becomes subordinated to an international regime that is not 
accountable to the American people). 
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conversation.444  Third, they argue that unique U.S. institutions and 
history are so integral to constitutional analysis that any precedent 
developed without them is irrelevant to the American experience.445  
This can be termed the Exceptionalist argument and was advanced by 
Justice Alito in his confirmation hearing.446  I will address each of 
these arguments in turn. 
The Social Covenant argument views the Constitution as a social 
contract, and it tries to limit constitutional reasoning by importing 
contractual norms into constitutional thinking.447  Since the 
Constitution is a contract, its meaning depends entirely on what the 
parties bound by it agreed.448  Their interpretation of particular 
language should thus control its meaning.449  Where there are doubts, 
they should be resolved in terms of the understandings, aims, and 
intentions of the contracting parties, not by resort to external 
evidence.450  Since foreign constitutional precedent by definition is 
not concerned with the intentions of Americans regarding American 
constitutional law, it has no place in American constitutional 
adjudication.451  Resort to foreign precedent thus risks surrendering 
control over the meaning of the parties’ agreement to external forces 
                                                          
 444. See AU Conversation, supra note 1 (noting that the Framers looked to foreign 
nations when drafting the Constitution but that foreign law should not now be 
employed in interpreting the Constitution). 
 445. See id. (contending that it is not fair to compare the death penalty in the 
United States to the death sentences handed down in other countries because in the 
United States those sentenced to death have the right to appeal by virtue of the 
habeas corpus provision unlike in other countries where the punishment is carried 
out summarily). 
 446. Alito Hearing, supra note 18 (“The structure of our government is unique to 
our country, and so I don’t think that looking to decisions of supreme courts of 
other countries or constitutional courts in other countries is very helpful in deciding 
questions related to the structure of our government.”). 
 447. Supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 448. Professor Jackson notes that each generation after the ratifiers has implicitly 
agreed to the terms of the Constitution by not amending it.  Jackson, Transnational 
Discourse, supra note 143, at 330 (pointing to “consent by acquiescence”). 
 449. See Chris Arledge & Todd Green, Originalism and Its Discontents:  How Should 
the Constitution Be Interpreted?, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Sept. 2005, at 18, 21, available at 
http://www.turnergreen.com/publications/GreenArledge_Originalism.pdf(positing 
that the Court lacks the authority to change the Constitution and must, therefore, 
avoid policymaking decisions that would be inherently illegitimate). 
 450. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
625 (1999) (explaining that the Framers intended for the Constitution to be 
interpreted simply by looking to the common meaning of its terms and not by 
delving into the possible intentions of the Framers when drafting the document); cf. 
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 182, at 311 (indicating that the American people are 
not interested in applying foreign judicial decisions where their constitutional 
powers and constitutional rights are at stake). 
 451. Cf. Kochan, supra note 182, at 542 (“If, indeed, sovereignty means the right to 
national autonomy, exclusion of foreign law is essential to the preservation of 
national identity and independence.”). 
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and institutions that lack both authority and institutional legitimacy 
for making such decisions, as well as any accountability to the 
American people or American democratic institutions.452 
It lies beyond the scope of this Article to examine this general view 
of constitutional interpretation in detail.  For present purposes, it 
should be sufficient to cite a few major weaknesses in the Social 
Covenant thesis as it applies to the use of comparative precedent.  
Foremost, the Social Covenant view does not describe how the 
Constitution operates.  Those who are bound to the Constitution 
today (and through most of history) were not part of the original 
agreement.453  Most of us did not, in any meaningful sense, 
consciously agree to be bound by the Constitution; rather, we simply 
inherited it as the law of the land when we were born or naturalized 
into citizenship.  If the Constitution were a true social contract, it 
would have to self-destruct and be renegotiated by each new 
generation, or even (taking the logic to its absurd extreme) with the 
addition of each new citizen.454  This does not in fact describe either 
how the Framers envisioned that the Constitution would function, or 
the way it has actually functioned for more than two hundred years.455 
Furthermore, what U.S. citizens inherited is not the Constitution as 
originally drafted, but rather the Constitution as it has been 
interpreted over the years.456  Though some theorists bristle at the 
                                                          
 452. Chief Justice Roberts expressed this concern during his confirmation 
hearings.  Supra note 18. 
 453. For example, in response the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), Frederick Douglass famously stated that “[The Framers] 
were for a generation, but the Constitution is for ages.”  Frederick Douglass, The 
Constitution of the United States:  Is it Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery?, Speech Delivered in 
Glasgow, Scotland (Mar. 26, 1860), in 2 PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467, 469 (1950). 
 454. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 
1408 (2001) (contending that a social contract is not the same as a legal contract 
because the individual has no bargaining power or an ability to consent, indeed, the 
social contract requires conformity). 
 455. See LEVY, supra note 218, at 324 (noting that the Framers intended the 
Constitution they created to “serve for ages to come”); BOWEN, supra note 218, at 241 
(“Morris was setting down a working instrument of government which must be plain, 
brief and strategically a trifle vague in places, to give play for future circumstance.”). 
 456. The ever-changing meaning of our Constitution has inspired the theory of a 
“living constitution,” which Justice Holmes eloquently described in Missouri v. 
Holland: 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the 
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into 
life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen 
completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to 
realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century 
and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they 
created a nation.  
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notion of a “living constitution,”457 the content of our constitutional 
“social contract” has undeniably evolved and is never fixed.  For 
example, the Constitution that a U.S. citizen born or naturalized 
before 1954 inherited permitted racial segregation, while the 
Constitution inherited by those born or naturalized after 1954 did 
not.  Yet the no-racial-segregation interpretation of Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka458 and its progeny is as binding on those who 
became citizens before 1954 as on those who became citizens after 
the Court struck down the “separate but equal” premise.  That is 
because the Constitution gave the Supreme Court the authority to 
render that decision—to change the meaning of the social covenant 
with regard to race—and it gave the U.S. government both the 
authority and the obligation to enforce that decision.459 
If the social covenant represented by the Constitution is not made 
by those it binds, and if its meaning is subject to continuous change 
after they are bound by it, it seems pretty obvious that ordinary 
notions of private contract making and interpretation have no 
particular relevance to constitutional interpretation.  Rather, as Chief 
                                                          
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political Science and 
the Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the Rehnquist Court, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737, 742 (2003) (positing that it is impossible to construe the 
Constitution by staying within the four corners of the document because the 
document is merely “a vehicle for the people’s changing conceptions of liberty”). 
 457. Joseph Story articulated a more static view of the Constitution in 1833 when 
he wrote, “[The Constitution] is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction.  
It should be, so far at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the 
passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.”  
STORY, supra note 247, at 145.  Many proponents of originalism still hold this 
perspective.  Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia is an example of one who bristles at the 
notion of a living constitution.  Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 849, 852 (1989) (scoffing at the notion that non-originalists possess an 
“intellectually legitimate device” for construing the Constitution); see also Lee J. 
Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional 
Interpretation:  Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 980 (2005) (“The benefits of the writtenness of the 
Constitution are only realized, however, if the original meaning of the text is 
authoritative:  if the text has a determinate, unchanging meaning.”). 
 458. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 459. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (asserting that 
“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is”); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (“It is, of course, quite true 
that the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States, but 
it is equally true that such responsibilities, like all other state activity, must be 
exercised consistently with federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state 
action.”); Reinstein & Rahdert, supra note 246, at 769-71 (invoking Justice Marshall’s 
language in Marbury to posit that the Supreme Court has the ability to overrule the 
legislature by virtue of the superiority of the Constitution); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Most Dangerous Branch:  Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L. J. 217, 
223 (1994) (arguing that the executive branch is the most powerful of the three 
branches because it is typically the last branch of government to act on most 
controversies). 
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Justice John Marshall recognized long ago in Marbury v. Madison, the 
Constitution is not a contract but a law.460  Contract notions do not 
determine how the Constitution is to be interpreted; methods of legal 
interpretation do.  Those methods do not preclude the courts from 
looking beyond the shared understandings and mutual expectations 
of the “parties” to the social covenant when they seek to ascertain its 
meaning.461  Nor do they bind the courts to particular techniques of 
interpretation or reinterpretation when they do so, so long as those 
methods are consistent with general processes of judicial 
interpretation.462 
Indeed, the Constitution itself says nothing at all about 
interpretative method.463  It neither commands nor constrains the 
interpretative methods of the courts in their exercise of judicial 
review.  It allows them to evolve in common-law fashion within the 
courts themselves.  Thus, for example, it does not transgress 
constitutional rule for the courts to consider the social science data 
introduced into constitutional analysis by the “Brandeis brief,”464 to 
utilize methods of statistical analysis (as in some jury-selection 
cases),465 to rely on principles of economic theory that were unknown 
at the framing,466 or to organize constitutional analysis around 
different “tiers” of constitutional scrutiny.467  None of these 
                                                          
 460. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (asserting that “[c]ertainly all those who have 
framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and 
paramount law of the nation”). 
 461. For example, legal methodology embraces many canons of construction.  See 
John F. Manning, Legal Realism & the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 283, 285 (2002) 
(articulating the value in utilizing canons of construction in order to discern 
legislative intent in the face of ambiguous statutes). 
 462. Cf. GINSBURG, LEGAL MATTERS, supra note 261, at 148 (citing a Ninth Circuit 
opinion authored by Judge Kozinski for the proposition that binding authority is 
derived solely from case law, and that the principles articulated in case law from an 
authoritative court must be followed unless overruled) (quoting Hart v. Massanari, 
266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 463. In fact, the Court has even looked to non-legal sources for inspiration.  See, 
e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421-26 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(providing an extensive quotation of the poetry of John Greenleaf Whittier as well as 
the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Francis Scott Key). 
 464. See Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis:  Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in 
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197, 198 (2000) (advancing the notion that non-legal 
materials should be inserted into appellate briefs in order to bolster policy 
arguments made by advocates). 
 465. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 488 (1977) (suggesting that the Court 
was persuaded by statistical data that Mexican-Americans were underrepresented on 
grand juries in Texas). 
 466. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (explaining that the 
aggregate effects of individual non-economic behavior may significantly impact 
interstate commerce). 
 467. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (requiring an 
“exceedingly persuasive” justification for state action, which approximates a strict 
scrutiny standard of review); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1977) (articulating a 
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interpretative methods existed in their current form when the 
Constitution was adopted.  All of them have evolved as the Court has 
matured into its constitutional role.  Consideration of foreign 
constitutional precedent is another such evolutionary step, one that is 
equally consistent with the general processes of judicial 
interpretation. 
The backup argument of the Social Covenant theorists, the 
asserted danger of surrendering decision making authority to 
institutions outside American democracy, both misunderstands 
comparative constitutional adjudication and overestimates the 
potential force of foreign constitutional law.  The argument might 
have validity if American courts simply deferred to the laws of other 
nations and imported them wholesale, regardless of their 
applicability.  But that is not an accurate view of comparative 
constitutional analysis.  No credible proponent proposes blind 
importation.  Rather, prudent advocates of comparative 
constitutionalism and the courts that employ it envision a selective 
and evaluative process.  This process entails American judges 
weighing the decisions of other nations against American principles 
and values, and only when appropriate adapting them to American 
institutions.468  Ultimate authority and accountability remain with the 
American courts.  The foreign precedent serves as an aid to 
interpretation, not a substitute.469  A court using comparative 
constitutional precedent no more delegates authority to the foreign 
constitutional court than a court citing a scholarly article delegates 
authority to its author, or a court utilizing social science research 
delegates to the investigators. 
A more accurate view of the U.S. Constitution treats the document, 
not as a social contract, but as the manifestation of a democratically 
controlled legislative and adjudicative process, which derives its 
                                                          
level of intermediate scrutiny); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 
(1949) (employing a standard of rational basis). 
 468. See, e.g., Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning:  The Law and 
Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 301, 318 (2004) 
(“[F]oreign decisions themselves have no precedential authority, and thus no 
binding effect, in domestic courts.  Therefore a court’s discussion of foreign sources 
need not be justified from a legal point of view.”). 
 469. Professor Jackson elaborates on this view of foreign precedent as an aid “in 
deepening understanding of the possibilities of interpretations that are available and 
also of deepening understanding of what is distinctive about our own constitutional 
commitments.”  Jackson, Transnational Discourse, supra note 143, at 284.  Justice 
Breyer also drove this point home in noting emphatically that the U.S. Supreme 
Court is not bound to follow any foreign precedent.  AU Conversation, supra note 1, 
at 523; see also Harding, supra note 242, at 417-18 (citing the Court’s denial of 
certiorari in Knight v. Florida as evidence of its indifference, if not outright hostility, 
towards foreign law). 
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meaning and authority from that process’s democratic legitimacy and 
historic continuity.470  This view of the Constitution leads some to 
argue that the original intention of the Constitution’s Framers should 
therefore control its interpretation.471  From their Originalist 
perspective, foreign constitutional precedent is irrelevant because it 
does not concern American original intent.472  This Originalist 
argument figures prominently in Justice Scalia’s outspoken 
opposition to comparative constitutional interpretation.473 
As with the Social Covenant view, the larger contours of this 
Originalist view are part of a theoretical debate that goes beyond this 
Article.  There are a few points, however, that are particularly 
pertinent to the relevance of comparative constitutional reasoning.  
Foremost, although individual Justices have at times championed 
original intention as the sine qua non of constitutional adjudication,474 
the full Court has never confined itself to rigid Originalist thinking.475  
                                                          
 470. Harding, supra note 242, at 444 (noting Justice Breyer’s advocacy of a 
“‘democratic’ approach to constitutional interpretation and adjudication”); see also 
Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent:  The Post-Originalist Problem in 
Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121 (2000). 
 471. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 370-71 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that any contemporary value of anonymous 
sources is irrelevant to the question of what the Framers meant by the phrases “free 
speech” and “free press”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (chastising the majority’s use of the “substantial effects” test in 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a departure from the original intent of the 
Framers); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I 
believe it is the Court’s duty to interpret these grants and limitations so as to carry 
out as nearly as possible the original intent of the Framers.  But I do not believe that 
it is our duty to go further than the Framers did on the theory that the judges are 
charged with responsibility for keeping the Constitution ‘up to date.’”). 
 472. See Calabresi, supra note 182, at 1106 (distinguishing between constitutional 
matters of public policy and constitutional interpretations of concrete clauses which 
can only be understood by examining the Framer’s original intent). 
 473. AU Conversation, supra note 1, at 521. 
 474. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 677 (1987) 
(describing Justices Hugo Black and William Rehnquist as “perhaps the two most 
consistent originalists in the Supreme Court’s history”); David A. Strauss, Originalism, 
Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 308 (2005) (characterizing Justice 
Antonin Scalia as “perhaps the most prominent originalist of all”).  Another recent 
proponent of originalism is Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas.  See supra note 
471 (citing cases criticizing the Court for invoking contemporary doctrines, rather 
than merely examining the intent of the Framers, to adjudicate constitutional 
matters). 
 475. See Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 909, 914 (1998) (“Unlike their originalist brethren, most of the Justices on the 
Supreme Court have taken and should continue to take a conventionalist or 
common-law approach to constitutional adjudication.”); Eric J. Segall, A Century Lost:  
The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 433 n.131 (1998) (listing a 
host of important Supreme Court cases to support the proposition that the Supreme 
Court has never consistently adopted the Originalist approach).  See generally LEVY, 
supra note 218, at 351 (commenting that originalists on the Court criticize the 
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As the American constitutional method has evolved, original 
intention has emerged as one among many sources for inspiration 
that the courts use to determine the meaning of constitutional text.476  
As a single, non-determinative, non-exclusive source, the Originalist 
view does not preclude the use of other resources and interpretative 
aids, including foreign constitutional precedent. 
Additionally, the Originalist argument assumes that the search for 
original understanding yields a specific, consistent and clear directive 
on contemporary questions, one that was widely shared not only by 
those who drafted the Constitution, but also by those who ratified the 
particular constitutional command in question.477  There may be some 
constitutional questions on which this kind of specific intention is 
available.  But on most unresolved constitutional questions today, 
finding an authoritative expression of specific intention is a pretty tall 
order that is unlikely to be filled.  Most of the discussions at the time 
of drafting and ratification were too general (and too varied) to yield 
specific directives on twenty-first century problems and applications 
of constitutional norms.478  Many of the most important provisions, 
including much of the human rights content of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights, were cast in general terms, the specific contours of 
which were barely discussed.479  Further, the unresolved problems of 
                                                          
majority for acting “like a superlegislature or a continuous constitutional 
convention”). 
 476. See Shannon Stewart, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 
91, 99 (1991) (“Constitutional interpretation is a delicate balancing process of many 
values and interests, which is best accomplished by blending a variety of interpretive 
techniques and methods.”).  Stewart subsequently concludes that “[o]riginalism . . . 
fails as a comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation.”  Id. at 109. 
 477. Id. at 108 (cautioning against the “occupational hazard of an overly intense 
quest for ascertaining the Framers’ intent,” as a treatment of intent as relevant 
requires that it “be one fairly inferable to a majority of the Framers and Ratifiers.  
But determining the general intent of any collective body will be nearly impossible”).   
 478. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 59 (1985) (citing Brown v. Board of Education as an example of when the Court 
declined to rely on the original intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 479. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 
The Constitution of the United States:  Contemporary Ratification, Address Before 
Georgetown University, Address at Georgetown University as part of its Text and 
Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 2 (1985) (“The 
[Constitution’s] phrasing is broad and the limitations of its provisions are not clearly 
marked . . . . This ambiguity calls forth interpretation, the interaction of reader and 
text.”).  Regarding the ability of interpreters to ascertain the intent of the Framers, 
Justice Brennan considered it “arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we can 
gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, 
contemporary questions,” particularly when “all that can be gleaned is that the 
Framers themselves did not agree about the application or meaning of particular 
constitutional provisions, and hid their differences in cloaks of generality.”  Id. at 4. 
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today involve applications that are too novel for that kind of specific 
intention.480 
Third, most of what goes by the name of original intention is 
actually an extrapolation from a known (or partly known) intention 
at the framing to an arguably parallel situation today.481  To illustrate, 
consider whether Congress has the power to regulate commerce in 
outer space.  To imagine that the Framers voiced specific views about 
regulating commerce in outer space would be absurd.  But would the 
absence of any specific discussion determine that Congress lacked the 
power?  I doubt that any but the most doctrinaire Originalist would 
draw that negative conclusion.  Instead, one may infer an intention to 
allow such power from the Framers’ known intent to allow 
congressional regulation of commerce on, say, the high seas.482  But it 
is we, not the Framers, who extrapolated the parallel between the 
high seas and outer space.  Yet once we admit the legitimacy of such 
extrapolations, we have admitted the power of the courts to interpret 
constitutional language expansively, beyond the historical record, 
and to adapt it to new situations—in other words, to go beyond the 
specific limits of stated original intention.483  How far one is willing to 
go then becomes a question of constitutional policy for which 
original intention itself supplies no immediate answer. 
Finally, there is the problem of interpreting the Framers’ intention 
regarding the methods of constitutional interpretation.  The 
Constitution makes no direct commands regarding methods of 
interpretation.  Nor does the historical record disclose any strong 
evidence of an attempt by the Framers to make their intentions 
controlling.  In fact, there is some evidence (such as the official 
secrecy of the original Constitutional Convention’s deliberations and 
the lack of more than rudimentary official minutes) that points in the 
                                                          
 480. Merrill, supra note 478, at 59 (citing Brown v. Board of Education as an example 
of the Court recognizing an issue too nuanced to rely merely on the Constitutional 
text). 
 481. See, e.g., David Chang, A Critique of Judicial Supremacy, 36 VILL. L. REV. 281, 359 
(1991) (“Extrapolating from the decisions made by the framers to determine the 
constitutional decisions voters today would make is an exercise in indeterminate 
speculation.”); Stewart, supra note 476, at 108-09 (“Extrapolating intent by analogy 
can become a speculative game in which the originalists can be as creative as the 
nonoriginalists they criticize.”). 
 482. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1824) (concluding that the 
Framers must have understood the word “commerce” to comprehend navigation 
when writing the constitution). 
 483. See Scott Moriarity, Comment, Originalism and the Commerce Clause:  A Migratory 
Flight, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1575, 1590 (2002) (noting that extrapolation to shed 
light on how the Framers would address a current challenge “invites the sort of 
speculation that originalism was meant to avoid.”). 
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opposite direction.484  While there is abundant evidence that the 
Framers anticipated constitutional interpretation by the judiciary as a 
means of resolving unanticipated constitutional questions,485 there is 
no evidence that they sought to confine the judiciary to particular 
interpretative methods or techniques.486  Instead, they expected the 
courts to follow the customs and usages of the common law, which 
even then went well beyond original intention and included reliance on 
foreign legal sources.487 
Thus, to the extent there was a discernible “Framer’s intent” 
regarding resort to comparative constitutional norms, the evidence 
supports, rather than chastises, the use of comparative materials.  The 
drafters of the Constitution themselves drew substantially from 
comparative sources.488  Unsurprisingly, since many were lawyers 
                                                          
 484. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers:  the 
Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 352 (1989) (relaying James 
Madison’s decision not to release the notes he took during the Constitutional 
Convention for fear that they may be used to influence the interpretation of the 
Constitution); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 903 & n.92 (1985) (noting the delegates’ decision not to publish 
the journal or other papers documenting their deliberation); see also LEVY, supra note 
218, at 331 (“[N]o evidence, not a shred, exists to show that the Framers meant, 
wanted, or expected future generations to construe the Constitution as they, the 
Framers, had.”). 
 485. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott 
ed., 1898) (“[A]n attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every 
Government . . . independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is 
desirable . . . that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and 
honorable policy . . . [and] in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils 
may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary interest, the presumed or 
known opinion of the impartial world, may be the best guide that can be followed.”) 
(quoted in Vicki C. Jackson, Could I Interest You in Some Foreign Law? Yes Please, I’d Love 
to Talk with You, 2004-AUG LEGAL AFF. 43, 44 (2004));  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 427 
(Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (declaring that “[t]he interpretation 
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.  A Constitution is, in 
fact, and must be regarded by the Judges as a fundamental law”); Saikrishna B. 
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 
TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1463 (2001) (finding ample evidence that the Framers expected 
there to be judicial review). 
 486. See Powell, supra note 484, at 889 (recognizing the anti-interpretive tradition 
of Anglo-American Protestantism and common law as the two main approaches to 
interpretation in American jurisprudence); LEVY, supra note 218, at 10-11 (citing 
Jefferson and Hamilton’s uniform belief that the Constitution ought to be 
interpreted “according to the conventional rules of interpretation”). 
 487. See Fontana, supra note 385, at 580-81 (noting that the Federalist Papers 
viewed experience, attained through consultation with a multitude of materials, as 
the basis for constitutional adjudication). 
 488. See McGinnis, supra note 182, at 307 (“In fact, the Framers may themselves 
have used international and foreign law as policy arguments when they debated the 
ratification of the Constitution.”); Douglas G. Smith, Interstate Commerce and the 
Principles of the Law of Nations, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 111, 112 (2004) (documenting the 
Framers’ reliance on writers such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel to gain an 
understanding of international law); Po-Jen Yap, Transnational Constitutionalism in the 
United States:  Toward a Worldwide Use of Interpretive Modes of Comparative Reasoning, 39 
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trained in the common law tradition, they relied heavily on principles 
and practices of English common law, particularly Blackstone, which 
was by 1787 a foreign source, even though it supplied the roots of 
American law.489  They also drew from continental law and legal 
theorists, English political philosophy, Roman law, and other 
international sources for many of the norms and structures they 
incorporated into the Constitution.490 
In his conversation with Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia acknowledged 
the use of these sources but refused to extrapolate from them.491  He 
asserted that constitutional drafting is fundamentally different from 
constitutional interpretation, and that in any event, the historical 
record would only support reference to the very foreign sources the 
Framers themselves used.492  Neither assertion withstands analysis. 
                                                          
U.S.F. L. REV. 999, 1013 (2005).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has throughout 
history looked to foreign and international sources of law for inspiration and 
guidance.  Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 101, at 756 (“It is thus not surprising that 
from its earliest years the Supreme Court considered and cited foreign sources of 
law.”). 
 489. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective:  From the Founding Era to 
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 661 n.71 (1999) (describing Blackstone’s 
influence on the Framers’ understanding of the law as “widely acknowledged”); John 
Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 982 (1993) 
(crediting Blackstone with guiding the Framers’ protection of natural rights) (citing 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41). 
 490. See, e.g., Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context 
of the Alien Tort Claims Act and International Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 193, 262-63 
(2005) (documenting the influence of great scholars, such as Hugo Grotius and 
Emmerich Vattell, on the creation of the U.S. Constitution); Smith, supra note 488, 
at 129 (citing Vattel’s influence); Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681, 737 (1997) (“[T]he Roman law is important 
not only because it was studied extensively and cited as authority in nineteenth and 
eighteenth century America, but also because the natural law theories that 
influenced the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were very much influenced by 
this body of law.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 18, at 102 (Alexander Hamilton & 
James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (following his description of the government 
structures around the globe, “I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of 
this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson; and 
because . . . it emphatically illustrates the tendency of Federal bodies, rather to 
anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head”). 
 491. AU Conversation, supra note 1, at 525 (“[T]he Founders used a lot of foreign 
law.  If you read the Federalist Papers, it’s full of discussions of the Swiss system, the 
German system, etc.  It’s full of that because comparison with the practices of other 
countries is very useful in devising a constitution.”). 
 492. Id. at 538-39 (responding to a comment that Alexander Hamilton urged 
attention to the judgments of other nations, Justice Scalia stated that Hamilton “was 
writing a Constitution, not interpreting one . . . [a]nd in writing one, of course you 
consult foreign sources, see how it has worked, see what they’ve done, use their 
examples and so forth.  But that has nothing to do with interpreting it.”).  Justice 
Scalia noted that according to his philosophy of interpreting the Constitution, 
“obviously foreign law is irrelevant with one exception:  old English law-because 
phrases like ‘due process,’ and the ‘right of confrontation’ were taken from English 
law.”  Id. at 525. 
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The former argument rests on the rather odd proposition that 
constitution making and constitutional interpretation are unrelated 
enterprises following fundamentally different methods.  It is not clear 
why this should be, and the proponents of this view supply no reason.  
Taken to its logical extreme, Justice Scalia’s curious line of distinction 
would defeat Originalism entirely, since everything the Framers did 
and said was by definition drafting rather than interpretation, making 
it all irrelevant to the interpretative process.  From an Originalist 
standpoint, it would seem to make more sense to insist that, what the 
Framers regarded as relevant to their understanding of the 
Constitution, the courts should also take as relevant to theirs. 
Justice Scalia’s alternative argument, if followed rigorously, would 
produce untoward (if not absurd) consequences for constitutional 
law.  It would, for example, deny the extrapolation of federal 
regulatory power from the high seas to outer space mentioned above.  
It would also confine the Second Amendment (whatever else it may 
mean) to blunderbusses, muskets and other eighteenth century 
arms.493  It would withdraw First Amendment protection for films, the 
Internet, and microwave broadcasts.  And it would produce a host of 
Luddite constitutional consequences.  No responsible Originalist 
views the Constitution in this limited fashion.  If the evidence 
concerning original intention regarding foreign constitutional 
materials is to be used the way we typically use other historical 
materials, it should permit extrapolation to account for the passage 
of two centuries.  Just as we can extrapolate from a book to a film, or 
a blunderbuss to an automatic assault rifle, we should be able to 
extrapolate from an eighteenth century comparative source to a 
twenty-first century one.  If the Framers used and considered the 
comparative constitutional sources of their day, then the courts 
should be able to consider the comparative constitutional sources of 
ours. 
Unlike the Social Covenant and Originalist arguments, the 
Exceptionalist argument against comparative constitutional analysis 
carries some weight, although it does not justify total exclusion of 
comparative materials.  The Exceptionalist position is that American 
constitutional traditions are rooted in unique American historical 
experience, which so thoroughly colors our understanding of 
constitutional provisions that comparative evaluation, even of 
comparably stated foreign norms, has no helpful relevance. 
                                                          
 493. Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 291, 318 (2000). 
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As a wholesale rejection of comparative analysis, this argument 
proves too much.  It ignores all the common constitutional ground 
that invites comparative constitutional analysis in the first place.494  It 
also overvalues the role of American history in defining constitutional 
powers and liberties.495  History certainly has its place in constitutional 
adjudication, but like Originalism, it is only one factor among many 
and does not displace all others. 
As a partial limit on comparative precedent, however, the 
Exceptionalist argument carries some force.  Some features of the 
American constitutional system are truly unique.  They run the gamut 
from broad doctrines of major importance to relatively technical 
details.  A list of exceptionally American constitutional concepts 
would probably include, for example, a good deal of federalism, 
some aspects of bicameralism, the structure and function of the 
Electoral College, the Dormant Commerce Clause; and the Twenty-
first Amendment’s treatment of alcoholic beverages.  Each of these 
subjects springs from particular developments in American history 
that deviate markedly from the experiences of other nations and that 
significantly influence how the issues in question should be 
evaluated.  There are other constitutional principles, however, that 
are less wholly rooted in particular American experience.  These 
include protections against coerced confession, rights to assistance of 
counsel, limits on double jeopardy and ex post facto crimes, limits on 
cruel and unusual punishment, many equality rights, and a good deal 
of procedural due process.  These and similar guarantees represent 
commitments to legal principles that operate independently of any 
single nation’s specific historical developments, and are instead 
widely accepted as universal foundations of any fair and democratic 
government.  In the middle of this idiosyncratic-universal spectrum 
are other principles, such as freedom of expression, free exercise of 
                                                          
 494. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address at the Ninety-Sixth Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (despite “reluctance on our current Supreme 
Court to look to international or foreign law in interpreting our own 
Constitution . . . there is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have 
given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here”); AU Conversation, 
Transcript, supra note 2 (Justice Breyer noted “these are human beings . . . called 
judges, who have problems that often, more and more, are similar to our own.  
They’re dealing with this [sic] certain texts, texts that more and more protect basic 
human rights”). 
 495. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Constitution Revolutions:  A New Look at Lower Appellate 
Review in American Constitutionalism, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 13 (2001) (describing 
multiple conventions for constitutional adjudication, including “text, intent, 
structure, tradition, or history”); LEVY, supra note 218, at 398 (“History can only be a 
guide, not a controlling force.”). 
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religion, and racial equality that, though widely shared by other 
constitutional democracies, are nonetheless deeply intertwined in 
some of their applications with American historical experience.496  
Some principles in these areas will find counterparts elsewhere, while 
others may acquire such an uniquely American character that the 
experience of other constitutional democracies will have little 
informative value. 
The upshot is that Exceptionalist considerations speak to the 
weight of comparative constitutional evidence, not its admissibility.  
Whenever comparative material is consulted, the court should first 
determine the extent to which the right at issue is a product unique 
to the American experience, rather than a widely-recognized 
democratic value.497  Where exceptional characteristics of American 
history have colored American understanding of constitutional 
principles, less weight should be accorded to comparative precedent 
on ostensibly similar issues elsewhere.  Occasionally, the exceptional 
factors of American law may be so strong as to defeat use of 
comparative precedent entirely.  But most of the time there will still 
be room for comparative constitutional analysis to play a significant 
role in the American court’s judgment. 
2. Contextual difficulties 
Even if we accept the potential relevance of foreign constitutional 
law, however, it does not follow that all such law will be useful.498  We 
must consider ways in which other nations’ constitutions might 
deviate from basic American norms as a result of unique foreign 
national characteristics that American constitutionalism does not 
share. 
                                                          
 496. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . 
shall exist within the United States”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born 
or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the 
state wherein they reside.  No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
 497. See Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance, supra note 118, at 597 (acknowledging that, 
while several nations use the same doctrinal phraseology in their constitutions, 
unique national considerations often require nations to interpret such clauses 
differently); Slaughter, Brave, supra note 118, at 295 (recognizing that a judge may 
declare international law irrelevant when faced with an issue unique to the American 
experience). 
  498.  See Anthony S. Winer, A Speculation on Enlightenment Roots, Foreign Law, and 
Fundamental Rights, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 509, 530-31 (2006) (arguing that not all 
foreign law is relevant to the United States and that, because there is a range of 
relevancy among those foreign jurisdictions that are appropriate for comparison, 
courts should employ a “different basis for selection” as necessary). 
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There is little doubt that such foreign national characteristics exist, 
or that they influence constitutional decisions in foreign states.499  
These differences can be large or small, obvious or subtle.  They may 
arise from differences in constitutional subject matter, commitment 
to different constitutional principles, differences in decisional 
structure or method, differences in the underlying society, 
differences in history, and a variety of other factors.  Just as the 
previous Section argued that courts must consider the admissibility of 
any comparative constitutional analysis by first assessing the extent to 
which the constitutional interest is a by-product of the American 
experience, so too must a court examine the traditions and history of 
foreign nations to determine the availability of an analogously 
recognized interest.  A few illustrations follow. 
One area where such differences arise is the role of religion in 
public life.  In the United States, religious establishment is 
constitutionally prohibited.500  In contrast, many foreign nations 
recognize one or more national religions,501 a fact that will have a 
major impact on how issues of religious freedom are treated under 
that nation’s constitution.502  Even nations that do not formally 
recognize a national church may have deeply intertwined legal 
relations with a single dominant religion503—Italy’s complex legal 
                                                          
 499. See Rosenkrantz, supra note 182, at 289 (discussing value of negative 
borrowing as stemming from an “awareness of the categorical differences between 
countries” and constitutional systems). 
 500. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof”); see also McCreary 
County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005) (“When the government acts with the 
obstensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central 
Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality 
when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”). 
 501. See Shimon Shetreet, State and Religion:  Funding of Religious Institutions—The 
Case of Israel in Comparative Perspective, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 421, 
426 (1999) (describing the “established church model” of the relationship between 
church and state as a framework in which “the state recognizes a certain religion or 
church as the state’s national church” but “does not mean that other religions are 
prohibited”).  For example, some nations in Europe have constitutional provisions 
naming either Catholicism or various forms of Protestantism as the national religion.  
Others, though nominally secular, support religion in ways that would be contrary to 
American traditions.  In France, for example, the Constitution provides that France 
is “secular,” but the State appropriates funds for religious schools.  1958 CONST. art. I 
(France). 
 502. See Darin W. Carlson, Understanding Chinese-U.S. Conflict Over Freedom of 
Religion:  The Wolf-Specter Freedom From Religious Persecution Acts of 1997 and 1998, 1998 
BYU L. REV. 563, 569 (1998) (arguing that limits on the number of official religions 
and on registrations for religious meeting places “have a significant impact on 
religious freedom in China”). 
 503. See Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the 
Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REV. 467, 468-69 (2001) (noting that 
while “almost all countries formerly had a state church” in Europe, over time “the 
official relationship between church and state eventually broke down” although this 
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relations with Roman Catholicism and the Vatican is an obvious 
example.504  Since the First Amendment prohibits such religious 
entanglement in the United States, our constitutional law on 
religious freedom is likely to be very different in character from these 
other states.505 
Another example concerns military power.  In reaction to the 
horrors of World War II, Japan’s constitution commits the nation to 
pacifism,506 a principle that obviously affects Japan’s concept of 
government military authority and influences its foreign relations.507  
In the opposite direction, Israel’s legal framework is undoubtedly 
affected by its perpetual state of national military emergency.508 
A third example concerns equality of ethnic minorities. Canada’s 
constitution guarantees the vitality of two distinct and sometimes 
conflicting linguistic cultures.509  Such a commitment may afford a 
range of constitutional rights to linguistic minorities that goes beyond 
what linguistic minorities could claim in the United States.510 
Sometimes, the differences are more structural, or part of a 
different analytical method.  Decisions of France’s constitutional 
                                                          
change “does not foreclose the existence of some churches remaining closer to the 
state than other religious organizations or groups”). 
 504. Id. at 471 (describing Italy’s Lateran Pacts as “regulating the relations 
between the state and the Catholic Church”). 
 505. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (declaring that a statute 
is invalid under the Establishment Clause when it fosters “excessive government 
entanglement with religion”) (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm’m, 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970)). 
 506. KENPÖ, art. 9, ¶¶ 1 & 2 (“In sincere pursuit of an international peace based 
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international 
disputes.  In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, are not maintained.  The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”). 
 507. See generally Lawrence W. Beer, Peace in Theory and Practice Under Article 9 of 
Japan’s Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 815-16 (1998) (contending that Japan’s 
constitutional commitment to pacifism may prove instructive to other nations). 
 508. CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:  ISRAEL III (Gisbert H. Flanz 
ed., Oceana Publications, Inc. 2005) (“[The lack of an Israeli Constitution] is due in 
part to the unresolved security questions surrounding the existence of the state of 
Israel which were not favorable to the entrenchment of fundamental constitutional 
values.”).   
 509. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) § 16, ¶ 1 (“English 
and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and 
equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and 
government of Canada.”).  In addition to granting equal status to the English and 
French languages, the Canadian Constitution further accords protection to linguistic 
minorities by promoting equal language access for legal and education rights.  Id. at 
§§ 17-23. 
 510. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 705 
(2006) (describing the American legal system’s adaptation of its immigration stance 
to address the issue of multilingualism as inadequate). 
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tribunal are undoubtedly influenced by the relative ease with which 
the French Constitution can be amended.511  Decisions in many 
European nations must account for the concurrent supranational 
judicial authority of the European Union and the European Court of 
Human Rights.512  And many foreign constitutional courts use 
analytical concepts, such as the principles of “subsidiarity” and the 
“margin of appreciation,” which do not have American cognates.513 
As with American Exceptionalism, this foreign constitutional 
difference does not preclude the use of comparative constitutional 
principles.  To the contrary, the benefits of comparative 
constitutional analysis actually depend on the existence of important 
constitutional differences, which highlight differences in perspective, 
which in turn illuminate common issues.514  Foreign constitutional 
difference nevertheless requires the exercise of informed discretion 
in using foreign materials.  Whenever foreign precedents are 
consulted, they must be situated in their indigenous legal context.  
There may be contextual differences that affect (or even sometimes 
defeat) the applicability of that precedent to the United States.515  
Occasionally, the differences might be so large that they render 
related constitutional precedent useful only as negative precedent or 
as part of a process of constitutional alignment.  In other instances, 
the differences will not defeat the adaptability of the precedents but 
may influence the weight American courts are willing to give them.516  
The differences, however, go to weight, not admissibility. 
                                                          
 511. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 47, at 8.  The author recalls an anecdote in which a 
scholar asked the owner of Parisian bookstore if he could purchase a copy of the 
French Constitution.  The clerk responded “I regret that I cannot help you, our 
bookstore does not carry periodicals.”  Id. 
 512. SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD, supra note 105, at 82-83. 
 513. See Bernard H. Oxman & Vincent P. Bantz, Prompt Release of Vessels and 
Crews—Exhaustion of Local Remedies—Lis Pendens—Amount and Form of Reasonable 
Bond—UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 713, 721 (2000) 
(“Municipal courts in Europe are also learning that well-reasoned decisions are more 
likely to elicit deference from regional international tribunals, be it in the context of 
the principle of subsidiarity in the European Community or in the context of the 
margin of appreciation under the European Convention on Human Rights.”); James 
A. Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation:  Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 473 (2005). 
 514. See Scheppele, supra note 352, at 298-99 (noting that rejections of other 
constitutional rules may be more instructive than borrowings). 
  515.  MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 48.  
 516. Many U.S. law firms now have branches in foreign nations with resident 
experts in foreign law who may be consulted.  See Carole Silver, Globalization and the 
U.S. Market in Legal Services—Shifting Identities, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1093, 1101 
(2000) (observing that “[f]oreign offices function as a signal to the national and 
international community of a law firm’s commitment to a national and international 
identity, to a particular foreign location, and to the development of international 
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3. Informational demands 
The need for contextualization of comparative precedent produces 
some fairly significant informational demands on courts and counsel.  
To engage in the weighing process, an American court may need to 
know a fair amount about a foreign system.517  Where the foreign 
system has familiar features, as is the case for the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and some other common law systems, as well as 
the more prominent European constitutional courts, these 
informational demands should be easily satisfied.518  In other 
instances, counsel will need to supply the American court with 
enough background about the foreign jurisdiction’s constitutional 
system to place the precedent in perspective.519  How much 
information is needed will depend on the nature and extent of the 
difference in the foreign system, the way the foreign precedent is 
being used, and the degree of importance given to the foreign 
precedent in the American court’s reasoning.520 
The practical challenge of contextualization leads some opponents 
of comparative constitutionalism to conclude that the task is too 
daunting and prone to error.  Other critics argue that if comparative 
constitutional analysis is to occur, courts must develop elaborate rules 
about when and how the relevance of comparative precedent is to be 
determined.521  These arguments neglect the essential role of legal 
advocacy. 
                                                          
expertise”).  These foreign offices enable law firms to gain access to foreign scholars 
to gain assistance in contextualization. 
 517. See, e.g., Young, supra note 182, at 166 (noting that Daniel Halberstam 
criticized Justice Breyer’s analogy between American federalism concerns and the 
German state-level system of implementing federal law in Printz v. United States due to 
Justice Breyer’s failure to sufficiently appreciate “critical differences in institutional 
context” between the nations) (citing Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and 
the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION 213, 249-51 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & 
Robert Howse eds., 2001))); McGinnis, supra note 182, at 320 (citing Lawrence v. 
Texas as an example of the Supreme Court invoking international law without 
considering material differences between the United States and Europe). 
 518. Compare The Bill of Rights (Act) 1689 (UK) art. I, part. 12 (“jurors ought to 
be duly impaneled and returned”), and Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) (Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms) § 11 (“Any person charged with an offence . . . [is] presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal”), and AUSTL. CONST. Chap. III, part 80 (“The trial on 
indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by 
jury . . . .”), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury”). 
 519. Breyer, ASIL Keynote, supra note 104, at 267 (noting that judges need lawyers 
to take the lead in supplying comparative background to courts). 
 520. Id. at 267-68. 
 521. See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 72 (advocating “a set of principles to ensure that 
[comparative analysis] is done as a part of a coherent, neutrally applied theory and 
practice”). 
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Counsel should play a critical role in sorting foreign precedent, 
identifying relevant materials, contextualizing them, and determining 
their potential utility.  In the U.S. adversarial system, courts typically 
depend on the advocates to perform these functions.522  Courts also 
depend on adversarial exchange both to highlight the strengths of 
precedent and to expose its weaknesses.523  Obviously, advocates can 
do this effectively only if they know the law and understand its 
context.  With domestic precedent, standardized legal education and 
practical experience ensure that competent advocates are sufficiently 
well versed in the law (or able to verse themselves) in order to 
perform these functions.524  With foreign precedent, however, we 
cannot presently assume such competence.525  Even highly 
experienced counsel face challenges in locating relevant foreign 
constitutional precedent, explaining its significance, or alternatively 
contesting its utility.526  Acquiring sufficient information to make 
effective use of comparative constitutional law will thus impose some 
potentially significant additional costs on adversaries. 
4. Language and access barriers 
One final limiting factor concerns the difficulties of finding and 
reading the material itself.  This difficulty is greatest where there is a 
language barrier.  Where precedent comes from non-English sources, 
it is unlikely that an American court will be able to treat the 
comparative material in its native language.  Translation into English 
                                                          
 522. See Kathleen Waits, Work Product Protection for Witness Statements:  Time for 
Abolition, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 305, 338 (1985) (“[A]dvocates play an important role in 
tempering bias because they force factfinders to think hard before making up their 
minds.”).  But see Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary 
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301 (1989) (acknowledging a modern trend moving away from 
the historic belief that the adversarial process as the best means to arrive at the truth, 
and instead suggesting more alternative means). 
 523. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”:  Procedural and Evidentiary Norms 
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1316 (1998). 
 524. See Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Tomorrow’s Law Schools:  Globalization and Legal 
Education, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 141 (1995) (noting that the legal education 
framework in the United States has long focused on “develop[ing] the basic skills 
needed by all those wishing to practice law:  legal theory and analysis through the 
study of precedent,” although this framework has undergone reform). 
 525. See Young, supra note 182, at 166 (arguing that most American lawyers lack 
the requisite training in comparative constitutional law). 
 526. See Thomas R. French, Internet Resources for Researching International and Foreign 
Law, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2002) (noting that the emergence of 
international and foreign legal materials on the Internet has facilitated practitioners 
as “only a few libraries or law firms even attempt to comprehensively collect foreign 
and international materials”). 
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will be needed.  This could be time-consuming and costly.527  Worse, 
awkward translation could interfere with an adequate understanding 
of the comparative text.  Fortunately, English is rapidly becoming an 
international second language, so that many foreign legal texts are 
now routinely translated⎯some officially or semi-officially⎯into 
English.528  Yet the difficulty and expense of obtaining English 
translations, in addition to the inevitable delays in the translation 
process, may cause the most up-to-date comparative materials not to 
be readily available. 
C. Evaluation:  Is Comparative Constitutionalism Worth the Candle? 
Ultimately, one must decide whether the light shed by comparative 
constitutional analysis outweighs its costs.  The answer is not as 
obvious as some proponents of comparative constitutional analysis 
suggest.  While there are certainly benefits to comparative 
constitutional reasoning, they are not mammoth.  And while there 
are no absolute barriers to comparative constitutional reasoning, the 
factors counseling hesitation discussed above suggest that 
comparative analysis is neither an easy nor a cost-free undertaking.  
The practical concerns relating to the value of foreign precedent that 
arose in Justice Alito’s confirmation hearings thus may have been his 
strongest arguments against using comparative precedent.  They 
include the uncertainty over which countries U.S. courts should look 
to, the scope of foreign judicial power, and the risk of losing context 
for foreign legal systems when looking at individual laws.529 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is more to be gained than 
lost from comparative constitutional analysis.  The benefits, though 
not overwhelming, are nonetheless real, and comparative 
constitutional analysis includes several advantages that do not 
replicate domestic precedent.  The costs of comparative analysis, 
though also real, do not outweigh the aggregate benefits.  The grave 
                                                          
 527. See Rose Kennedy, Much Ado About Noting:  Problems in the Legal Translation 
Industry, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 423, 435 (2000) (noting that the cost of 
translation of legal materials is so high that it may be “prohibitive”). 
 528. For example, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court, through its website, has 
provided transcripts of its decisions translated into English.  SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD, 
supra note 105, at 75; see also Stacy Amity Feld, Comment, Language and the 
Globalization of the Economic Market:  The Regulation of Language as a Barrier to Free Trade, 
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153, 199 n.228 (1998) (chronicling efforts by the 
European Union to translate legal texts); Merit-Ene Ilja, Estonian Legal Language 
Centre:  Legal Translation and Terminology Work, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 274, 274 (2005) 
(describing efforts to translate Estonian legislation into English and EU legislation 
into Estonian); MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 142-44 (noting general 
improvements in access to English translations of foreign law). 
 529. Alito Hearing, supra note 18, at 471. 
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dangers supposed by those who fear a turnover of American 
constitutional law to foreign courts should never materialize, since 
any comparative principle is no more than persuasive authority that 
American courts are free to accept, challenge, or disregard according 
to their own judgment.530  Instead, the principal costs will be 
educational and informational, associated with the difficulties of 
locating, translating, contextualizing, and advocating relevant foreign 
precedent.  Since these costs derive partly from general American 
legal isolation, globalization may reduce these costs over time. 
Educational and informational costs may be reduced further through 
some strategic adjustments in American legal education as discussed 
below. 
D. The Best Uses of Comparative Constitutional Precedent 
1. Results 
To date, most use of comparative constitutional law, and most 
debate over it, has concerned comparison of results.  Should the 
United States’ ruling on the question follow the constitutional 
outcomes of other nations, or should the court disagree and go its 
own way?  While results are certainly important, this is an unduly 
narrow view of the potential uses of comparative precedent.  Beyond 
comparative results, American courts can and should use foreign 
constitutional precedent to evaluate a rule’s potential 
administrability, its potential impact on government institutions, and 
the potential scope of it as precedent. 
2. Administrability 
Sometimes constitutional debate in the United States centers on 
whether a new or different constitutional rule would be easy or 
difficult to administer.531  Courts need to know if a new rule will 
provide clear guidance or create confusion for those to whom it 
applies.532  Where there is a choice, courts generally prefer a rule that 
can be easily and consistently applied.533  Thus, American judges often 
                                                          
   530.  MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 25. 
 531. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1979) 
(declining to adopt a uniform federal rule where application of state laws would not 
adversely affect administration of the federal program). 
 532. See id. at 728-29 (fearing the proposed rule would upset the expectations and 
practices of creditors). 
 533. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 
826, 832 (2002) (rejecting a proposed rule that would allow responsive pleading to 
create jurisdiction as it would undermine the clarity and ease of the “well-pleaded” 
complaint rule); In re Berger, 498 U.S. 233, 235-36 (1991) (adopting a bright-line 
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evaluate a proposed constitutional rule in terms of its capacity for 
sound administration.534  Since the rule is new, judicial arguments 
about administrability inevitably involve some amount of speculation 
regarding the rule’s potential administrability. 
Comparative precedent could help.  Where an analogous rule has 
been adopted in a foreign jurisdiction, American courts can assess 
the experience of the foreign government in administering the 
rule.535  Did difficulties applying the rule materialize?  Did the rule 
spawn a flood of litigation?  Did the rule require additional 
legislation or detailed administrative rulemaking?  Did the rule 
produce conflicting applications in lower courts or agencies?  By 
considering the actual experience of other constitutional systems 
using a similar rule, the American court can arrive at a more 
informed determination of whether adoption of a similar rule in the 
United States would be administratively acceptable. 
3. Impact on governmental institutions 
Other times, the debate in American courts concerns the potential 
impact of a particular constitutional rule on the branches of 
government most directly affected by it.536  For example, will a 
particular constitutional protection for the accused or procedural 
safeguard for the detained interfere significantly with effective law 
enforcement?  Will a limitation on government military authority 
endanger national security?  Will a regulation of speech stifle public 
                                                          
rule for the award of attorneys fees in fear of the imprecise analysis that would 
accompany a case-by-case approach); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 683 (1965) 
(“We believe that the rule we adopt is the fairest, is easy to apply, and . . . will be most 
generally acceptable to all the States.”). 
 534. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-93 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the judiciary ill-equipped to administer rules 
regarding termination of life-sustaining treatment and abortion); Mohasco Corp. v. 
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 833-34 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lamenting a rule that, 
in Blackmun’s mind, adds complexity to the EEOC process); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 544-45 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (fearing the new rule will jeopardize 
the crime solving abilities of investigators as it leaves many questions unanswered). 
 535. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 180, at 1289 (providing that the Supreme Court’s 
physician-assisted suicide decision, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 
(1997), “exemplifie[d] the ‘empirical’ use of comparative experience”); Jeremy 
Waldron, Dirty Little Secrets, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 510, 527 (1998) (urging advocates of 
legal change to use comparative law to identify practical alternatives to existing laws); 
MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 135 (noting that transnational dialogue is 
useful where “foreign law provides ‘additional’ evidence that a proposed solution has 
‘worked’ in other systems”). 
 536. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (considering 
“whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between coordinate branches”); 
United States v. Alves, 688 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Mass. 1988) (“the impact [of 
legislation focused on criminal sentencing disparities] on the three branches . . . 
must be evaluated”). 
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debate?  In these situations, judges who oppose the rule often predict 
dire institutional effects, while judges who support it minimize 
institutional concerns.  As in predictions of administrability, both 
sides speculate about the rule’s likely impact. 
Where an analogous rule has been adopted in another nation, 
American courts can find some helpful information.  American 
courts can determine the practical effect of the rule on the other 
nation’s comparable institutions or policies, and can thus glean 
insight into the possible institutional impact of a parallel decision in 
the United States.  Of course, governmental institutions in other 
nations will never be exactly like the United States, and social or 
cultural expectations may influence the way a foreign rule has 
impacted the government, but these are factors for appropriate 
contextualization. The very process of examining such factors and 
debating their relevance should help American courts to clarify the 
potential domestic impact of the proposed new rule. 
4. How horrible the parade? How slippery the slope? 
When courts consider potential constitutional rules, one 
ubiquitous concern is the risk that the rule will usher in a parade of 
unacceptable results or start the courts down a path toward other, 
progressively more harmful extensions of the rule.537  Dissenters are 
fond of predicting such consequences from majority opinions with 
which they disagree.538  Majority opinions tend to respond with 
confident assurances that the supposed consequences will never 
materialize, or alternatively with reservation of judgment.539  Again, 
                                                          
 537. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (regarding the constitutionality of physician-assisted suicide for 
terminally ill medical patients, the concurring opinion noted that “[t]he case for the 
slippery slope is fairly made out here, . . . because there is a plausible case that the 
right claimed would not be readily containable”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
314-15 (1987) (considering a study which showed evidence of racially biased capital-
sentencing procedures, the Court noted that “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical 
conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire 
criminal justice system”). 
 538. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 553 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) 
(contending that the Court “hit the bottom of the slippery slope”); Bates v. St. B. of 
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 405 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that “once the 
Court took the first step down ‘the slippery slope’ . . . the possibility of 
understandable and workable differentiations between protected speech and 
unprotected speech in the field of advertising largely evaporated”). 
 539. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 195 
n.16 (1999) (dismissing “the dissent’s suggestion that if the merely voter eligible are 
included among petition circulators, children and citizens of foreign lands will not 
be far behind.  This familiar parade of dreadfuls calls to mind wise counsel:  ‘Judges 
and lawyers live on the slippery slope of analogies’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 169 (1990))); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852 (1986) 
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both sides are speculating, and it is often difficult to determine which 
position has merit.  We know that rules do sometimes have 
undesirable collateral consequences, but we also know that similar 
past claims of impending disaster have materialized far less often 
than predicted.540 
Foreign constitutional precedent can give us some insight into the 
slipperiness of the slope or the horror of the parade.541  Were the 
nations that adopted the rule forced to face an array of thorny 
collateral questions?  Did they find the temptation of further 
extrapolation irresistible?  Did collateral consequences of the rule 
overwhelm them?  Did the predicted horrors materialize?  From 
foreign experience we can gauge how likely it is that adoption of a 
proposed constitutional rule will have similar consequences in the 
United States. 
V. IMPLEMENTING COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS:  THE 
IMPORTANCE OF ADVOCACY AND THE ROLE OF LEGAL EDUCATION 
If American courts accept the theoretical utility of comparative 
constitutional analysis, the next questions concern implementation.  
Which foreign systems should be consulted?  How should relevant 
foreign precedent be assembled and evaluated?  How should its 
meaning and application be determined? 
Underlying these questions is a concern, often raised by critics of 
comparative constitutional analysis, that without clear rules governing 
the comparative method, comparative constitutional reasoning will 
unravel into an arbitrary and sporadic process that is more useful for 
rhetorical effect or erudite window-dressing than for rigorous and 
consistent analysis.542  Following Chief Justice Roberts, one might call 
this the “friend in the crowd” problem.543 Because of this concern, 
some scholars advocate complex metaprinciples governing the use of 
comparative constitutional law.544  Without such principles, these 
                                                          
(acknowledging the potential problems with importing “concepts of pendent or 
ancillary jurisdiction into the agency context,” the majority nevertheless “decline[d] 
to endorse an absolute prohibition on such jurisdiction out of fear of where some 
hypothetical ‘slippery slope’ may deposit us”). 
 540. See Frederick Schaver, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 381 (1985) (noting 
that nearly every time one party makes a slippery slope argument, the opposition 
could do the same). 
  541.  MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 127. 
 542. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 17, at 81 (arguing that unguided use of 
comparative precedent will reveal its use as a cover for a pre-determined agenda). 
 543. Roberts Hearing, supra note 18, at 201 (“[L]ooking at foreign law for support is 
like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends.”). 
 544. See Ramsey, supra note 17, at 82 (cautioning that comparative 
constitutionalism may be unworkable). 
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scholars fear that comparative constitutionalism will ultimately do 
more harm than good. 
These arguments are overdrawn.  By layering a blanket of rules 
regarding legal method, they make the process of using comparative 
precedent unnecessarily cumbersome.  More importantly, they 
ignore the influential role of counsel and the issue-sharpening 
function of adversarial advocacy, which together ought to serve as an 
adequate safeguard against misplaced reliance on foreign precedent.  
To borrow Holmes’ famous dichotomy, experience, not logic,545 ought 
to determine what foreign precedent is used and how it is given 
effect.  American advocates, after all, are not as clueless about 
comparative advocacy as some of the comparative constitutional 
theorists assume.  Comparative advocacy is a well-established 
component of appellate advocacy, especially in federal circuit and 
state appellate courts.546  In many states, it is routine for courts to 
receive briefing on the treatment of a novel legal question by other 
jurisdictions.547  Counsel are adept both at identifying relevant law 
from other states and at arguing adversarially about its significance. 
Although most American advocates do not have much experience 
with inter-nation comparative analysis, they can secure guidance 
about its contours both from the work of comparative scholars and 
from the comparative methods of foreign courts.  The work of the 
South African constitutional court is particularly instructive.  When 
South Africa adopted a new constitution following the collapse of 
apartheid, it explicitly drew on the constitutional experience of other 
nations.548  In recognition, the South African Constitution explicitly 
                                                          
 545. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the 
law has not been logic:  it has been experience.”). 
 546. See Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue, supra note 355, at 39 (noting that federal 
circuit and state courts have been learning from transnational and international 
decisions). 
 547. See, e.g., People v. Djordjevic, 584 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) 
(considering decisions of Pennsylvania and California courts in a case of first 
impression under Michigan law); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412-16 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc) (considering decisions of “sister states” on similar issues when 
resolving a case of first impression under Missouri law), aff’d sub nom., Cruzan v. Dir. 
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Dubick v. Dubick, 653 S.W.2d 652, 653 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (examining the views of other states when considering a 
proposed rule). 
 548. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 306, at 191 (“[T]he South African constitutional 
text was modeled largely on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, with 
liberal borrowings from Germany and the United States of America.”); Jeremy 
Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa’s Bill of Rights 
and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 177 (1998) 
(noting that borrowing is a trend among emerging democracies); MARKESINIS & 
FEDTKE, supra note 35, at 27 (stating that South Africa’s constitutional drafters “not 
only used comparative law themselves when drafting the two Constitutions of 1993 and 
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authorizes comparative analysis for interpreting South African 
constitutional guarantees.549  Taking this directive seriously, the South 
African constitutional court has developed a reliable method for 
identifying and evaluating relevant foreign precedent.550  This 
method, supplemented by comparative scholarship, can supply 
American advocates with a basic model for the correct approach to 
comparative constitutional advocacy. 
From these sources emerge a few simple, basic guidelines for the 
selection of appropriate comparative material.  Advocates should 
confine their research to foreign systems that function as 
constitutional democracies.  Within this group they should look for 
systems with:  (1) roughly similar constitutional structures, 
(2) comparable legal norms, (3) professionally trained and 
reasonably independent tribunals, (4) transparent and impartial 
adjudicative processes, and (5) some degree of final decisional 
authority.551  For many foreign systems reciprocity⎯the willingness of 
the foreign tribunal to consider U.S. constitutional precedent⎯can 
also serve as a reliable index of potential relevancy.552 
Beyond this baseline, the rest of the process for determining which 
particular foreign decisions are most relevant and how they ought to 
be used should be left to the adversarial process.  This is, after all, the 
process for domestic precedent.  Despite the importance of 
precedent in judicial decisionmaking, there are remarkably few strict 
rules about what precedent advocates should cite or how precedents 
should be used.  Instead, we rely on the adversarial process to isolate 
and identify the most pertinent material.  An advocate who omits an 
important case, statute, or ruling does so at her peril, because her 
opponent is likely to take advantage of the omission.  An advocate 
who places too much weight on an isolated precedent risks having 
her argument deflated when her opponent exposes the weakness of 
her position.  Courts thus learn from the arguments of the parties 
                                                          
1996, but also felt that the judiciary . . . should be alerted to the rich bounty of 
foreign courts venturing into the uncharted waters of South African human rights 
protection”) (emphasis in original). 
 549. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, § 39(1)(b), (c) (providing that in interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court “must consider international law” and “may consider foreign law”). 
 550. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Chronicling a Movement:  20 Years of Lesbian/Gay 
Law Notes, 17 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 415, 544 (2000) (discussing the South African 
Constitutional Court’s analysis of foreign precedent in decisions regarding sexual 
orientation and marital status). 
 551. See Young, supra note 182, at 161 (encouraging courts to look to foreign 
jurisdictions most similar to the United States). 
 552. See also Ramsey, supra note 17, at 77 (noting that differing constitutional 
guarantees in comparative analysis opens U.S. courts to charges of selectively using 
foreign precedent). 
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what precedent to value and how much weight it can bear.  There is 
no reason to treat comparative precedent differently.  Good 
advocacy, not lots of rules, will enable courts to determine what 
comparative constitutional precedent counts, how much it counts, 
and for what it counts. 
This reliance on adversarial advocacy presumes competent 
advocates, a presumption that is linked directly to the need for high 
quality legal education.  Unless American lawyers are trained by 
American law schools to find and use foreign law, including foreign 
constitutional law, American lawyers will never be competent 
comparative constitutional advocates.  And unless American lawyers 
develop competency as comparative advocates, comparative 
constitutionalism will never advance beyond its current occasional 
and largely cosmetic role.  Without training and competence, 
advocates are unlikely to incorporate comparative constitutionalism 
at the early stages of litigation where it can make the greatest 
difference.  Nor will the courts trust counsel to frame accurately the 
relevant comparative issues or debate their significance.  Without 
changes in legal education, comparative analysis will never play more 
than a minor non-structural role in U.S. constitutional adjudication. 
Existing patterns of comparative constitutional advocacy illustrate 
the competency-based barriers to comparative constitutionalism.  In 
most cases⎯including many where relevant material could be 
introduced⎯comparative constitutional analysis never appears at all.  
In the exceptional cases where it does figure, it usually occurs late in 
the litigation, at higher appellate levels of review.  Sometimes 
comparative material gets introduced only when the case arrives in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  The most likely reason for this late 
introduction is that the attorneys who first handled the case in the 
trial court simply did not know, think about, or look for relevant 
comparative constitutional law.  Only in the late stages of appellate 
litigation, when the stakes were raised and the parties or their allied 
amici curiae called in sophisticated appellate counsel, did foreign 
constitutional material enter into the briefing process.  By that point 
the foreign precedent necessarily came as an add-on.  The pleadings 
were fixed, the issues were framed, the facts were developed, the 
record was set, and the lower court decisions⎯probably the most 
influential sources for ultimate resolution⎯were taken, all without 
regard to any pertinent foreign constitutional law.  To be used at all, 
foreign precedent had to fit in around this existing framework, as 
either a complement or supplement to the advocacy that had already 
set the course and momentum for the decision. In circumstances like 
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these, it should be no surprise that comparative constitutional law 
seldom plays an influential role in the courts’ thinking.  In most cases 
it simply arrives too late in the process to have much impact. 
If there is to be a trend toward greater and more significant use of 
comparative constitutional precedent, it must begin in the earlier 
stages of litigation when there is greater potential for impact.  But 
this will not happen unless the advocates who file constitutional 
lawsuits, frame the pleadings, develop the facts, and do the 
spadework on the issues are able to incorporate comparative law into 
their thinking.553  This, in turn, will happen only if there are 
significant reforms in the way that legal research and advocacy are 
taught in American law schools.  What we need is a system that 
exposes most law students, rather than just a relative few, to research 
and advocacy training that utilizes foreign and international legal 
materials, including materials concerning foreign constitutional law.  
We need to do something in legal education to combat the American 
legal profession’s “comparative illiteracy.” 
What can be done?  First, there needs to be significant change in 
the way that law libraries and legal databases make comparative 
resources available.  Without raw materials, the comparative 
constitutional enterprise will stall at the starting gates.  Law libraries 
that do not presently acquire such materials need to begin doing so.  
Those that presently segregate them need to integrate them into 
their collections.  Legal research databases that do not include such 
materials need to make them available and more readily accessible.  
Where English versions are available they should be provided; where 
they are not, there should be efforts to increase the amount of 
translated material.  The aim should be to increase substantially the 
amount of comparative constitutional precedent for lawyers and law 
students to find. 
Second, there needs to be systematic instruction in research 
methods for comparative materials.  This instruction should be given 
not only to law students, but to practicing lawyers and even to law 
faculty.  Too few of us know how to find comparative materials, and 
the methods we use for domestic materials are unlikely to turn them 
up.  If we do not know how to find these materials, we will not go 
looking for them.  Thus, it is important to create some systematic and 
general instruction in legal research methods for comparative and 
                                                          
 553. See Slaughter, International Dimension, supra note 157, at 417 (“Law schools 
should be sending the message to all law students that a working knowledge of 
international law should be a basic part of any lawyer’s education in the 21st 
century.”). 
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international sources.  And there should be ample opportunities for 
putting comparative research skills into practice.  In time, 
comparative work should be incorporated into standard law school 
research and writing courses, so that all students get some exposure 
to the process of finding comparative law and precedent. 
Of course, just knowing how to find comparative sources does not 
mean they will be effectively used. Accordingly, there should be 
opportunities in law school for students to exercise comparative 
research skills by actually engaging in comparative advocacy.  The 
Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition provides 
one model.  Law schools could provide similar moot court 
competitions that would encourage student advocacy in comparative 
international law.  Unfortunately, however, such a specialized 
competition is likely to reach only a few students.  To reach a broader 
spectrum, comparative advocacy opportunities could be worked into 
required legal research and writing courses, school-wide moot court 
programs, and moot court competitions with a constitutional or 
human rights focus.  In these contexts it would be possible to select 
problems where comparative materials are available, make sure that 
students will be able to gain access to them, and make it clear to 
students that effective use of comparative materials will be an 
important component of their grade or score. 
Beyond efforts directed specifically at comparative advocacy, there 
should be more attention to comparative materials and their use in 
non-comparative doctrinal law school courses, particularly those 
concerning constitutional law and/or human rights.  For example, 
courses that could easily incorporate substantial comparative 
constitutional components include those on constitutional law, 
political and civil rights, civil procedure, criminal law and procedure, 
jurisdiction, immigration, labor and employment law, and property, 
as well as more explicitly international or comparative courses.  In 
these courses, instructors can encourage students to compare 
alternative solutions to common legal problems, explore their 
implications for basic constitutional values, and construct 
comparative arguments in class discussion and on examination 
papers.  These efforts would reinforce basic lessons about 
comparative reasoning and research to which they had been exposed 
in their legal research and writing courses. 
With such comprehensive attention to comparative research, 
analysis, and advocacy, it might be possible for law schools to reverse 
the longstanding trend toward comparative illiteracy in the American 
bar.  Doing so would increase the prospect for integrating 
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comparative constitutional analysis as a regular part of American 
constitutional advocacy and law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has probed the arguments for and against comparative 
constitutional analysis.  Despite the reactions against comparative 
analysis in conservative circles, the Senate, and the confirmation 
hearings of Chief Justices Roberts and Alito, the arguments for use of 
comparative constitutional precedent are stronger than the 
arguments against it.  Use of such precedent is consistent with the 
American legal method, and it provides significant benefits that 
would improve the quality of American constitutional 
decisionmaking.  Arguments against it based on theories of social 
contract, claims of improper delegation and appeals to original 
intent ultimately fail, while arguments based on American 
exceptionalism and pragmatic concerns affect the weight to be given 
to comparative precedent, not its use. 
The key to comparative constitutional advocacy’s future, however, 
lies with legal education.  Unless comparative research techniques 
and comparative analysis achieve greater prominence in American 
legal education, advocates will lack the skills that are needed to make 
sophisticated and effective comparative constitutional arguments, 
and the role of comparative precedent will remain largely cosmetic.  
With significant change in legal education, the forces of globalization 
and constitutional convergence, as well as the growing sophistication 
of foreign constitutional law, promise both greater and more effective 
use of comparative constitutional analysis in the future.  This steady 
erosion of American constitutional isolation is probably inevitable.  It 
should be welcomed and encouraged, not resisted. 
 
